The action is statutory ejectment. The land involved is a narrow strip described as follows: “All that part of the northwest quarter of section nine (9), toAvnskip sixteen (16), range eighteen, lying north of the Mt. Meigs road and Avest of the line dividing the east half from the Avest hálf of said quarter section and east of an irregular line beginning one
A great number of deeds were introduced in evidence, some as muniments of title and some as color of title and evidence of bona fide claim of title. The defendant objected to the introduction of a great number of these deeds in evidence chiefly on the ground that they were void for uncertainty in the description of the land attempted to be conveyed, and because they did not describe the land involved in the suit. Some of these were very indefinite and uncertain as to description, but there was evidence tending to show that actual.possession of the land in question was taken under these instruments, and that the land in question was actually held and claimed under these deeds; and hence they were admissible to show good faith in the taking and holding of possession thereunder, although the description was too uncertain to operate as muniment of title to the land in question, or to answer as color of title. For this reason, we find no reversible error in the admission of these instruments in evidence in connection with the other evidence to show good faith and claim of title to the land in question. It is unnecessary to notice each of these assignments as they all involve practically the same question, though the description in
The court, at the conclusion of the trial, gave the affirmative charge for the plaintiff. This was reversible error. There was ample evidence in this case to support a verdict and judgment for the defendant if the jury believed it; and the court should not have taken the question from the jury. The defendant’s evidence tended to show that he and those under whom he claims had been in the actual, open, notorious, and continuous possession of the land, under claim of right and title, for more than 30 years prior to the blunging of the suit. It was clearly open for the jury to infer that this possession was adverse to that of the plaintiff and of all the world, and that it had continued for such length of time as to ripen into title; and that this possession was of such character and of such duration as to raise the presumption of a grant. It is true that there was some evidence tending to show that Noble’s possession of the strip in question was not adverse, but that he was merely claiming to own up to the true boundary line which was unknown and uncertain; and that, while he was in the actual possession of the land in question, he was not claiming to own it if the true boundary line — when ascertained — showed that it was not a part of the tract claimed by him, and included within the description of his deedg. For this reason the general affirmative charge could not be given for the defendant.
If the jury believed this phase of the evidence, then Noble’s possession was not adverse; and, if they believed the evidence of the plaintiff’s surveyor, the lands in question were not included in Noble’s deeds, and for
This, in connection with other evidence of defendant’s witnesses, was sufficient to carry the question of title by adverse possession to the jury, and the court erred in giving the affirmative charge for plaintiff.
Reversed and remanded.
