| Or. | Jul 15, 1879
By the Court,
The first question arising on the demurrer in this action is as to the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint to constitute a cause of action. The contract relied on is an agreement made by the alleged father of a bastard child with the mother, whereby he agreed to pay her for its maintenance. It is claimed by the respondent that this alleged agreement is without consideration and void, for the reason that the putative father of a bastard child is not legally bound to support it, but that this obligation legally devolves on the mother. We think that whatever the moral obligation of a putative father may be to support such a child, no legal obligation attaches to him in that behalf, and that this legal obligation is upon the mother. Tyler on Infancy and Coverture (p. 285), lays down the rule that the mother is the natural guardian of such a child, and is bound to maintain it, and we think such is the law. When one agrees to pay another for a service which that other is legally bound to perform, the contract is without consideration, and can not be enforced. (Parsons on Contracts, 424.)
It may be truly said that the respondent was under a moral obligation to contribute to the support of this illegitimate child, and it is insisted that this is a sufficient consideration to support this promise. But to constitute a moral
We think, therefore, that the alleged promise of Starr to pay the appellant for the maintenance of this child can not be enforced at law, and that the judgment of the circuit court must be sustained.
The other points in the demurrer are therefore immaterial.