*1 Dist., B140258.Second Div. Five. Feb. [No. 2001.] NIEDLE, Petitioner, ANTONETTE BOARD,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS LA SALSA al., HOLDING COMPANY et Respondents.
Counsel Lawrence Drasin & Associates and Lawrence Drasin for Petitioner. Stockwell, Harris, & Widom Woolverton and Carl E. for Re- Rosenquist La Holding Salsa spondents California Insurance Company Indemnity Company.
No Workers’ appearance Respondent Compensation Board. Appeals Opinion PEREZ,
GODOY J.
Introduction a writ of after the Workers’ Antonette Niedle seeks review Compensation and, (Board) thereby, Board denied her for reconsideration petition Appeals (WCJ) decision. affirmed the workers’ compensation judge’s Code section issue is whether California Labor primary presented clause of the United subdivision violates equal protection Const., Amend.) it (U.S. States Constitution 14th because impedes travel, or otherwise no rational Section serves purpose.1 *4 be cost- an out-of-state vocational rehabilitation more (g) plan requires (g) effective than an in-state We hold that section subdivision plan. to travel because that does not a obligate does the impede to the benefits to a former resident who has continue same providing not violate to another state. We also hold that the statute does moved of the laws it costs more since equal protection petitioner’s and statute there- out-of-state vocational rehabilitation plans administer a fore serves rational purpose.
We affirm the Board’s order. Summary and Procedural
Factual La Antonette Niedle sustained a work-related while injury employed to Nevada. (LSHC). Niedle moved Holding Subsequently, Salsa Company Niedle to on a vocational rehabilitation agreed plan complete parties credential. The vocational rehabili- necessary teaching the course units for a credential in obtaining teaching the costs of tation coordinator compared $637 Nevada costs were more. Nevada as California. opposed and obtained based section subdivision (g) LSHC refused pay the Rehabilitation Unit. Niedle appealed a favorable decision from WCJ, the statute contending Unit to the decision of the Rehabilitation WCJ the Rehabilitation upheld constitutional to travel. The violated her decision, to determine the but also stated that he had no jurisdiction Unit’s to provide not be liable (g) provides: employer “An shall 1 Section subdivision state, agreement of the upon unless services at location outside vocational rehabilitation Compensation the Division of Workers’ employer employee, or determination in the state.” provided than similar services that those are more cost-effective services indicated. statutory are to the Code unless otherwise All further references Labor aof statute. constitutionality Niedle for reconsideration. The petitioned reconsideration, decision, Board affirmed the granted WCJ’s adopted WCJ’s and recommendation on reconsideration. report review,
Niedle this court for a petitioned writ which was denied. The Supreme Niedle’s granted for review and transferred the petition matter to us directions to vacate our order and to denying petition issue a writ of review. We issued writ of review and heard oral argument. matter, After reconsidering we conclude section not unconstitutional.
Discussion 1. Standard review.
Because the Board lacks the to declare a statute authority unconsti tutional, Const., (Cal. III, 3.5; standard of review de novo. art. § Greener v. Workers’ Comp. Bd. Appeals Cal.4th 1028 [25 863 P.2d Cal.Rptr.2d
2.
section
Constitutionality
subdivision (g).
*5
Niedle contends that the statute violates her constitutional
to
right
travel,
cites,
strict
thereby
Niedle
requiring
scrutiny.
with little analysis,
several United States
Court decisions
holding that
state
not
may
receive;
deny new residents the same benefits old residents
Dunn v. Blum
330,
(1972)
995,
stein
1001,
405 U.S.
338
S.Ct.
31 L.Ed.2d
[92
274]
(Tennessee statute
requiring year’s residence before
to
receiving
right
vote held
travel);
violation of
to
right
Hooper
County
Bernalillo
Assessor
612,
(1985)
2862, 2866,
472 U.S.
618
(New
S.Ct.
86 L.Ed.2d
[105
487]
Mexico statute
tax
granting
to Vietnam
property
veterans who
exemption
8, 1975,
resided in state
to
prior
held an
May
unconstitutional impingement
travel);
on the right to
Attorney General N.Y. v.
(1986) 476
Soto-Lopez
of
2317,
U.S. 898
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
(New
90
York
[106
statute
civil
limiting
899]
service veterans
to
preference
only those veterans who were residents of
state when
entered
service held
they
military
unconstitutional impingement
travel);
2309,
to
right
(1982)
Zobel v. Williams
457
55
U.S.
