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Nissho-Iwai American Corporation v. R. Sukarno Kline, Individually and D/B/A Frankenburg Import-Export Ltd.
845 F.2d 1300
5th Cir.
1988
Check Treatment

*1 CORPORA AMERICAN NISSHO-IWAI Plaintiff-Appellee, TION, KLINE, Individually and

R. Sukarno Import-Export Frankenburg

d/b/a Defendants-Appellants. Ltd., 87-2902.

No. Appeals, Court States

United Circuit.

Fifth

May 1988. Rehearing

Opinionon Denial 5,1988.

July

pipe for which willing pay Pemex was approximately million. $5.2 To obtain assistance locating a manu- pipe Pemex, facturer of for resale to Kline agreement entered into an with Aston Oil- Supply (“Aston”) princi- field Co. and its Neal, pals, Richard Douglas, Cliff and Bud (“the group”). Franklin Aston Under this agreement, Aston and each became fifty percent Frankenburg of owners Im- port-Export Limited (“Frankenburg-Cay- man”), Cayman a Island corporation Sulkow, R. Birnbach and Martin Howard supplier formed to locate a to fill the Pe- City, for R. New York Sukarno Kline and purchase mex order. Frankenburg Import-Export. February 1980, In agreed after Pemex Galvin, John, Paul E. Kathleen J. St. price a increase consonant with world mar- Tex., Dallas, plaintiff-appellee. prices, negotiations ket between Aston group representatives and of appellee Nis- (“Nissho”) sho-Iwai American Co. resulted agreement a sales confirmation accord- 92,- to which Nissho contracted to sell POLITZ, SMITH, Before and KING pipe Frankenburg-Cayman meters Judges. Circuit approximately agree- million. $5.6 This SMITH, Judge: JERRY E. Circuit contingent ment made pay- was on a direct arrangement ment that would be consum- appeal In this from a final mated between Pemex and the Bank incorporating partial a summary judgment Tokyo, where Nissho was a customer. liability, appellants on the issue of Rukmini Frankenburg Sukarno Kline Import- and In payment arrange- June a direct Export Ltd. contend that the court below Nissho, ment was finalized between Pe- abused reinstating its discretion in not mex, and Richard Neal on Frank- behalf of pleadings, their a stricken state court enburg-Cayman. so-called Box This “Lock Appellants to removal of this case. Agreement” provided that Pemex would also contrary finding to a below— assert — company issue million made $5.6 check competent evidence the record is payable Frankenburg-Cayman’s raise precluding issues material fact it to a box in York send lock New summary judgment. We AFFIRM. Tokyo the control Bank of Company. Trust I. meantime, In Kline sent a letter Appellant Rukmini Tokyo Company Sukarno Kline Trust autho- Bank (“Kline”) appellant was sole owner of rizing it to collect Pemex’s check and to Frankenburg (“Frank- Import-Export proceeds Ltd. credit the to Nissho’s account. enburg-Kansas”), corporation Assignment a Kansas She also executed an and Se- registered in Agreement Mexico as a middleman-suppli- curity behalf of Franken- on products er of steel In country. burg-Kansas, security granting Nissho a (“Pe- December Petróleos might Mexicanos from interest monies she receive mex”) accepted Kline’s to supply bid Pe- pursuant purchase Pemex to the Pemex 93,000 mex with some oil Agreement meters of steel This Security order. further pipe, field provided and March 1979 pay- forwarded that she would receive such Frankenburg-Kansas purchase order ment Nissho as “trustee” for and deliver (hereinafter order”) “the purchase Pemex immediately comming- “without thereafter requesting types quantities various ling.” moved the state court process. Kline twice shipped Nissho June Throughout orig- pleadings, delivered motions to reinstate pipe to Veracruz shipping doc- lading and other inal bills denied. were Frankenburg-Cayman. These uments August impleaded Pemex to Pemex were forwarded documents party defendant and removed the as a third could issue Before

