Nix v. SmithNix v. Smith
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is аn action to quiet title to two unimproved lots in Highland Park. The general taxes for the year 1958 on these lots were not paid, and the property was sold at a tax sale on February 29, i960, to a purchaser who subsequently assigned his interest to the defendant,' Margaret Smith. The property was not redeemed, and in accordance with section 266 of the Revenue Act of 1939, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 120, par. 747,) the defendant petitioned the county court of Lake County for the issuance of tax deeds. Thereafter, on March 2, 1962, orders were entered finding that the statutory requirements had been satisfied and directing the issuance of tax deeds. No appeal was taken from these orders. The defendant recorded her deeds on March 21, 1962. The present actiоn was commenced some six months later by the plaintiff, Joseph S. Nix, who was the record owner of the property in 1958. He seeks to have the defendant’s tax deeds set aside as clouds upon his title.
The plaintiff concedes that section 266 was fully complied with. His contention is that there were defects in connection with the original proceeding that culminated in the judgment and order of sale in i960 which nullified
The complaint alleged many defects which could have been presented to the court by way of defense to the collector’s application for judgment and order of sale. Since the case was decided in the circuit court, and while it was pending upon appeal, this court decided First Lien Co. v. Markle,
In view of the Markle case, the plaintiff now concentrates upon three objections, of which one goes to the jurisdiction of the court to enter the judgment and order of sale, and the others involvе matters that occurred subsequent to that judgment. The first objection is that there was no adequate description of the plaintiff’s property in the published notice, which is the process upon which the tax sale judgment was entered. The second is that thеre was no “precept,” or process authorizing the sale of the property, as required by section 239 of the Revenue Act of 1939. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 120, par. 720.) The third objection is that the judgment and order of sale was not entered in the colleсtor’s tax judgment, sale, redemption and forfeiture record, as is said to be required by section 232 of the Revenue Act of 1939. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 120, par. 713.) The defendant denied the allegation of the complaint concerning the insufficiency of the desсription of plaintiff’s property and admitted the factual allegations concerning the other two alleged defects. The circuit court held that none of the objections advanced by the plaintiff were available in this collateral аction and dismissed the complaint for want of equity. The plaintiff has appealed directly to this court. The case presents a question arising under the constitution of the United States and of this State.
Jurisdiction of the county collector’s application for judgment and order of sale is acquired by published notice. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, chap. 120, par. 706.) The plaintiff contends that the notice published in this case was defective in that his property was inadequately described, and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to order the sale of his property for nonpayment of taxes. He also contends that other defects, which relate to matters not mentioned in seсtion 266, occurred after the entry of the judgment and order of sale and prior to the filing of the petition under section 266, and that they also deprived the court of jurisdiction to order the issuance of the tax deeds. On the ground that the objections that he seeks to raise could not have been raised in the section 266 proceeding, he argues that unless he is permitted to raise them now, in this collateral proceeding, he has been deprived of due process of law.
Section 263 of the Revenue Act of 1939 describes the notices required to be given by a purchaser or his assignee, and provides that no “purchaser or assignee of such purchaser of real estate sold for non-payment of general taxes * * * shall be entitled to a deed” until he has given the notices required by that section. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap.
As pointed out by the plaintiff, this court stated in Young v. Madden,
For present purposes, however, the significant thing about these two cases is that neither of them involved an attack upon the jurisdiction of the court to entеr the original judgment of sale, or upon the steps taken by the county clerk or the collector after that judgment was entered. A judicial opinion is a response to the issues before the court, and these opinions, like others, must be read in the light of the issues that were before the court for determination. (14 Am. Jur. (Courts) sec. 79.) In Young v. Madden the only issues raised in the brief of the appellant in this court concerned the propriety of the action of the trial court in refusing extensions of time and continuаnces, alleged errors with respect to the admission of evidence, and a contention that the evidence failed to sustain the judgment. These are the issues to which this court’s opinion was addressed. Similarly, in First Lien Co. v. Markle,
The plaintiff asks us to read section 266 as though it prohibited the raising of any objection going to the jurisdiction of the court to issue a tax deed. The statute of course does not contain such a prohibition, and we are not concerned with possible objections to its validity that might arise if it did. It does emphasize compliance with the statutory obligations imposed upon a purchaser if he is to receive a deed. It could fairly be anticipated that those are the matters that would most frequently be raised at such a hearing. The fact that they are specifically enumerаted does not, in our opinion, mean that jurisdictional objections are precluded. It is axiomatic that such objections may be raised at any time, and the fact that the statute does not specifically mention them does not indicate an intention to bar them.
Baldly stated, the plaintiff’s position comes to this: A property owner who has not paid the taxes due upon his property may ignore personal notice that his property has been sold for taxes and that a deеd will issue unless he effects a redemption by a specified date. Then, perhaps years later, he may attack the validity of the tax deed, not upon the ground that his taxes had actually been paid or that the property was exempt from tаxation, but because some official involved in the taxing process has failed to perform his duty with meticulous perfection.
We think that neither the statute nor the requirements of due process of law require such a result. A property owner can hardly be heard to say that he is not aware that annual taxes are a recurrent charge against his property, and that his failure to meet his obligation increases the burden imposed upon other taxpayers.
If we assume that the original published notice was defective and that the appropriate officers did not take all
We hold, therefore, that section 266 afforded the plaintiff adequate opportunity upon appropriate notice to raise the objections now asserted and that the circuit court did not err in dismissing the complaint. The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.