S.Ct.
(Alaska
L.Ed.2d
statute distributing income from minerals to citizens
672]
based on
of
length
residency held unconstitutional violation of
to
right
travel); Memorial
Hospital
(1974)
Maricopa County
We do not We conclude agree. petitioner’s classification is statutory and thus strict of California’s scrutiny penalized, that a cited Niedle do not the proposition The cases support required. to strict when attacked subject scrutiny classification based residence is upon denied the benefit in one who has from the state which migrated question. 629, (Fisher (9th 1979) (1980) F.2d cert. den. v. Reiser Cir. 1124].) 930 [100 to the Fourteenth Amendment
The clause of the equal protection within denying any person United States Constitution state from prohibits Const., Amend.) (U.S. 14th The of the laws. jurisdiction protection its equal and state Constitutions are “essen clauses of the federal equal protection be situated should treated alike.” similarly a direction that all tially persons Center, (1985) (Cleburne Inc. Living v. Cleburne 3249, 3254, 313]; (1979) J. 25 Cal.3d In re Eric Con 549].) P.2d California provisions Cal.Rptr. “substantially guaranteeing equal protection equivalent stitution ” Mental (Dept, Amendment. clause the Fourteenth equal protection 586, 588 400 P.2d Kirchner 62 Cal.2d Cal.Rptr. Hygiene denied, Hence, the effect 321].) is that charge equal protection “where Witkin, ed. (9th of Cal. Law (8 Summary both constitutions is the same.” Law, 603, 1988) 57-58.) Constitutional § a statute operates confronted of whether
When question law, court under the the reviewing one the deny equal protection (Ayala Superior determine the standard of review. must first appropriate dis As *6 (1983) 146 Cal.Rptr. Court Cal.App.3d classifications reviewing legislative cussed in at “When Ayala page 943: States and California clauses of the United under the equal protection Constitutions, is to be constitutional. the classification generally presumed ‘However, classification scheme once it determined that the [Citation.] shifts; thereafter the state a or the burden right affects fundamental interest the law interest which justifies establish that it has compelling must first to the are necessary drawn law demonstrate that the distinctions and then omitted.) (Italics . . further that . purpose.’ [Citation.]” stake, the is not at or a classification” “suspect If a fundamental interest to “directed court is reviewing merely is less because stringent inquiry bears ‘rational classification statutory whether or not question to a conceivable (Ayala relationship’ legitimate purpose.” Superior Court, at Cal.App.3d p.
Thus, the first is what level of question review appropriate. (Attorney General 476 U.S. at fn. Soto-Lopez, supra, ofN.Y. must, matter, 2322-2324].) at determine as an initial “[W]e whether or not the State’s laws burden to actually travel.” [Niedle’s] 907, at 2323].)2 fn. 6 p. p. {Id. obligation on the state to immediate or imposed grant reasonably recognition to arrived
prompt newly citizen cannot be basis for automatically reverse on obligation the former state to continue imposing to care for the former resident. v. Torres {Califano 906, Torres, 65].) L.Ed.2d In various old benefits age disability under the Income Security Act were Supplemental only while payable claimant resided in one of the 50 states or the District Columbia. Torres to moved Puerto Rico and the benefit was terminated. The Court Supreme declined to hold that that a who moves to requires person another state is entitled to receive benefits in his former enjoyed state of residence since doing so would a State to continue to “require those pay benefits indefinitely any who had once resided there.” persons {Id. S.Ct. at p. Torres, 1, Relying supra, 435 U.S. the Ninth Circuit in Califano Reiser, 629, Fisher v. 610 F.2d contrasted a California resident’s claim for workers’ supplemental compensation benefits from Nevada with three Court cases discussing Supreme withholding or benefits as a rights result of interstate The court migration.3 held the statute did not burden the of travel in a manner strict scrutiny. requiring Fisher, resident,