June 26. The federal district court. follow- case to *3 knowledge however, the check, and without (i.e., month, rein- Kline moved to amend Nissho, to the Hous- Kline sent a letter of state) court pleadings. Before the instructing Pemex to of Pemex ton office motion, Nissho for rule on this moved could Frankenburg- payable to check its make summary grounds that up partial judgment pick for her to hold it and to Kansas possession of of also demanded all Kline’s personally. presupposed She reinstatement representing ti- shipping documents of argued, among the other Nissho defenses. responded that it Pemex pipe. to the tle liability things, had incurred for that Kline Agreement Box the Lock under was bound proceeds of the check the amount York, to New and could check to the send security and the sales confirmation both receiving first without do otherwise reply response agreements. In to Kline’s Nissho and Frank- from joint instructions motion, objected Nissho to Nissho’s thereupon insisted enburg-Cayman. linchpin sum- affidavit—the of her Kline’s had purchase order original Pemex that mary judgment proof unsworn. —as Frankenburg-Kansas, mak- been issued 1983, granted In Nis- October company its sole owner. ing her and, from the in a writ- sho’s motion bench 1980, 7, August capitulated. On 5,1984, July declared as its ten order dated $5,584,392.04 pay- was issued for check plaintiff’s in rationale “the reasons stated ship- Frankenburg-Kansas, and able Meanwhile, moving papers.” Kline’s mo- placed at dis- Kline’s ping documents were post- tion to file an amended answer August Kline went Pe- posal. On office, parties to rebrief the possession poned of to enable the took mex's Houston documents, exchanged them for issue; and subsequently denied this motion was deposited She it in Franken- the check. pro- 1983. The case then on December Manhat- burg-Kansas’s account with Chase damages, the issue of ceeded trial on promptly in Bank New York and with- tan resulting judgment for money in a Nissho.1 proceeds. Approximately $1.5 drew brief, correctly points out In Nissho spent personal as her million she later appellants cannot secure a reversal that funds, rest in an as- and the she secreted (1) unless determine this case we yet-undisclosed Lichenstein or Swiss bank. in not district court abused its discretion January This lawsuit ensued. In their de- permitting appellants to reinstate petition Nissho filed its in Texas state dis- fenses, (2) defenses, if such rein- and alleging against trict court counts Kline for stated, pre- raise issues of material fact contract, fraud, misappropri- breach of cluding summary judgment. we now Since significant of trust funds. The as- ation did not abuse its hold that the district court pect proceedings pur- the state court summary appellants’ discretion and that poses appeal judge’s of this the state incompetent, affirm judgment proof is we 7, 1981, striking December Kline’s court without judgment defenses and counterclaims their entire- ty abusing discovery reaching appellants’ sanction the merit defenses. $5,584,- man, remaining parties companies, 1. The had settled and the two Aston agreed $535,000.00 against damages; trial: Nissho to dismiss its claims in attor- 392.04 in actual Franklin, Neal, Whalen, International, Douglas; fees; $4,703,080.24 Aston pre-judgment neys’ Inc., Supply, and Aston Oilfield interest, $10,822,472.28 post- plus for a total of Inc., agreed entry against judgment them Only Kline and Franken- interest. Judgment in favor of Nissho. July In its Final appeal burg-Kansas from the filed the instant 24, 1987, Nissho, against the court awarded Judgment below. Final Kline, Frankenburg-Kansas, Frankenburg-Cay- Foods, In Granny II. Goose Supreme interpreted Court section give 1450to inter- appeal raised this is wheth- One issue locutory state court greater orders no is owed to an interlocu- er deference “force and effect” they than would have a case tory state court order once has been obtained had the case remained state determining removed to federal court. 436-37, court. 415 U.S. at 94 S.Ct. at permit appellants reinstate their not to Rather, 1122-23. by ensuring these orders pleadings, the district court de- stricken lapse upon removal, do not imposition statute fa- ferred to the state court’s cilitates the federal being “supported by taking court’s such sanction as case up Additionally, “where the record.” the district court state court left it off.” Id. considered itself bound to do so 94 S.Ct. at (quoting Duncan v. “spirit (11 and letter” both 28 U.S.C. 1450 Gegan, Otto) U.S. Supreme interpretation and the Court’s (1882)). L.Ed. 875 The federal court ac Foods, Granny thereof in Goose Inc. v. cepts the posture case its current “as *4 Teamsters, 423, 415 Brotherhood U.S. though everything done in state court had 1113, (1974). 94 S.Ct. 39 L.Ed.2d 435 Lan- in fact been done in the federal court.” guage opinion Granny Goose Foods Ry., 377, Savell v. Southern 93 F.2d 379 figuring prominently in the district court’s (5th Cir.1937) (construing Duncan v. Ge analysis states that section 1450 was de- end, gan). In the judicial economy is signed interlocutory to ensure “that orders by eliminating served duplica- the need for by protect entered the state court that proceedings tive in federal court. Granny rights parties lapse various of the will not Foods, 436-37, Goose 415 U.S. at 94 S.Ct. 437, upon removal.” 415 U.S. at 94 S.Ct. at at 1122-23. here, question however, 1123. The is not Accordingly, where as in present lapse during the order whether will transi- ruling case the state purely court’s is inter- court, rather, tion from state to federal but locutory, subject it remains to reconsidera- origin in

