In three separate condemnation claims (1) the claimant in Action No. 1 appeals from (a) a decision of the Court of Claims (McNamara, J.), dated May 23, 1996, and (b) a judgment of the same court dated June 12, 1996, which, after a trial, is in favor of the State of New York and against it, dismissing the claim; (2) the claimant in Action No. 2 appeals from (a) the decision dated May 23, 1996, and (b) a judgment of the same court dated June 12, 1996, which, after a trial, is in favor of the State of New York and against it, dismissing the claim; and (3) the claimant in Action No. 3 appeals (a) from the decision dated May 23, 1996, and (b), as limited by its brief, from so much of a judgment of the same court dated August 8, 1996, as, after a trial, is in favor of it only in the principal amount of $103,672, and the State of New York cross-appeals from so much of the same judgment as awarded the claimant in Action No. 3 consequential damages.
Ordered that the appeals from the decisions dated May 23, 1996, are dismissed, without costs or disbursements, as no appeal lies from a decision (see, Schicchi v Green Constr. Corp., 100 AD2d 509); and it is farther,
Ordered that the judgments dated June 12, 1996, in Action Nos. 1 and 2 are affirmed, without costs or disbursements; and it is further,
Ordered that the judgment dated June 12, 1996, in Action No. 3 is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
It is well settled that where there is a partial taking of a condemnee’s property, the general measure of damages is the difference between the value of the whole parcel before the taking and the value of the remainder parcel after the taking (see, City of New York [Civitano—Humble Oil & Ref. Co.], 39 NY2d 453; Diocese of Buffalo v State of New York, 24 NY2d 320, 323). Here, in determining the value of the parcel before the taking, the Court of Claims relied on certain comparables used by the appraiser for the State in his market approach to value, and gave considerable weight to a 1987 sale of the subject parcel. In determining the value of the parcel after the taking, the court substantially relied on the claimants’ evidence with respect to costs to cure, specifically itemizing those costs that it found appropriate (see, Hylan Flying Serv. v State of New York, 49 NY2d 840, 841-842; Mayes Co. v State of New York, 18 NY2d 549; 4A Nichols, Eminent Domain § 14A.04 [2] [3d ed 1997]). A review of the report of the claimants’ engineer, to which the court specifically referred, supports the values employed by the court. Under these circumstances, where the court adequately explained its reasoning, its determination should not be disturbed (Matter of City of New York [Reiss], 55 NY2d 885, 886; Matter of City of New York [A. & W. Realty Corp.], 1 NY2d 428, 432-433; see also, Cummings v State of New York, 62 AD2d 1084, 1085-1086).
The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Ritter, J. P., Sullivan, Santucci and McGinity, JJ., concur.