Mr. a Nevada was receiving Nevada workers’ compensa- tion benefits. he and his wife moved to California. Subsequently, Mr. Fisher died, but his wife continued to receive reduced benefits. Nevada supple- mented the benefits to meet the cost Mrs. Fisher living. an petitioned argument, attorney suggested 2At oral Vincent Delta Airlines for LSHC’s that insurer 4, (WCAB, 1999) Jan. VNO VNO had established that section did prematurely attempted not violate to travel. It did not. Vincent reconsideration, resolve this issue. After the Board remanded for the Rehabilitation Unit compare plans. Appeal the costs of the The Court petition dismissed Vincent’s for review (B129494, 1999). (S078026, premature May Mar. The California 1999) (99-684, 2000) *7 Supreme and the United States Court Jan. denied review. The Oz, according parties subsequently attorney, settled to appeared Vincent’s Esther who with action, attorney Niedle’s in this had to permission she been denied file an amicus curiae brief. 3Shapiro (1969) 600]; Thompson v. Dunn U.S. L.Ed.2d v. Blumstein, 330; supra, Hospital County, Maricopa supra, Memorial U.S. v. 415 U.S. 250. increase, to as a but denied. She the issue the Circuit was Ninth presented to of and a restriction on her travel. The Ninth denial equal protection here that of the Circuit stated: we contrast the claim with presented “[W]hen or rights cases of discussing withholding three principal Supreme a that the of as a result of interstate we find absence migration, benefits state, the the the claimant and or residential relation between political and the fact that eligibility absence of durational residency requirement, the the need are all factors which detract from strength not based upon does not burden statutory claim to such an extent that the classification Reiser, (Fisher scrutiny.” supra, travel in manner strict requiring 610 F.2d at p. further, Dunn, “In and Maricopa County,
The court
Shapiro,
explained
new
of the claimant’s
obligation
issue involved
responsibility
residence;
to
an
obligation against
here the claimants seek
enforce
Any
obligation
state of former residence. The distinction is critical.
primary
status or condition and to make provision
to ascertain citizen’s economic
residence,
her
the state of current
well-being
for his or
falls upon
that
resided. It is a fact of our federal
formerly
system
state where the citizen
limited,
exercising
both in
and its
to
a state
its competence
responsibility,
and,
residents,
are
in
its
for those
who
its
persons
perhaps
welfare powers
cases,
its
We find no
authority
those
within
borders.
temporarily
some
must
legislation
the broad
that Nevada
pass prospective
proposition
formerly
subsistence or economic
well-being
reference
persons
elsewhere,
resi-
it but who are now resident
or include former
residing in
Dunn, and
In Shapiro,
dents in statutes
to aid current residents.
passed
hand,
the state with whom the claimant had a
other
Maricopa County,
relation refused to
that status without
recognize
new
existing political
of a durational
That
discriminated
waiting period.
period
the imposition
exercised their
of interstate
migra-
those who had
against
recently
Reiser,
omitted.)
(Fisher
fn.
. . .”
610 F.2d
tion.
Nevada,
Niedle,
has failed
that California
residing
similarly argues
now
in
entitled
the same benefits a California resident
her with
provide
would
compensation injury
enjoy.
rehabilitation due
a workers’
vocational
Reiser,
We turn then to the whether distinction question between residents clause, nonresidents violates the even equal protection if to travel concerns are implicated.
A law will be sustained under the
clause if it can be
equal protection
said to advance a legitimate government interest. This is true even if the law
seems unwise or
works to
disadvantage of
or if the
particular group
(Romer
rationale for it seems tenuous.
