57 Vt. 388 | Vt. | 1885
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This action was brought to the County Court, is between residents of Vermont, and is for a trespass on lands in Massachusetts. Section 899, R. L., declares that actions in the County Court of ejectment and trespass on the freehold shall be brought in the county in which the lands lie. It is argued that this section refers to lands lying in this State; and further, that the distinction existing at common law between local and transitory actions rested upon reasons no longer existing, and should therefore no longer be observed.
Our statute leaves the venue in actions of trespass guare clausum as it was at common law. At common law venue was transitory when the cause of action might have happened in any county; it was local when it could happen in one county, only. An assault could happen in any place. The entry upon land could only happen where the land lay. The place of trial in the latter case, therefore, was fixed by the very nature of the injury complained of.
In Doulson v. Matthews, 4 T. R. 503, which was trespass
If it was too late in Lord Kenyon’s time to inquire into the wisdom of the distinction between local and transitory venue, the lapse of near a century has made the inquiry no more opportune; especially, since the courts have been meantime rooting the doctrine deeper and deeper in the law by a uniform course of decision.
The venue in case of crimes is local. It would hardly be claimed that our courts had jurisdiction over a crime committed in another State. And yet the same reasoning that supports the doctrine of local venue applies equally to crimes and real actions. Rex v. Johnson, 6 East, 583. We hold, therefore, that at common law and under our statute the court below had no jurisdiction of the cause of action declared upon.
Judgment affirmed.