47 F.2d 888 | 8th Cir. | 1931
This is an appeal from a conviction for interstate transportation of a stolen automobile from St. Louis, Mo., to Madison, Ill.
The appellant urges two matters here: First, insufficiency of the. evidence; and, second, error in the charge of the court.
II. The contention as to the charge is based upon the following: At the conclusion of the charge the court called for suggestions, whereupon occurred the following:
“Mr. Richards: If the Court please, in view of the fact that tho evidence in this ease is in part circumstantial, we will- ask the Court to charge the jury that if they find the evidence is as consistent with the defendant’s innocence as it is with guilt, then it is their duty to acquit him.
“The Court: I think, in defining circumstantial evidence, I caused that thought to- enter into the definition; more strongly, perhaps, than the mere suggestion of counsel. I shall rest upon what I have charged in that behalf.
“Mr. Richards: We will save our exceptions to the Court’s failure in that.”
In the course of the charge and in connection with a definition of circumstantial evidence, the court said:
“The facts and circumstances from which these inferences are drawn ought to he consistent with each other, consistent with the guilt of the defendant, and wholly inconsistent with any reasonable theory of defendant’s innocence.”
This statement sufficiently covered the matter to which the court’s attention was directed as above.
The judgment of conviction should be, and is, affirmed.