(1996)
v. Evans
As an in on how much employer’s premium part, compensation has been on its behalf paid the reform was past, legislation specifically *9 292 Com., (Sen. Rules
directed insurance costs to the lowering employer. 5, (1992-1993 Sess.) as amended Mar. of Assem. Bill No. 110 Reg. Analysis Com., (1992- of Assem. Bill No. 110 1993); Analysis Sen. Appropriations. Com., 5, 1993); Sen. and Means Sess.) amended Mar. Reg. Ways 1993 (1992-1993 Sess.) as amended Apr. of Assem. Bill 110 Reg. No. Analysis 12, 1993.) an monitoring
There are administrative costs involved in higher Wulz, (See & Rehabili out-of-state vocational rehabilitation Silberman plan. (Alliance Educators 332- tation: The Cal. of Vocational System 333.) costs,
Thus, is it more to reduce an out-of-state unless is plan prohibited This is a cost effective in order offset additional administrative costs. the distinction between in-state and out-of-state vocational rational basis for rehabilitation plans. that benefits are not social argues
Niedle also workers’ compensation are insurance they welfare because legislation by companies, implying paid note that social that a level of should We higher scrutiny apply. entitled,to a of We constitutionality.4 welfare legislation presumption was compensation further note that Fisher commented that the supplemental but fund. general not insurers was a benefit from paid paid Reiser, However, 6S6-637.)5 F.2d at Niedle has not (Fisher v. 610 Regardless, a different standard of scrutiny. provided any authority requiring Torres, supra, page page S.Ct. at 4 Asthe court said in v. 435 U.S. 908]: Califano might to another person be a where a who has moved from one State “If there ever could case corollary he came as a of his be entitled to invoke the law of the State from which travel, surely a attack this is not it. For we deal here with constitutional constitutional monetary a governmental payments law benefits. Such statute ‘is upon providing Castro, 181, constitutionality.’ De 429 U.S. strong presumption entitled to a Mathews v. rational, 431, 434, (1976). long judgments as its S.Ct. 50 L.Ed.2d ‘So 389] invidious, needy are legislature’s problems poor and the not not efforts to tackle 535, Hackney, subject straitjacket.’ v. 406 U.S. to a constitutional Jefferson Jobst, 47, 1731, 1724, (1972). 434 U.S. 53-54 [98 32 L.Ed.2d See also 285] Califano 95, 99-100, 228]; Goldfarb, 430 U.S. Califano Davis, (1977); Helvering L.Ed.2d 270] (1937).” A.L.R. 1319] beneficiaries, that, the statute group compensation of workers’ 5 Fisherreasoned from inflationary cost-of-living supple consisting The of Nevada residents. identified subclass entity apparent as discrete group That this was treated ment was limited to subclass. benefits. The basic industrial insur funding supplemental made for the provisions from the alike, benefits, an insurance fund paid and nonresidents were from ance available to residents (Fisher a fixed of benefits. employers, with schedule and maintained Nevada established Reiser, legislative grant action to subsequent, distinct Nevada 610 F.2d at payable from this insurance fund cost-of-living was increase to subclass residents 616.626, 616.628.) (Nev. Nevada Rev. Stat. general §§ funds of the State Nevada. but from this court has not relied on a to find that a presumption constitutionality rational for the statute exists. relationship
Niedle that legitimate also contends there is basis for *10 statute—that if its were cost it but not. savings, say would so does purpose Further, that section was amended at the same time and 139.5 puts cap costs, total vocational rehabilitation which leads to the inevitable conclusion that section must have only discriminatory purpose. to state its intent in statute. A cost Legislature required every containment intent in one statute does not a related expressed preclude containing statute from also costs that its stating without as purpose. Finally, Niedle how the can limit questions Legislature constitutionally vocational rehabilitation benefits for those workers reside out- injured who benefits, side the state when the other permanent disability compensation, care, temporary disability and future medical are not compensation, present similarly limited.
No evidence the other benefits was regarding adduced below and this argument assume, therefore, was not more We fully developed. without that deciding, the administrative cost associated these other benefits remains the same regardless.
Disposition The Board’s order denying reconsideration is affirmed. J.,
Armstrong, concurred. P. TURNER, I concurin the I to judgment. write separately emphasize J. there has been why no denial of the right constitutional to travel. In (1999) Roe 689], U.S. the United States Court identified Supreme three situations in the separate which right had been defined in its decisions. The prior Court held: Supreme “The to ‘right travel’ discussed in our cases embraces at least three different legitimate confining likely has interest in payments spend to those most to them within the (Califano territorial limits of the state. Aznavorian 435].) Fisher reasoned further that the Legislature rationally may have concluded that it was more familiar with the needs of in-state recipients of workers’ decision, compensation, may that there be supporting including additional factors the for, of, administering payments ascertaining eligibility costs of out-of-state residents. Fisher challenged that rationally legitimate found classification furthers all these Reiser, (Fisher p. interests. F.2d at a citizen of one State enter and It right components. protects State, visitor rather than an to be treated a welcome leave another right State, and, for those when second unfriendly present alien temporarily residents, to be treated who elect to become the travelers permanent (Ibid.) of that State.” like other citizens “the from
The first
of the constitutional travel
go
aspect
another,
to cross state'borders while en route
one
place
including
Roe,
S.Ct. at
In
(Saenz
. . . .”