whether its state court sets it just tion as it had been to removal. apart any interlocutory from order a feder- General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & may al court decide to reconsider. 261, Michigan 267, Ry., Southern 260 U.S. below, For reasons stated we decline to (1922). 43 S.Ct. 67 L.Ed. 244 imposing comity read section 1450 as re- “Had the cause remained in the state court straints, agree and we thus with Kline that power to reconsider would have been Granny prede- Goose Foods mandates no court, that but when the removal was made termined level deference which a federal power passed with the cause to the reconsidering court must observe in in- an District Court.” Id. terlocutory However, state court order. accept we do not Kline’s conclusion that hand, On the other it is well estab the federal court abuses its discretion lished that state court order becomes whenever, below, permits as was done it federal, federalized insofar as rather than the state court order to stand on the basis state, procedure governs the manner of its of the developed by record the state court. supplies enforcement as well as whatever Interlocutory state court policy justification might support orders are kept upon in force removal of Foods, a ease to Granny continuance. 415 Goose by federal court 438-41, 1123-25; 28 U.S.C. U.S. at 94 at see § S.Ct. pertinent part states: Azzopardi Drilling also & Ex Ocean Co., (5th ploration

Whenever 742 F.2d 895 Cir. action is removed from a 1984). state court to a To the extent the court order district court of the state Unit- injunctions, orders, requires parties ed States ... to act or refrain from [a]ll proceedings acting other had in such action a manner inconsistent with feder shall remain in procedural full force and al requirements, effect until the district dissolved or modified court to fed must accommodate the order court. Foods, eral Granny law. Goose 415 U.S. 37(b)(2) procedure; Fed.R.Civ.P. federal 1124-25 & n. at S.Ct. & n. 439-41 federal court specifically authorizes a 15.2 pleadings party of a out who strike removed, is sum, case whenever comply discovery with its or- refuses to are trans- court orders

