Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Kelvin N., File No. 26-CV-32 (JMB/JFD)
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General ; Kristi ORDER Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security ; Todd M. Lyons, Acting
Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ; David Easterwood, Acting
Director, St. Paul Field Office Immigration
and Customs Enforcement ; and Ryan Shea,
Sheriff of Freeborn County ,
Respondents. Kelvin N., Minneapolis, MN, self-represented.
Trevor Brown and Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, and David Easterwood. David John Walker, Freeborn County Attorney’s Office, Albert Lea, MN, for Respondent Ryan Shea.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Kelvin N.’s [1] Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1 [hereinafter, “Pet.”].) Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Todd M. Lyons, and David Easterwood (together, “Respondents”) oppose the Petition. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the Petition in part.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Kelvin N. is a citizen of Ecuador who entered the United States without
inspection in June 2021. (Pet. ¶ 18; Doc. No. 5 ¶ 6.)
2. On July 1, 2021, ICE released Kelvin N. under an Order of Recognizance, and Kelvin N. has reported as directed since then. (Doc. No. 5 ¶ 7.) [2]
3. On December 3, 2022, ICE issued a Notice to Appear charging Kelvin N. as removable pursuant to sections 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. ( Id. ¶ 8.)
4. On April 30, 2024, Kelvin N. filed a petition for asylum. (Pet. ¶ 19; Doc. No. 5 ¶ 9.) His asylum petition is pending before the Executive Office of Immigration review. (Pet. ¶ 19.) Kelvin N. had a Master Calendar Hearing at the immigration court at Fort Snelling, Minnesota on January 7, 2026, and a final hearing on his claim for asylum is scheduled for February 4, 2026. (Pet. ¶ 19; Doc. No. 5 ¶ 11.)
5. Respondents took Kelvin N. into custody on or about December 12, 2025, and canceled his Order of Recognizance. (Pet. ¶ 24; Doc. No. 5 ¶ 10.)
6. On January 5, 2026, Kelvin N. filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet.) Kelvin N. seeks immediate release or, in the alternative, a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). ( Id. at 15.)
DISCUSSION
Respondents argue that Kelvin N.’s detention is mandatory pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that because section 1225(b) is not applicable to him, Kelvin N. is entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to section 1226(a)(1). The Court therefore grants Kelvin N.’s Petition. [3] As a threshold matter, the Court notes that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted to any person who demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld , 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (concluding that the Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United States” (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2)); Aditya W.H. v. Trump , 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 702 (D. Minn. 2025). For most of the nation’s history, habeas review “has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” Hamdi , 542 U.S. at 525 (quotation omitted). The right to challenge the legality of a person’s confinement through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “extends to . . . immigration-related detention.” Deng Chol A. v. Barr , 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2020) (citation omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that his detention is illegal by a preponderance of evidence. Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi , No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), 2025 WL 2466670, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H. , 782 F. Supp. 3d at 703).
The fundamental question raised in this case is whether Kelvin N. is an applicant for admission under section 1225(b), or a noncitizen residing in the United States under section 1226. Respondents argue that because Kelvin N. is a noncitizen who is present in the United States without having been admitted, he is an “applicant” for admission under section 1225(b) and therefore subject to mandatory detention under section 1225(b)(2). (Doc. No. 9 at 2.) Courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ interpretation that section 1225(b)(2) requires the mandatory detention of all noncitizens living in the country who are “inadmissible” because they entered the United States without inspection. See, e.g. , Barco Mercado v. Francis , No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 & n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that this interpretation had been rejected in 350 cases “decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the United States” and collecting cases in an Appendix A); Jose Andres R.E. v. Bondi , No. 25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025) (collecting cases); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi , No. 25-CV-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (collecting cases). This Court also finds Respondents’ interpretation unpersuasive.
When interpreting a statute, “every clause and word of a statute should have meaning.” United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc. , 599 U.S. 419, 432 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)). Noncitizens who have been residing in the United States but who entered without inspection have not, historically, been considered to still be “arriving” under section 1225(b). This is because the statute itself states that, in order to apply, several conditions must be met; specifically, an immigration officer must determine that the noncitizen “is an applicant for admission . . . seeking admission . . . [and] not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Determining the plain meaning of the statute requires consideration of the tense of the verb “is” and the present participle “seeking.” Here, section 1225(b)(2) applies to persons who presently are applicants for admission and who presently are seeking admission at the time of their detention. To be seeking admission means to be seeking entry, which “by its own force implies a coming from outside.” United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day , 279 U.S. 398, 401 (1929). In this case, Kelvin N. has been residing in the United States and is, therefore, not currently “seeking admission” into the United States.