526 U.S. at
p.
p.
Saenz,
limited the
Court examined a California law which
arrived residents. The Su-
newly
maximum welfare benefits available to
in the amount
welfare
Court concluded that such
reduction
preme
(Id. at
did not
an obstacle to
into this state.
entry
benefits
constitute
*11
case,
1525].) In the
the funding
imposed
S.Ct. at p.
present
requirement
[119
4644, subdivision
does not interfere
obviously
Labor Code section
by
cross state borders.
with the
of an
injured employee
its basis in article
The second
of the constitutional travel
finds
aspect
IV,
Constitution, the
and immunities
section 2 of United States
privileges
clause,
states,
to all
“The citizens of each state shall be entitled
which
Saenz,
states.” In
the
and immunities
citizens in the several
privileges
and immuni-
Court set forth the
United States Supreme
pertinent privileges
“Thus,
virtue of a
state citizen-
ties clause
as follows:
analysis
person’s
States, intending
who travels in other
to return
a citizen of one State
ship,
the
‘Privileges
at the end of his
is entitled
enjoy
home
journey,
in the several
that he visits. This
Immunities of Citizens
States’
provision
the disabilities of
in the
alienage
removes ‘from the citizens of each State
168,
[(1868)
(8 Wall.)
v.
75 U.S.
179
L.Ed.
Virginia
other States.’ Paul
[19
357,
. .
from the citizens
(‘[W]ithout some
.
removing
provision
359-360]]
States, and
them
giving
disabilities of
in the other
alienage
of each State the
States,
have
citizens of those
the
would
Republic
equality
privilege
States;
it
constituted
little more than
would not have
league
constituted
exists’).
for nonresi-
It
the Union
now
provides important protections
which
Orbeck,
Hicklin
to obtain
employment,
dents
enter State whether
who
2482,
(1978), to
medical
S.Ct.
57 L.Ed.2d
procure
Further,
Saenz,
in
while discussing the
and
clause
immunities
privileges
aspect
the United States
right,
Court cited as an
Supreme
Kline,
of allowable discrimination the
example
discussion in Vlandis v.
at
at
where it
page
was
pages 2232-2233]
higher
had a
that the State of Connecticut
impose
unquestioned
Later, Vlandis, the
in
tuition on nonresident students.
college
“Our
tuition
stated:
discriminatory
charges
addressed
issue of
again
must
be taken to mean that Connecticut
should in
wise
holding today
residents, for
in
as
university system
purposes
the students
its
classify
fees,
there. Nor should our
because
school
just
they go
tuition and
student,
one
on a
be construed to
a State the
deny
impose
decision
residence, a
durational resi-
bona fide
reasonable
element in demonstrating
We fully
be met while in student status.
which can
dency requirement,
and preserving
that a State has
interest
legitimate
protecting
recognize
own bona fide
and universities and the
of its
colleges
of its
quality
(Id. at
institutions on a
tuition basis.”
residents to attend such
preferential
2236-2237],
omitted.) The omitted footnote in
S.Ct. at
fn.
452-453
of the California
from Vlandis cited to
decision
foregoing
quotation
(1969) 273
University
in Kirk v. Regents
Court Appeal
of California
residency
Kirk concluded a one-year
Cal.Rptr.
Cal.App.2d
260].
reduced
of California student could receive
before a University
requirement
(Id.
not violate the constitutional travel right.
tuition rates did
cited in
is Baldwin v. Montana Fish
Another relevant decision
Comm’n,
1863-
U.S. at
pages
Game
pages
arising
claim
under
another
on travel
boundary
Baldwin drew
1864].
held: “Nor must a State
and immunities clause. Baldwin
the privileges
resident or
anyone,
or all its
equally
all its laws
services
always apply
nonresident,
distinctions
it
do.
Some
so to
may request
who
[Citations.]
that this
reflect the fact
merely
residents and nonresidents
between
States,
other distinctions
individual
and are permitted;
Nation
composed
formation, or the devel
hinder the
they
purpose,
because
prohibited
to those
Only
respect
Union of those States.
single
opment
*13
as a
of the Nation
bearing
vitality
and ‘immunities’
upon
‘privileges’
citizens,
nonresident,
resident and
the State treat all
must
single entity
1860].)
(Id. at
383
S.Ct. at
p.
p.
equally.”
