*1 myself questions or could ask if man we to.
want NIELSEN, Conservator of the I Okay. guess “THE DEFENDANT: Olson, of Estate M. I like just would to do is first of what all Appellee, Petitioner and being apologize for late I because didn’t v. anything guess about this I day. know like just go what would to do is kind of CASS COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES day back that from what I can remem- BOARD and North Dakota go [Emphasis ber of and from there.” of Respondents Human and added.] Appellants. apparently As the defendant concedes Civ. No. 11219. that rights he was of advised all his appearance, his initial at or least has not Supreme Court of North Dakota. not, conclude, asserted that he was we Oct. 1986. light developments disclosing of later due court, consideration of his interests willingness proceed
defendant’s to trial lawyer, a jury,6
without without and as lawyer, rights pro-
his own that his to due
cess have not been violated.
In light analysis of this we conclude that appropriate
this case was an one sum-
mary disposition 35.1(a)(4), under Rule
N.D.R.App.P., in that there been no
error of law and no abuse trial
court’s discretion.7 stated,
For the judgment reasons
conviction is affirmed. WALLE, LEVINE,
VANDE MESCHKE GIERKE, JJ.,
and
concur.
6.
judge
ment
Lawyer,
trial was not
ant’s motion. We
State v.
prised
his
appearances. The
immediately before trial
for a
If
Nilles, Davies, Fargo, pe- & appellee; argued by titioner and Richard Henderson. Nordwall, Gen., Atty. L. Asst.
Blaine Dept, North Dakota of Human Bismarck, appellants. for respondents and GIERKE, Justice.
This is an from a district court judgment reversing a decision of De- (the Depart- partment Human Services ment) Evelyn to terminate Olson’s medical assistance benefits. We affirm. Evelyn began receiving medical assist- ance benefits from the on Subsequently, Evelyn’s 1983. March Nielsen, daughter, appointed was Evelyn’s handle affairs. mother, Carlson, Evelyn’s died, When Ida Evelyn property by was to inherit intestate succession, $23,- with an estimated value of However, Evelyn, from Ida’s estate. conservator, through her renounced in- in Ida’s terest estate. The de- Evelyn’s termined that interest Ida’s es- prior to the constituted tate renunciation property inchoate which deemed to Evelyn disquali- an available resource to 50-24.1-02, under fying her N.D. C.C., receiving from further bene- fits. When renounced interest estate, the Department in the determined that the constituted a transfer 50-24.1-02(1), property under Section disqualified Evelyn which also further medical assistance benefits.
Evelyn requested
an admin-
and received
hearing whereupon the termi-
istrative
of her medical assistance benefits
nation
Department. Evelyn
was affirmed
appealed to the
court
re-
district
Department’s
on
decision
versed
ground
in Ida’s es-
disqualifying
“3.
did not constitute a
re-
tate
Unless the decedent
donee of the
power
the renunciation did not
otherwise,
source and
has provided
transfer.
constitute a
property or interest
renounced de-
(cid:127)
volves as
renounc-
renouncing
inheritance
Prior to
on
ing predeceased the decedent....
A
Evelyn’s behalf,
for and
Carol moved
ob-
*3
renunciation relates back for
pur-
all
the
approving
a court order
renun-
tained
poses to the
date
death of the
30.1-29-01,
See Section
ciation.
decedent or the donee of
power.”
the
Department
that it had
The
concedes
actual
hearing
on
motion
notice
Carol’s
and
foregoing
The
provisions unambiguously
appearance
it did not make an
to
that
ob- provide that the
of
effect
a renunciation is
to
ject
the renunciation. See Section 30.1-
treat
to
the
interest
it never
29-05, N.D.C.C.
passed
renouncing party,
to the
because
party
that
predeceased
is deemed
have
dispute
The
does not
either
the
decedent
whom the interest would
probate
approval or
the
court’s
the validity
provisions
have been
The
received.
further
issue
of the renunciation. The
of whether
unambiguously provide that “for
probate
pur-
all
approved
the
court should have
the
poses” the renunciation relates
renunciation is
back
the
therefore
before us on
appeal,
of
Depart-
nor is
of a
date
the
death.
the issue
conflict
decedent’s
The
of
regarding
ment’s
Evelyn’s
interest
Carol’s dual status
view that
interest in
Ida’s
potential
and as
estate should be treated as an available
beneficiary of the renounced inheritance.
resource or that her renunciation of it
should
treated
a disqualifying
trans-
dispositive
The
issue
on
fer is
requirement
inconsistent with the
is
case whether
interest
in Ida’s
renunciation relate back to the date
estate constituted a resource or the renun-
the
of
pur-
of
death
decedent “for
the
all
of the interest
ciation
constituted
trans-
poses.”
fer
her from
fur-
ther medical assistance benefits.
express
provi
Absent an
statutory
contrary,
sion
the
a renunciation is not
When a district court decision in
assets,
treated as a fraudulent transfer of
volving a
agen
review of an administrative
renouncer’s creditors cannot on
court,
appealed
cy
to this
we
review the
ground
any rights
claim
to the re
agency
decision of the
look
property.
nounced
In the Matter
See
of
compiled
it.
record
before
Schultz v.
