39 F. 109 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York | 1889
(orally.) In Marvel v. Merritt, 116 U. S. 11, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207, the principle is laid down that where the words used íd a tariff act are not technical, either as having a special sense by commercial usage, or as having a scientific meaning different from their common meaning, they are the words of common speech, and as such their interpretation is within the judicial knowledge, and therefore matter of law. That case was one touching minerals, and the same rule must apply to vegetables. In Arthur v. Morrison, 96 U. S. 108, the proposition is laid down that when the legislature adopts such language to define and promulgate their action the just conclusion must be that they not only themselves comprehend the meaning of the language, but choose it with regard to those for whom it is designed to constitute a rule of commerce, namely, the community at large. The community at large, of course, are the people of the United States. In the absence, however, of any evidence tending to show a different acceptation of words elsewhere than what we find in the community residing in this particular district, or of any knowledge on the part of the court that there is such different acceptation, it will be assumed that the use of the words is the same throughout the community at large. With regard to this particular community, the word “vegetable,” in its popular and received meaning, is used to cover a class of articles which includes tomatoes, and the word “fruit,” irrespective of what the dictionaries may lay down as to its botanical or technical meaning, is not in common speech used to cover tomatoes. For these reasons I shall direct a verdict in favor of the defendant.
The jury found a verdict for the defendant as directed by the court.