interlocutory state Thus, scope is of our review ders.3 of 28 U.S.C. by operation § formed determining this choice limited whether district court of the federal into orders court choice the district of sanctions—a The district is removed. action which the by operation of 28 U.S.C. adopted the order thereupon free treat is court an discretion abuse of 1450—constitutes interlocutory it any such itas would jurisprudence. Rule under federal might itself have entered. If, example, appears that the discretion of a federal district The inconsistent imposed sanctions court state impose sanctions under Rule standards, federal court federal with 37(b)(2) “broad but unlimited.” fettered considerations not be should Inc., Industries, Fenick Emerick v. developing independently from deference Cir.1976). We have F.2d dissolving modifying or then record and emphasized a dismissal repeatedly order, may re the circumstances remedy, or prejudice is a “draconian” with however, policy of Conversely, quire. resort,” last to be em “remedy Granny economy promoted judicial comply only when the failure ployed against impos mitigates our Foods Goose from wilfull the court’s order results with obligation courts to on the district an *5 than from an ina or faith rather ness bad of the de novo conduct a determination deliberate, Nevertheless, comply.4 bility to carried court sanctions propriety state discovery orders repeated obey to refusals upon removal to federal the case with the of this held to warrant use have been court, is every an order contest time such See, Sciambra, su e.g., ultimate sanction. perfectly free is to ed. The district court Kabbe, supra; v. But pra; Bonaventure the adopt court record as basis the state Cir.1979). 625, (5th ler, 626 We 593 F.2d challenged or sustaining state court for a is not our are further mindful “[i]t der, by the court below. as was done say reviewing responsibility as a court to a more would have chosen whether we moreover, case, present the In the responsibility It our moderate sanction. under no affirmative obli district court was court solely to decide whether magnitude of the gation to harmonize the discretion, could, the in determined its have imposed panoply the of sanc sanction with to flagrant to so appellant’s conduct be tions available for the same abuse under 439-41, Foods, day Granny Supreme at 94 S.Ct. Court after removal. 415 U.S. 2.In Goose the question effect 28 at 1124-25. confronted the of U.S. temporary restraining order §C. 1450 on a 37(b)(2)(C) pertinent provides in 3. Fed.R.Civ.P. (TRO) to issued in California state part: held, all, Supreme removal. The Court first provide party obey ... an order If fails any greater the that since order does obtain discovery permit ... the court in which or if the case had effect than it would have had pending may orders in action is make such court, lapse remained state order would just, among regard are failure as time, court, just as it would state without striking following: order out others the [a]n affirmatively taking for- federal court’s parts pleadings or thereof.... 433-36, mal dissolve it. 415 U.S. 94 action The held S.Ct. at 1121-23. Court next no See, Co., e.g., 4. News 841 Sciambra Graham longer event would the order remain in force 651, (default pursuant judgment 655 F.2d imposed than the time limitations Fed.R.Civ. produce doc- 37 affirmed for failure Rule TRO’s, 65(b) Cir.1988); P. on federal measured from the uments) (5th Speloe Neal Batson v. Thus, although 511, Cir.1985) Associates, Inc., (5th date of removal. California F.2d 516 League Hockey TRO would have remained in effect in state (citing Club, Hockey v. Metro National removal, 2778, 2779, days beyond Inc., court for 13 the date of 96 S.Ct. 427 U.S. Mosle, 65(b) (1976)); 10-day time limitation Rule caused v. Rotan 49 L.Ed.2d Inc., Kabbe 1083, Cir.1985). lapse the order to federal court on the tenth F.2d Emerick, striking pleadings.” carry decided to justify Nissho’s motion yet until date, F.2d at 1381. again ordering later once Kline to appear deposition for produce her cer- deliberately The that Kline record shows documents, tain scheduled to occur on No- repeatedly court orders violated state vember 2. produce subpoenaed doc- requiring her to questions relating to uments and answer appear Kline did not for this court-or- of the Pemex check whereabouts deposition. dered Nor did attorneys her deposition her was noticed funds.5 When notify opposing counsel of her “inability” 8,1981, May protective she for a for moved to attend.7 Kline’s merely prof- counsel order, court denied and state erred unsworn answers to thirty-four appear deposition her ordered her' to for questions she had been ordered to answer. produce subpoenaed documents. and to requested The documents were not includ- 8, ordered, May appeared as On but ed. On November the state court held produced requested neither documents hearing the show cause and determined questions nor answered Nissho’s about the pleadings that Kline’s should be stricken. check funds. We find no abuse discretion. September the state court or- appear