In addition, Respondents’ interpretation of 1225(b)(2) renders superfluous other immigration laws. Specifically, interpreting section 1225(b)(2) as applying to noncitizens who have already entered the country and are not currently seeking admission into the country, as Respondents urge, would render meaningless a recent amendment to section 1226 by the Laken Riley Act (LRA). The LRA added new categories of noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under section 1226(c), and one such category was for noncitizens lacking valid documentation and who have been charged with or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). But if Respondents’ interpretation of section 1225 were correct, then there would have been no need for the LRA to create these additional categories because all noncitizens who are present in the United States and have not been admitted would have already been ineligible for bond under section 1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court also agrees with those courts that have found that Respondents’ interpretation of section 1225(b) is “at odds with both the relevant legislative history and longstanding agency practice.” Belsai D.S. , 2025 WL 2802947, at *7; see, e.g. , Maldonado v. Olson , 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1150 (D. Minn. 2025) (discussing the longstanding practice of treating noncitizens who resided in the United States, but who had entered without inspection, as being subject to section 1226(a)).
The fact that Kelvin N. has applied for asylum does not change the conclusion. The definition of “admission” in this context means “the lawful entry of the noncitizen into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer . ” Barco Mercado , 2025 WL 3295903 at *5 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis altered)). Even by applying for asylum, a “noncitizen who already has entered the United States illegally and is living here cannot be said to be actively seeking lawful entry into the United States,” because the “entry, whether lawful or unlawful, occurred years ago.” Id. (emphasis in original). Other courts have reached this same conclusion under similar facts. E.g. , Quishpe-Guaman v. Noem , No. 4:25-CV-00211-TWP-KMB, 2025 WL 3201072, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 2025) (finding it was “strong evidence” that the federal government earlier released a noncitizen on her own recognizance under section 1226 and rejecting Respondents’ argument that her asylum application shows that she “is plainly seeking admission to the United States”); Mayamu K. v. Bondi , File No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819, at *4, 8 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025) (concluding that despite a pending asylum application, the petitioner’s previous Order of Release on Recognizance under section 1226 precludes detention under section 1225).
Therefore, because section 1225(b) is inapplicable to Kelvin N., he is subject to the provisions of section 1226, which “sets forth a discretionary process for the apprehension and detention of aliens who are already present in the United States and eligible for removal.” Selvin Adonay E.M. v. Noem , No. 25-CV-3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025 WL 3157839, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025). Pursuant to section 1226(a), Kelvin N. is entitled to a bond hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)(2); see also Belsai D.S. , 2025 WL 2802947, at *5–6; Jose Andres R.E. , 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2. For these reasons, the Court finds that Kelvin N.’s detention is governed by section 1226(a), and he is not subject to section 1225(b)’s mandatory detention. Accordingly, the Court grants the Petition.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petition (Doc. No. 1) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as follows:
1. Respondents must immediately provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and in any event, on or before 5:00 p.m. CT on January 13, 2026.
2. If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be immediately released from detention.
3. On or before 11:00 a.m. CT on January 14, 2026, Respondents shall provide the Court with a status update concerning the results of any bond hearing conducted pursuant to this Order, or if no bond hearing was held, advise the Court regarding Petitioner’s release.
4. Respondents shall not remove, transfer, or otherwise facilitate the removal of Petitioner from the District of Minnesota prior to compliance with Paragraphs 1–3 of this Order.
5. To the extent Petitioner seeks additional relief, the Petition is DENIED. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 7, 2026 /s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan United States District Court
[1] This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any nongovernmental parties in immigration cases.
[2] The Petition does not include any statements concerning this proceeding or the ensuing order.
[3] Because a bond hearing is the primary relief available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Court declines to address the remaining relief requested. In addition, to the extent that the Petition also includes a request for immediate release, the Court declines to address this requested relief because the Petition does not develop an argument that Kelvin N.’s December 12, 2025 arrest was unlawful or otherwise challenge the decision to cancel the Order of Recognizance, separate and apart from the challenged legal basis for his continued detention without a bond hearing.