Colacci,
369,
37 Colo.App.
the Estate of
North Dakota
Human
of
(1976);
549 P.2d
Finegan,
1096
Coomes v.
(N.D.1985).
Res
(1943).
233 Ia.
7
N.W.2d
olution
us
issue before
involves the
underlying
motive
the renunciation is not
application
of a statu
relevant to the
to renounce. Estate
provision
tory
question
which is
law
Oot,
95 Misc.2d
“1. of an incapaci- [T]he “Rights Creditors and Others: As protected person, tated or who is an regards creditors, taxing authorities and heir, renounce, in ... whole others, provision for ‘relation back’ part, to any succession legal preventing has effect suc- therein, property or ... becoming operative cession from in favor filing a written renunciation under this The relation disclaimant. back is . section. include, all purposes’ ‘for which would [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] among others for the rights N.D.C.C., 50-24.1-02, arewe aware creditors, and asser- Section taxing authorities individuals to potential exists for dower.” tion of which, bequest an inheritance or refuse that there is a valid unpersuaded areWe refusal, would be available absent Depart- allow the upon distinction the re- costs of medical care for pay the treating a renunciation to benefit ment nouncing party otherwise although the reno'uncer’s a transfer However, legislature Department. department cannot. tax and the creditors prevent such a adequate tool to provided 30.1-10-01, N.D.C.C., pro renun- authorizing that one’s result treating exceptions to a renun no vides for by written rights be barred ciation relating to the date of the back ciation as simple and ade- In view waiver. However, under Sec of decedent. death unwilling, through remedy we are quate 30.1~10-01(4)(a)(2), legis tion infringe interpretation, to erode or judicial *4 to re provided lature has expression that a legislative upon the clear waiver. may by barred written be nounce prede- renouncing to have party is deemed that such does not assert The and the renunciation ceased the decedent by it from was obtained a waiver of the back to the date made effective receiving medical assist prerequisite a purposes. death for all decedents benefits, attempt and it cannot now ance treating Eve by facto waiver judg- secure a de opinion, with this In accordance or the renun renounced interest lyn’s the district court is affirmed. ment of ciation, itself, from disqualifying her
receiving benefits. LEVINE, JJ„ concur. MESCHKE and that the result we We do not believe WALLE, Justice, dissenting. VANDE today by reach our appeal 30.1- not an from the under Section I dissent. This is effect of renunciation 10-01, N.D.C.C., legisla county a decision to conflicts with court of decision require eligibility 30.1-10- regarding intent renunciation under Section permit tive un Rather, the ma- ments for medical assistance as noted 50-24.1-02, N.D.C.C. Under der Section from a deci- jority opinion, it is an person can re eligibility provision no Department of Human Services sion made an who has ceive medical benefits Evelyn Olson’s medical assist- to terminate property for “assignment or transfer” Department con- ance benefits because receivp eligible to purpose becoming in her sister Ida’s Evelyn’s interest sidered expressly legislature The did not benefits. it property which estate an inchoate act, disqualifying a make “renunciation” resource to Eve- to be an available deemed provided; although easily so could have 50-24.- disqualifying her under Section lyn “assignment” or nor did it define the terms N.D.C.C., 1-02(1), receiving further However, under commonly “transfer.” Nielsen, the con- medical benefits. stood, desig act of those terms connote an estate, was noti- of her mother’s servator per conveying thing from one nating or Board County Social Service fied Cass or trans assigns son to another. One who petition for renun- should Nielsen’s assignee or property designates fers a ineligi- granted, Evelyn would be ciation be convey transferee and the terms of the until such time as for further benefits ble contrast, ance. one who renounces expenses incurred medical may she have bequest inheritance under 30.1- Section estate, some her interest Ida’s equaling 10-01, N.D.C.C., the re designate cannot Nielsen, notification, $23,000. Despite the cipient disposition or otherwise control the by the renun- personally would benefit who property. of the renounced interest for which her mother’s ciation of of her moth- petitioned as she By refusing to allow estate, petition and it was pursued the er’s under Section 30.1-10.- treat a renunciation in an “Ad- they promised had granted. As 01, N.D.C.C., act under onerous, part to Nielsen and a letter both vanee Notice” Federal and State attorney, Department disqualified Eve- expenditures. There can be little doubt lyn from further benefits until she incurred purpose 50-24.1-02(1) that the of Section $23,000 expenses. in medical require was to those who have assets avail- pay able them to for medical assistance gives only passing majority opinion The pay those costs from those assets in 50-24.1-02(1), to Section N.D. reference order that those who no have assets avail- C.C., provides that medical assist- provided able be for public from the person either any ance be who apparent legisla- fisc. It is to me that the income and insufficient to resources enacting 50-24.1-02(1) tive intent necessary meet the costs of medical care prevent was to from purposely “at any and services and who has not time becoming impoverished in order to obtain making application before or after taxpayers’ medical assistance at the ex- assignment assistance made pense person’s and to the benefit of the property transfer of for the relatives and heirs. The result reached rendering eligible for himself assistance majority opinion violence does to that chapter.” under This statute has purpose and justifi- intent. The result can 30.1-10-01, equal standing with Section ably taxpayers considered as a must and the two be construed “rip-off.” together. majority has failed to do this, stating only that 1 and subsections There are several other rules of statu- 30.1-10-01, “unambiguously pro- of Section tory construction which should be con- *5 vide that the effect of a is to resolving in sidered provi- issue. The treat the passed it never 50-24.1-02(1) sion in Section relative to dis- renouncing party, Although to the ...” the qualification for assign- because majority opinion support in authority cites pur- of property ment transfer for the contention, only its those cases involved pose rendering a eligible as- person renouncing creditors of the and did sistance to was added the statute in 1975.
