70 Fla. 530 | Fla. | 1915
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff in error, Louis Nims, hereafter referred to as the defendant, a colored man, was indicted for and tried and convicted of, the crime of murder in the first degree, the jury in their verdict recommending mercy, and was sentenced to imprisonment for life in the State penitentiary, in the Circuit Court of Leon County, and by writ of error brings such judgment here for review.
But one assignment of error is presented here, and that is that the court below erred in denying- the defend
For a conviction the State relied in large measure upon what purports to be the ante mortem statement of the deceased. ' This statement is in some respects remarkable. As detailed by the witnesses testifying to it, the deceased was walking first along St. Augustine street and then down Gay street passing near the defendant’s house, that as he passed the defendant’s house he saw the hack or carriage of the defendant with two horses hitched to it standing near the defendant’s house with the defendant in the hack, and that the defendant got out of the hack and followed along after him down Gay street until he reached the point where he was shot. That he knew it was the defendant who was following him in the street, before he shot him. That the defendant came up behind him and shot him in the back. That immediately upon being shot he, the deceased, first pulled out of his pocket
Another feature of the case impelling us to' the conclusion at which we have arrived, is the recommendation to mercy by the jury in their verdict. The deceased was killed by some assassin in cold blood, and if this defendant was in fact guilty of it, there were no circumstances that called for or justified an extension of mercy, unless it was incorpoarted into the verdict as a safeguard against
In view of the entire evidence bearing on the identity of the plaintiff in error as being the perpetrator of the homicide, we are of the opinion that a new trial be awarded. Platt v. State, 65 Fla. 253, 61 South. Rep. 502.
The judgment of the court below is hereby reversed at the cost of Leon County, and a new trial ordered.
Whitfield and Ellis, JJ., concur.
Shackleford and Cockrell, JJ., dissent.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). — I regret exceedingly my inability to concur in the opinion prepared by the Chief Justice. It is true that sharp conflicts exist in the testimony upon material points, but, as we held in McClellan v. State, 66 Fla. 215, 63 South. Fla. 419, following prior decisions of this court, “While the legal effect of evidence or the lack of evidence in its relation to a verdict rendered in a trial, may by appropriate proceedings be reviewed by an appellate court, yet conflicts in competent testimony, the weight of legal evidence and the credibility of competent witnesses are primarily for the determination of the jury; and where there is some substantial competent evidence of all the facts legally es
“In passing upon an assignment questioning the correctness of the ruling- of the trial court in denying a motion for a new trial, which is based upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the guiding principle for an appellate court is not what it may think the jury ought to have done, or what such court may think it would have done had it been sitting as a jury in the„ case, but whether as reasonable men the jury could have found such verdict from the evidence adduced. If this question can be answered in the affirmative, the action of the trial court upon such motion should not be disturbed.
The verdict of the jury should be conformable to legal rules and defensible in point of sense. It must not be absurd or whimsical. But an appellate court is not warranted in substituting- its standard of what is reasonable for that of the jury. If reasonable men might have found the verdict in question, and it has received the sanction of the trial court, an appellate court should not disturb it.
The refusal of the trial court to grant a new trial for insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, or because the verdict is contrary to the evidence, will not be reversed unless, after allowing all reasonable presumptions of its correctness, the preponderance of the evidence
When the trial court concurs in the verdict rendered by a jury by denying the -motion for a new trial, and-there is evidence to support it, an appellate court should refuse to disturb it, in the absence of any showing that the jurors must have been improperly influenced by considerations outside the evidence.”
As I read the transcript of the record, I find ample evidence to sustain the verdict, and I cannot say that the jurors must have been improperly influenced by the Considerations outside the evidence.
Cockrell, J., concurs in this dissent.