NATURE OF CASE
Appellants Warren H. Noffsinger, individually and doing business as Rush Creek Ranch; Terry B. Noffsinger, doing business as Rush Creek Ranch; Warren, Terry, and Thomas H. Noffsinger, as cotrustees of the Audrey M. Noffsinger Trust; J.R. Brown; and BSM Technologies, Inc., filed an appeal from the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer of аppellee Nebraska State Bar Association. Appellants filed a petition *186 alleging negligence by appellee, through the conduct of the Counsel for Discipline, in failing to investigate the misconduct of former attorney Terrence D. Malcom. Aрpellants claim that this failure resulted in Malcom’s later conversion of appellants’ money. The trial court sustained appellee’s demurrer on the ground that appellants did not have standing to sue and did not rule on the other grounds. Appellants filed an appeal from this order. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer.
BACKGROUND
Appellants allege that they were clients of Malcom, an attorney practicing law in Red Willow County, Nebraska, in 1995 and 1996. Noffsingers allege that on December 15, 1995, and January 4, 1996, Malcom received funds in his capacity as their attorney and that those funds were illegally converted to the use of Malcom, thereby permanently depriving Noffsingers of those funds in the sum of $245,000. Brown alleges that on July 3, 1996, Brown delivered the sum of $150,000 to Malcom as Brown’s аttorney and that Malcom converted this money, thereby permanently depriving Brown of it. Noffsingers and Brown obtained judgments against Malcom in the sum of $245,000 and $150,000 respectively, but neither of these judgments has been paid.
Appellants allege that in September 1993, prior to the above-described events, the law firm where Malcom was a partner discovered that Malcom had been stealing money from the firm and immediately reported the theft to the Counsel for Discipline of appellee. According to appellants, the Cоunsel for Discipline failed to require Malcom to file an accounting after the reported theft from his law firm and no investigation was done of the alleged theft. Appellants claim that the Counsel for Discipline did not request trust account statements, even though the law firm had reported to him that it had reason to believe that Malcom was out of trust and had engaged in theft. Appellants allege that the Counsel for Discipline was acting within the scope and course of his employment with appellee and that he is charged by law with the responsibility of investigating the merits of the allegations and reporting his findings to the Supreme *187 Court so that an order of temporary suspension could be issued. Appellants allege that the Counsel for Discipline failed to fulfill this duty and that this failure allowed Malcоm to continue to practice law through 1996 without the public’s being informed of his criminal propensity. As a result, Malcom was in a position to and did convert appellants’ funds.
Appellee demurred to appellants’ petition on four grounds: (1)that appellants lаcked standing to sue, (2) that appellee and its employees and agents are immune from the claims set forth in the petition, (3) that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction of thе subject of this action. The trial court sustained appellee’s demurrer on the basis of standing but did not rule on the other grounds asserted. From this order, appellants filed an appeal.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Appellants claim as their sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in sustaining appellee’s demurrer.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In an appellate court’s review of a ruling on a demurrer, the court is required to accept as true all the facts which are well pled and the proper and reasonable inferences of law and fact which may be drawn therefrom, but not the conclusions of the pleader.
Danler
v.
Rosen Auto Leasing,
Where the record demonstrates that the decision of the trial court is correct, although such correctness is based on a different ground from that assigned by the trial court, the appellate сourt will affirm.
White
v.
Board of Regents,
ANALYSIS
Appellants argue that because the trial court sustained appellee’s demurrer on the basis of standing alone, this court should address only that issue on appeal. An order sustaining a demurrer will be affirmed if any one of the grounds on which it
*188
was asserted is well taken.
Drake
v.