not consider the stat- two 447, See 1975 N.D.Sess.Laws Ch. sec. 1. appeal utes such are involved in the 30.1-10-02(1) Section was enacted in 1973 I before this court. do not these believe part Uniform the Probate Code. See cases are definitive of the issue before us N.D.Sess.Laws, 257, 1973 Ch. sec. 1. If appeal. on this is in there a conflict statutes the in later
Although specifically prevails. general pro- enactment if a stated in the And majority opinion, special a apparent provision it is to me vision is in conflict with gives very a in broad another statute and the conflict construction Section is irrec- oncilable, very special prevails. 30.1-10-01 and provision a narrow construction the 1-02-07, 50-24.1-02(1) by construing Section Sec. N.D.C.C. 50-24.1- 02(1) term is “assignment special provision concerning transfer” as in a medi- used persons the latter needy statute exclude a renunciation cal assistance for whereas under the former is a part statute. With all due Section 30.1-10-01 the Uniform respect generally applies to the Code which to all Comment the Uniform Probate quoted opin- persons in majority succeeding proper- Probate Code in the to an interest ion, ty. I submit the juxtaposition two statutes in involved creates important, placed More the construction an ambiguity giv- which we must reconcile upon agency charged with statute
ing regard meaning purpose due to the given weight its administration is to 50-24.1-02(1) of Section as well as Section we have stated that this rule of construc- 30.1-10-01. tion is in particularly true those instances widely is specifically
It known that Legislature result of which the has soaring costs, agency guidelines required prepare medical assistance needy substantial, following provisions for the has become a if to assist in place Quarles is at a where we should assume that Public v. McKenzie statute. (N.D. cast their decedents would relatives on the No. School Dist. Here, required to reserve their 1982). welfare roles estate guidelines family to assist other members. prepare by statute 50- of the statute. Sec. the administration I the decision of would reverse the trial 24.1-02(3), It considers of the Depart- court and affirm the decision as a with interest in Ida’s estate “resource” ment of Human Services. 50-25.1-02, N.D. meaning of Section in the position is not at all unreason That C.C. ERICKSTAD, C.J., concurs. prevail under the circum and should able case. stances that if adher-
Finally, this court held would strict letter of a statute
ence to the absurdity, spirit of injustice or
lead to meaning prevails over literal
the law language of statute for particular construing the statute to See, e.g., give legislative effect to intent. Guy In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Lake Public Dist. No. Loney v. Grass Sch. KJORVESTAD, Sr., Deceased. (N.D.1982). 322 N.W.2d believe Matter of the ESTATE upon OF placed construction these statutes KJORVESTAD, Selma Deceased. majority opinion injus- to be clear by the tice. FIRST COMPANY OF TRUST NORTH Department should not have to seek DAKOTA, Appellee, Petitioner of renun- waiver written v. that the effect of that stat- ciation order Furthermore, the De- CONWAY, Respondent implemented. ute be Eileen attempt partment did not to recover bene- Appellant. *6 renunciation; only prior to the it fits 11173, 11174. Civ. Nos. peri- disqualified benefits for Supreme of North Dakota. Court subsequent to time the renunciation od of if the notice that would do so after 28, 1986. Oct. were effected. I cannot see renunciation any distinction between a waiv- substantial ini-
er as a condition
tially a notice that be benefits will subsequent to
discontinued a renunciation. argument, told at oral
We were indicates, comment so that Section
editorial designed postmor- to aid in
30.1-10-01 and that planning
tem be variety including for a
made reasons
carrying the decedent’s not ex- out wishes
pressed properly in a executed will. Such permitted cannot and should not
reason public policy the broad set
to overcome 50-24.1-02(1). Although in Section
forth required
lawyers may be advise their so fully
clients in order that the clients be
informed, yet willing am to concede Dakota, society,
that our at least North