dered Kline to a court re- before porter thirty-four on October answer III. questions she had refused to answer dur- Our need to reach the substantive produce and to certain appellants’ merit of and de counterclaims enumerated documents that had been with- fenses is obviated for ap another reason: ap- held. On October Kline neither pellants’ failure to resist Nissho’s motion peared any explanation nor offered for her partial so, summary judgment prompting compe with failure to do Nissho to move entry judgment against summary judgment of a default tent evidence. At the thereupon her.6 The state court issued an time the court below ruled on Nissho’s requiring appear Kline to and show motion, only summary evidence in the why cause she should not be sanctioned. purporting justify record *6 appropriation Kline’s of the Pemex check On October Nissho’s motion funds was her rendition own of facts con present was heard. Kline was not because notarized, tained in a self-described “affida allegedly business, she was in Mexico on 8 attorneys and her vit.” This affidavit is neither sworn nor the meantime had for a moved continuance. The state court its contents stated to be true and correct However, argument, 5. As noted expert in oral Nissho was seri- Kline’s own medical conceded that, ously prejudiced by comply. hearing although Kline’s failure to at the show cause unable travel, Contemporaneously discovery requests, enough deposed with its to Kline was well to be mandatory injunction hearing Nissho had filed for a to in New York. by offer made No was at the place proceeds regis- deposi- the check into court’s Kline’s counsel to submit to further try theory. under a constructive trust tion in New York. injunction was able to block issuance of the so 8.Essentially, Kline’s version is that the Aston long as Nissho could not inform the court of the group conspired displace from the start to her money’s location. relationship in her business with Pemex. Nis- alleged agreed orally throughout sho is to have with Kline 6. Kline maintained this case that supply pipe knowledge to to fill an additional million $20 she had no of the state court’s order orders, purchase requiring appear worth of Pemex and then to posi- her to on October 8. This undermined, however, joined group’s conspiracy. by have in the Aston presence tion was afoot, apprised When by Kline became of what was of a letter written on her behalf a Mexican appropriated protect September stating she the check to her official in appear funds that she could not original entitlement to a commission under the on that date because she was to have an order, purchase compensate to her audience with the President of Mexico. We damages repudiation for caused Nissho’s thus find no abuse of discretion in the state alleged agreement disregarding its again, explanation. court’s oral with her. Once this opinion we offer no as to the substantive 7. Kline contends that she was unable to attend merit of these facts as a defense to Nissho’s the November 2 because of illness. cause of action. 1306 summary judgment.11 precluding fact issue penalty perjury.9 under nor stated exception to this rule exists statutory A defects, to objected these duly Nissho permits which un- 28 under U.S.C. § to opportunity Kline an giving thereby for an affi- declarations to substitute sworn affidavit file a corrected for leave move oath if the statement contained there- ant’s why her unsworn state- respond or as perjury” penalty made “under in is competent for considered should be ment Kline's “true and correct."12 verified as fact. Kline made

raising of material issues conformity is not in substantial affidavit Only appeal on does she response. now no drafted, because, with either formula as “hypertech- objection Nissho’s characterize penal- allows the affiant to circumvent drafting attorney’s af- and offer nical” signing onto intentional perjury for ties jurat in Kline’s as evidence fidavit her Kline never declared state- falsehoods. expos- avoid intended affidavit correct; therefore, her to be true and ment as penalties peijury, Nis- to the ing her disregarded summary must be affidavit claims.10 sho v. Abex See also Flowers judgment proof. (N.D.Ill. F.Supp. 1230, 2n. Corp., in this circuit that an a rule It is settled 1984) signature (merely notarizing does not incompetent is raise affidavit unsworn summary judgment proof acknowledgement pur- client establish at end 9. The peijury exposure false state- ported reads as follows: without affidavit contemplated by the federal rules. ments that is OF TEXAS THE STATE above, attorneys failed cor- As noted Kline’s OF HARRIS COUNTY ME, undersigned authority, pointed even it out BEFORE the defect after Nissho rect day personally appeared Su- summary pleadings. Mrs. Rukmini this Kline, person me to known to be karno foregoing e.g., v. W. Oil Distribu is subscribed to the Affi- See Martin John Stone whose name 11. davit, tor, Inc., (5th Cir.1987); acknowledged to that she exe- me Mes 819 F.2d purposes for the and considera- Belgique, cuted the same v. Fina 736 F.2d erole M/V expressed. Watson, Cir.1984); tion therein (5th 622 F.2d Gordon v. Menard, Rukmini Sukarno Kline Cir.1980); (5th /s/ 559 F.2d 123 1282, Jones KLINE RUKMINI SUKARNO Cir.1977). n. 4 SEAL OF GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND day April, 1983. OFFICE this 17th provides: 12. 28 U.S.C. Bennett, C. Jr. Robert /s/ Wherever, any of the United law Notary Public in and for rule, order, regulation, or States or under County, Texas Harris law, any requirement pursuant mat- made theory is 10. Nissho’s that Kline and attor permitted supported, required or to be ter evidenced, her, intentionally subjecting neys "affidavit,” avoided in her established, proved or penalties perjury for a false to the certificate, declaration, verification, sworn affidavit, complica have caused would affidavit, statement, oath, writing of the or proceeding. tions her in related criminal (other making deposi- person tion, than a the same fact, “affidavit,” the time she tendered her office, required or or oath of an oath an taking proceeds she had indicted for been specified other to be taken before a official *7 the check. She was convicted sen may, notary public), such matter with than years prison. tenced to fourteen State, in See Kline v. evidenced, effect, supported, like force and established, be (Tex.App. 737 S.W.2d 895 [1 — Houston proved by or the unsworn decla- ref'd). attorney pet. ap Kline’s on Dist.] peal statement, ration, certificate, verification, or person proceeding the criminal was the writing person such which subscribed who notarized her "affidavit" in the court be him, by dated, penalty peijury, true under low. following substantially the form: Shortly argument, before oral Kline tendered (1) “1 If the United States: executed without (in form) proper to this court an affidavit exe- state) (or certify, verify, pen- or declare under firm, attorney cuted with another an who alty peijury United under laws formerly represented Kline the instant civil foregoing is true States of America that matter, pre- which affidavit asserted that he (date). on and correct. Executed pared faulty instrument and that was not (Signature)”. designed penalties intentionally to avoid the States, (2) If its executed within United perjury. apparently on the Counsel was horns territories, possessions, or commonwealths: prepared a of a dilemma: He had either flawed state) (or verify, (but certify, might “I declare or affidavit that for the otherwise strik- foregoing penalty peijury pleadings) protected that the is true of her have his client (date). summary judgment, on from an or and correct. Executed adverse he had (Signature)”. contrived a document his intended allow may granted partial summary into affidavit district transform document purposes). designate, still summary judgment Kline failed to or judgment, be used to, any way deposition as the refer if her af that even maintains support response of factual her source deposition considered, her cannot be fidavit Thus, deposition Nissho’s motion. ap in an asserts testimony unquestionably part competent never made sum- was position she the identical propriate manner judgment record mary before assumption— Her in her takes affidavit. court. that the incorrect—is to be we note must be searched the case record in entire genuine issue of a

