Noble Drilling Services appeals the district court’s dismissal of its case pursuant to an arbitration clause incorporated into two agreements to which it was not a party. We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal and REMAND for proceedings on the merits in the district court.
I. Facts and Background
This case centers on Noble Drilling Services, Inc.’s (“Noble”) purchase of wire mooring rope from Bridón International, Ltd. and Bridon-Ameriean Corporation (collectively “Bridón”) through its distributor, Certex USA, Inc. (“Certex”). After various hurricanes hit the Gulf of Mexico, the United States Mineral Management Service required all drilling rigs in the gulf to enhance their moorings. To comply with that order, Noble decided to purchase new wire mooring ropes, and it approached Bridón and Certex about the possibility of buying wire ropes from Bridón. Noble alleges that Bridón 1 and Certex made various representations about the strength of Bridon’s ropes, and, based on these representations, Noble entered into a sales contract with Certex to purchase certain wire rope manufactured by Bridón. Certex is Bridon’s distributor pursuant to a distribution agreement (the “Distribution Agreement”) that expressly disclaims any intention to benefit any third party. 2 It also incorporates an arbitration clause.
To fulfill Noble’s order, Certex entered into purchase order agreements with Bridón (the “Purchase Order Agreements”) specifying the type of wire rope that Noble wanted and directed Bridón to ship that rope directly to Noble. The Purchase Order Agreements incorporate Bridon’s “terms and conditions.” Bridon’s “terms and conditions” include a provision as follows: “If at any time any dispute or difference arises out of or in connection with the contract, either party may give the other notice in writing of the existence of such dispute, or difference, and the same shall be referred to the arbitration of a person ....” No evidence suggests that Noble was ever furnished a copy of the Distribution Agreement, the Purchase Order Agreements, or any “terms and condi *472 tions” containing an arbitration clause pri- or to this litigation. For its part, Noble’s orders to Certex did not contain an arbitration clause. Indeed, Noble incorporated its own terms and conditions in its order to Certex, including a clause to the effect that Noble’s purchase order and incorporated terms and conditions represented the complete agreement of the parties.
After Noble installed the ropes, Hurricane Ike struck the Gulf of Mexico, and the ropes in question allegedly failed, such that Noble’s rigs were damaged. Noble brought this lawsuit alleging that Certex breached its sales contract with Noble by failing to deliver wire ropes of the quality and capacity represented. Noble alleged that Bridón was negligent in its design of the wire ropes. Noble also alleged that both Bridón and Certex: (1) breached their express warranty that the ropes would conform to the specifications represented to Noble; (2) breached an implied warranty of merchantability because the goods were not of fair or average quality, were not fit for their particular purpose, and did not meet the quality and performance levels represented to Noble; (3) were negligent and grossly negligent in making misrepresentations to Noble about the ropes; (4) engaged in fraud and fraudulently induced Noble into purchasing the ropes by making false representations to Noble; (5) were liable under redhibition, as defined by Louisiana law; and (6) violated the Louisiana Products Liability Act.
In the district court, Bridón and Certex moved to compel Noble to arbitrate its claims based on the arbitration clause incorporated in the Purchase Order Agreements and Distribution Agreement, even though Noble was not a party to those agreements. Bridón and Certex argued that Noble was bound under the theory of “direct benefits estoppel.” The district court found that Noble was bound to arbitrate its claims because its claims were premised on Bridon’s failure to perform according to the terms of the Purchase Order Agreements and that Noble received a direct benefit from those orders. It dismissed the case, 3 and Noble appealed to this court.
II. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s use of direct benefits estoppel to compel arbitration for an abuse of discretion.
4
See Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C.,
III. Discussion
Noble argues that the district court erred in finding that it was obligated to arbitrate its claims against Bridón and Certex under the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel. Noble contends that it was not a party to the contracts in question, was expressly excluded from those contracts, was not “either party” described in the arbitration clause, and was not relying upon the contracts in question for its lawsuit. “Direct-benefit estoppel involve[s] non-signatories who, during the life of the contract, have embraced the contract despite their non-signatory status but then, during litigation, attempt to repudiate the arbitration clause in the contract.”
Hellenic Inv. Fund, Inc. v. Det Norske Veritas,
Courts have applied direct benefits estoppel to bind a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement when the non-signatory knowingly exploits the contract containing the arbitration clause and obtains a direct benefit from that contract.
See Hellenic,
Noble alleges that it did not have any knowledge of the Purchase Order Agreements until after this litigation began. It argues that it “was never apprised of the existence, much less any specific terms, of the [Purchase Order Agreements].” Ap *474 pellees do not point to any evidence that Noble had any knowledge of the Purchase Order Agreements at the time Noble purchased and received the ropes, and the district court did not find that Noble had such knowledge. 5 Because no evidence supports a conclusion that Noble knew of the terms of the Purchase Order Agreements, Noble could not have the knowledge necessary to support the “knowingly exploited” theory of direct benefits estoppel.
As discussed above, the doctrine of direct benefits estoppel also applies when a non-signatory sues to enforce certain terms in a contract containing an arbitration clause,
Int’l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen GMBH,
As plaintiff, Noble is not required to base its claims on the Purchase Order Agreements and can, as it has, disclaim any reliance thereupon. Noble’s claims— by its own admission — rise or fall on the *475 pre-purchase representations and whatever duties a manufacturer and distributor have by law. We thus conclude that the theory of direct benefits estoppel is not applicable, and Noble is not obligated to arbitrate its claims.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of this case and REMAND for proceedings on the merits.
Notes
. Bridón contends that the only pre-purchase "representations” made to Noble were contained in Certex’s literature, not Bridon's own. We express no opinion about the merits of this assertion or Noble’s contrary position.
. The Distribution Agreement incorporated Bridon’s terms and conditions including the following: "The right whether past present or future pursuant to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act of 1999 (or otherwise) of any third party to enforce the terms of this contract is expressly excluded.” The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act of 1999 is a United Kingdom law that expressly grants parties rights similar to our "third-party beneficiary” status.
. Our court has not previously definitively decided whether Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(3) is the proper rule for motions to dismiss based on an arbitration or forum-selection clause.
Ambraco, Inc. v. Bossclip B.V.,
. Noble argues that our review is de novo. While this court generally reviews the grant or denial of arbitration de novo,
Garrett v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.,
. Moreover, Noble could not have had knowledge of the Purchase Order Agreements when it ordered the ropes from Certex because the Purchase Order Agreements were not created until after Noble ordered the ropes.
. Bridón asserts that
Int’l Paper Co.
is "on all fours with the circumstances at bar.” That case, however, involved a non-signatory who sought to enforce warranties found in a contract containing an arbitration clause.
Int’l Paper Co.,
.Hellenic
provides an example of this doctrine.