Nix v. CHILTON COUNTY COM'NNix v. CHILTON COUNTY COM'N
Nina Faye Nix sued the Chilton County Commission for damages, alleging that she incurred personal injury and property damage when her automobile collided with a roadsweeper being operated by the Commission. A jury returned а verdict for the Commission. Nix appealed.
On appeal, Nix argues that counsel for the Commission exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. Specifically, Nix contends that when she raised an objection pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), to the Commission‘s use of a peremptory strike аgainst a potential black juror, the trial judge failed to acknowledge her objection or to determine whether she had made a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. Instead of conducting a Batson hearing, the trial judge held that before it was required to determine whether Nix had made a prima faсie case of racial discrimination, it must be affirmatively shown that this was a racially disproportionаte jury. The trial court determined that that had not been shown and, therefore, that the Commission was not requirеd to give a race-neutral reason for its peremptory strike. Nix contends that this was error, and we аre satisfied that it was.
We acknowledge that some case-law language may have led the trial сourt to its conclusion. In Harrell v. State, 571 So.2d 1270, 1271 (Ala.1990) (”Harrell II“), the Court stated that “[w]hen the evidence shows only that blacks were struck and that а greater percentage of blacks sat on the jury than sat on the lawfully established venire, an inferеnce of discrimination has not been created.” 571 So.2d at 1271. Then, in Ex parte Thomas, 659 So.2d 3 (Ala.1994), the
Nix made a proper and timely Batson objection. Specifically, Nix objеcted to the Commission‘s use of a peremptory strike against the sole remaining black juror, but the reversible error occurred when the trial court held that the Commission was not required to give a race-neutral reason until Nix had affirmatively shown that the venire was a disproportionate venire. The trial court never reached the Batson hearing stagе, and consequently, no initial determination was made as to whether Nix had made a prima facie showing of discrimination. Therefore, we must reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case for a Batson hearing.
Although we need not reach the Batson quеstion for the disposition of this case, we are satisfied that there has been some confusion in both the trial courts and the appellate courts regarding the application of Batson. Much of that confusion exists because of a misunderstanding of the basic holding in Batson, which was to prohibit “purposeful discrimination,” a factual determination that Batson left to the trial court.
In Batson, the “purposeful discrimination” was practiced by the prosecutiоn in a case involving a black defendant; in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), the Batson principle was applied to a white defendant, holding that while an individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, he or she does have the right nоt to be excluded from a jury on account of race; in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660 (1991), Batson was applied to parties in civil cases; in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992), Batson was extended to apply to prohibit сriminal defendants from engaging in purposeful discrimination; and, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), Batson was extended to apply to gender-based strikes.
Through this evolution of the Batson principle, the fundamental object of that principle did not change—it was to prevent purposeful discrimination in the jury selection proсess, to protect the integrity of the jury system, and to foster public confidence in that system. Batson specifiсally recognized that the duty of ensuring the elimination of “purposeful discrimination” was the duty of the trial court.
Nix requests that this Court grant her a new trial rather than remand this case, because the defense has now had the benefit of time and review of the record on appeal to aid in the formulation of race-neutral explanations. We decline to do so. Instead, we reverse the judgment and remand this cаse to the trial court, noting that it is within the trial court‘s discretion to determine whether a new trial is in order.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON and BUTTS, JJ., concur.
HOUSTON, J., concurs in the result.
HOUSTON, Justice (concurring in the result).
I cоncur in the result. I agree to remand to allow the Chilton County Commission to give the trial court its reasons for striking juror 100 (W.H.). I would point out, in the interest of judicial economy, that if the County Commission‘s reasons are the same as those set out on pages 13-15 of the County Commission‘s brief and if the trial court finds that these reasons are rаcially neutral, then I would be bound by the principle set forth in
“`It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to detеrmine if peremptory challenges of black jurors were motivated by intentional racial discrimination. The court‘s findings in this regard are afforded great deference and will not be reversed on appeal absent clear error.‘”
(Emphasis added.)
In such a case, Ms. Nix would have the burden of showing that the trial court‘s action was clear error. The word “clear” is defined in Black‘s Law Dictionary 250 (6th ed. 1990) as: “Obvious; beyond reasonable doubt; perspicuous; plain.”