and found bereft summary judgment before material fact JACKSON CORPORATION, MARINE entered. may properly be Trudell, Richard G. Denton, Felis F. 56(e) contrary, Fed.R.Civ.P. To the III, al., et Plaintiffs-Appellants, go party to nonmoving “requires ... v. affi by her own beyond pleadings FOX, Tackle, BLUE Gear, Apparel, answers davits, ‘depositions, by the or etc., al., et Defendants-Appellees. file,’ and admissions interrogatories, No. 87-3167. showing that there facts ‘specific designate ” United States Court of Appeals, for trial.’ Celotex issue genuine is a Fifth Circuit. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 477 U.S. Corp. v. (1986) (quoting L.Ed.2d 265 May 31, 1988. added). 56(e)) (emphasis Fed.R.Civ.P. motion, Kline des Nissho’s response to she testi facts to which ignates specific no only deposi in her first

fies —her court below time the tion of record at sup would motion—that

ruled on Nissho’s We cannot of this case.

port her version or for deposition, her second

consider affidavit,

matter, drafting attorney’s to an exami is confined

because our review the lower court of materials before

nation made; ruling subse

at the time the Ingalls are irrelevant.

quent materials Corp.,

Iron Works Co. Fruehauf Cir.1975); Wright, C. F.2d Kane, Federal Practice and

A. Miller & M. (1983). 2d

Procedure: Civil IV. reasons, foregoing

For the is AF- district court

entered

FIRMED.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

PER CURIAM: *8 petiton that the re-

IT IS ORDERED entitled and num-

hearing filed in above hereby DE- and the same is

bered cause be rehearing asserts petition

NIED. The deposition was made

that the second assuming

part of the record. Even the time the was of record at

Case Details

Case Name: Nissho-Iwai American Corporation v. R. Sukarno Kline, Individually and D/B/A Frankenburg Import-Export Ltd.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date Published: Jul 5, 1988
Citation: 845 F.2d 1300
Docket Number: 87-2902
Court Abbreviation: 5th Cir.
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