[98
conclu-
following
law leads
of constitutional
body
The foregoing
in the
arising
claim
and immunities clause
sions
concerning
privileges
Roe,
(Saenz v.
supra,
not absolute.
context. The
travel
Witsell,
334 U.S.
1525];
supra,
v.
at
Toomer
p.
297 local action. problems legislative {Landing v. New York Tax require Appeals (1998) 766, 774, 717]; Tribunal 522 U.S. S.Ct. [118 Witsell, Moreover, Toomer v. 1162].) supra, U.S. at p. at p. [68 context, in the higher education states in may based engage reasonably conduct (Saenz residence a cost or discriminatory utilizing factor. funding Roe, v. supra, 526 U.S. at S.Ct. at p. p. [privileges 1525] Kline, immunities claims]; clause and travel right Vlandis supra, at at claim]; 452-453 pp. clause Kirk pp. process 2236-2237] [due Regents University California, Cal.App.2d at p. [equal of claim].) protection Finally, if or on privilege does not bear immunity nation, vitality of discriminatory treatment nonresident against may be constitutional. (Supreme Virginia v. Friedman 2260, 2263-2265, 56]; 64-65 Baldwin Montana Comm’n, Fish and Game 436 U.S. at S.Ct. at p. of these Application principles demonstrates Labor Code section does not violate (g) any travel on premised privileges and immunities clause. This case involves funding college training. The statutory requirement funding limitations on a imposed nonresident are premised a need to contain expenditures and an out-of-state spiraling vocational ante, rehabilitation (See involves program higher costs. maj. opn., 291-292.) at The limited cost pp. limitation by Labor Code section imposed 4644, subdivision nation; does not bear on the vitality out-of-state residents still entitled to vocational to the training, only subject narrow limitation from a need resulting to control workers’ spiraling compensation close, expenditures. Although issue is given the considerable leeway accorded states under determine our federal system to the extent their education, funding for higher and immunities clause privileges violation has occurred under extremely narrow circumstances in this case. present
The third of the travel aspect right identified in is the of newly Saenz arrived citizens to the same and immunities privileges other enjoyed by Roe, residents of this state. supra, 526 U.S. {Saenz 152-1528].) case does not present newly involve arrived resident. In this is not regard, controlling. Saenz
Nonetheless, even if the issue is whether residents Nevada must be treated the same as those exactly California, the crucial analysis *14 as to this third of the travel is as follows: aspect “Disavowing any desire to fence out the indigent, California has instead an entirely advanced fiscal for justification its multitiered scheme. The enforcement of [Welfare and Institutions Code 11450.03 will save the State approximately section] $10.9 million a The year. is not whether such is question saving a legitimate the discriminatory that end may by but whether the State accomplish purpose evenhanded, reduction of about 72 An across-the-board means it has chosen. But the same result. beneficiary for would every produce cents month per does not rest on the weakness answer to the our negative question It on the fact that justification. Citizenship State’s fiscal rests purported Amendment expressly citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth equates for, for, not degrees not and does allow residence: ‘That Clause does provide is clear It length equally based on residence.’ [Citation.] of citizenship of similarly not tolerate a subclasses hierarchy that the Clause does Thus based on the location of their residence. prior situated citizens [Welfare Neither the Code 11450.03 vulnerable: doubly and Institutions section] residence, of their identity prior California nor duration respondents’ residence, Nor do those to their need for benefits. States of has relevance any an making to the State’s interest in equitable factors bear any relationship (Saenz citizens.” among needy the funds to be distributed its allocation of Roe, 1528],. omitted.) at at fn. 506-507 p. supra, of out- different from materially Supervision case present Saenz. then those involves costs retraining greater of-state of vocational recipients ante, (See inside California. maj. opn., incurred when monitoring retraining there situation in where was at This is in contrast p. California resi- the duration of the welfare recipient’s correlation between dence, and their need for benefits. nor the of their residence identity prior Roe, 1527-1528].) (Saenz S.Ct. at pp. Here, to be training for the out-of-state the correlation is clear—it costs more Further, reimbursement this case involves California officials. monitored (Kirk “food, costs, and shelter.” clothing tuition for college payments 440.) No University Cal.App.2d California, v. Regents of occurred. violation has to read as above. was modified printed On March the opinion denied May Court was for review Petitioner’s petition 2001.