47 S.W.3d 837 | Tex. App. | 2001
OPINION
Alleging she sustained physical injuries as the result of an assault, Wanda Nikol-outsos filed a civil suit against her ex-husband, Tony Nikoloutsos. A jury found that Tony Nikoloutsos maliciously assaulted Wanda Nikoloutsos. The trial court entered judgment for $863,440.00 on a jury verdict. Tony Nikoloutsos raises two issues on appeal.
Issue one asks “[w]hether the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of witness Mansfield.” The trial court excluded A.B. Mansfield as a witness because his identity had not been disclosed in discovery. This basis for the ruling is not supported by the record. Tony Nikolout-sos disclosed Mansfield’s identity in an answer to an interrogatory, as follows:
State the name, address and telephone number of any and all persons, excluding expert witnesses, having knowledge of relevant facts relating to the incident which is the basis of this lawsuit, the cause thereof, or the damages resulting therefrom.
Answer: TONY NIKOLOUTSOS
[address] [telephone number]
WANDA NIKOLOUTSOS
[address] [telephone number]
AB MANSFIELD CONSTRUCTION
P.O. BOX 1605
VIDOR, TEXAS 77662 409-769-6565
At trial, Wanda’s counsel argued that Tony had identified a business entity, not an individual. According to the record, however, there is only one entity, the individual named Mansfield. Mansfield testified that he is self-employed and his business, “A. B. ‘Junebug’ Mansfield Dozer and Backhoe Service,” is not a corporation. Mansfield’s home telephone number was listed in the response. Wanda’s attorney interviewed Mansfield shortly after the incident.
Wanda argues this case is governed by our decision in Ledesma v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 795 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1990, no writ). In Ledesma, we held the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding a pharmacist as a witness, although the name of the pharmacy, Medical Center Pharmacy, had been identified in some supplemental discovery responses. Id. In that case, the pharmacist was not named at all. Id. Even a “catch-all” identification is sufficient if there is no pre-trial objection. See
“[E]rror in the exclusion of evidence requires reversal if it is both controlling on a material issue and not cumulative” of other evidence admitted at trial. Williams Distrib. Co. v. Franklin, 898 S.W.2d 816, 817 (Tex.1995) (quoting Mentis v. Barnard, 870 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex.1994)). In a bill of exception, Mansfield offered eyewitness testimony about the incident that formed the basis of the suit. According to Mansfield, Wanda was acting belligerent and Tony did not assault her. The testimony of a disinterested person undoubtedly carries more weight than similar testimony coming from interested parties to the case. See Tinkle v. Henderson, 777 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1989, writ denied). In Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex.1989), the Supreme Court held in an assault case that testimony from a non-party that one party did not strike the other concerned a material issue dispositive of the case. As Mansfield was the only disinterested witness in a swearing match between the former spouses, his testimony was controlling on a material issue and not merely cumulative. Issue one is sustained.
Issue two asks “[w]hether the trial court erred in excluding Wanda’s prior conviction of false report.” In a bill of exception, Tony proved that Wanda had been convicted of fifing a false report and placed on probation in a case in which Tony was the complaining witness. The discussion of Wanda’s initial objection to admission of this evidence was not recorded. In the bill of exception, defense counsel argued for its admissibility as impeachment evidence of a crime of moral turpitude. Plaintiffs counsel argued the evidence should be excluded because it was not provided through discovery. Although Wanda’s interrogatories included a request for detailed information on offenses charged against either party, Tony’s discovery responses do not describe an incident occurring on a date corresponding to the false report. Under Rule 215(5), the evidence could have been excluded as a discovery sanction. See
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.