Drake,
Appellee asserted immunity below as an alternative ground for demurrer. The asserted ground of immunity in this case is jurisdiсtional. See
King v. State,
Neb. Ct. R. of Discipline 22(B) (rev. 1996), regarding immunity and privileges, states that “[t]he Counsel for Disciрline, his or her representatives, and members of [the Disciplinary Review] Board and Committees [on Inquiry] shall be immune from suit for any conduct in the course of their official duties under these Rules.” The Counsel for Discipline’s immunity exists not merely by rule; rather it derives from the common-law immunity рossessed by judges for the performance of judicial functions. As a general rule, judges are immune from civil actions for damages for acts performed in the course of their official functions and judicial capacity.
Frey v. Blanket Corp.,
The question becomes whether thе functions of the Counsel for Discipline performed in this case are judicial functions. In determining whether to grant quasi-judicial immunity, courts examine the nature of the functions with which a particular official or class of officials has been lawfully entrusted and seek to evаluate the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions. Id.
To determine whether the Counsel for Discipline’s functions are judicial in nature, we must first determine their source. The Nеbraska Constitution vests the judicial power of the state in the Supreme Court. Neb. Const, art. II, § 1, and art. V, § 1. As we have stated previously, when the Supreme Court was created, it brought with it inherent powers, i.e., powers that are essential to the existence, dignity, and functions of the сourt from the very fact that it is a court.
In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass’n,
In exercising its inherent power to regulate the bar, this court uses the Counsel for Discipline for investigative purposes. The Counsel for Discipline has been given, among other things, the power to investigate allegations of misconduct, prepare and file charges of misconduct against attorneys, and dismiss charges. See Neb. Ct. R. of Discipline 8 (rev. 2000). The exercise of these powers and duties expressly involves discretion and judgment. See id. Thus, in performing his or her powers and duties, the Counsel for Discipline is performing a judicial function and is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Rule 22 is merely a recognition of the immunity he or she already pоssesses.
Were the Counsel for Discipline not granted immunity in performing his or her official duties, he or she would be a probable target for harassing lawsuits. See Simons v. Bellinger, supra. Indeed, because the Counsel for Discipline investigates and prosecutes only attorneys, who could use their familiarity with the legal process to explore vindication in other forums, the Counsel for Discipline would be a more likely target for litigation than judges or prosecutors. See id. Thus, immunity is an appropriate shield.
The question remains, however, whether the Counsel for Discipline was entitled to immunity for his aсtions in this case. Appellants allege that the Counsel for Discipline was negligent in failing to investigate the allegations of misconduct against Malcom. The investigation of attorney misconduct is at the core of the Counsel for Discipline’s official duties. Thus, the Counsel for Discipline was performing a judicial function, and it is about his performance of this function that appellants complain. Because the Counsel for Discipline is immune from suit for the performance of his official duties, he is thus entitled to quasi-judicial immunity in this case.
This determination is consistent with the case law in other jurisdictions. See,
Simons
v.
Bellinger, supra
(holding that members of committee on unauthorized practice of law were entitled to immunity because they were performing judicial function in determining who was authorized to practice law);
Sassower
v.
*191
Mangano, supra
(holding that because state disciplinary proceedings are judicial in nature, quasi-judicial immunity bars claims against members of state bar disciplinary and grievance committees);
Eston
v.
Van Bolt,
Because the Counsel for Discipline is immune, there cannot be vicarious liability on the part of appellee under аppellants’ sole theory of recovery.
In addition, appellee, as an arm of the Supreme Court, has quasi-judicial immunity in its own right. The instant case is similar to
Bailey
v.
Utah State Bar,
We further determine that the trial court’s action in dismissing appellants’ petition without granting leave to amend was correct. When a demurrer to a petition is sustained, a court must
*192
grant leave to amend the petition unless it is clear that no reasonable possibility exists that an amendment will correct the defect.
Gordon
v.
Community First State Bank,
CONCLUSION
We hold that the immunity granted to the Counsel for Discipline prevents suit against appellee for the alleged negligent acts of the Counsel for Discipline. We further determine that there is no reasonable possibility that an amendment to the petition could overcome appellee’s immunity. Because these determinations are dispositive of this case, it is not necessary to, and we do not, address the other grounds raised by appellee’s demurrer.
Affirmed.