Nicolds v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and ParoleNicolds v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole
*653 DECISION
11 Lаry W. Nicolds appeals the dismissal of his petition seeking extraordinary relief under rule 65B(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See
12 Nicolds filed a petition for extraordinary relief on October 1, 2010, challenging the actions of the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole at his original parole grant hearing, which took placе on October 3, 2006. The district court interpreted Utah Code section 78B-9-107 of the Post-Conviction Remedies Aсt (PCRA) "to be applicable to petitions for extraordinary relief filed by inmates." Section 78B-9-107 requires а post-conviction relief petition to be "filed within one year after the cause of actiоn accrued."
13 In Renn, the Utah Supreme Court stated that while petitions filed under rule 65B(d), which was formerly rule 65B(e), "should be filed within a reasonable time after the act complained of has been done or refused, there is no fixed limitation period governing the time for filing them." Id. Accordingly, the district court in this case erred in applying the one-year statute оf limitations contained in
T4 Laches is comprised of two elеments: "(1) a party's lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that lack of dili-genee." Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Hon. Lindberg,
{ 5 Nicоlds states that he relied upon materials provided by "contract attorneys"who are retained by the Utah Department of Corrections to assist inmates-regarding the statute of limitations applicablе to his petition. He attaches as an addendum to his brief a document captioned Instructions for Completing and Filing a Petition for Writ of Extraordinary Relief that was provided to him by the contract attorneys. Thоse instructions state, in part, "The Statute of limitations for filing a Petition for Extraordinary Relief (
T6 Under these cireumstanсes, the district court's factual finding that filing the petition just short of four years after the original parole grant hearing constituted unreasonable delay is clearly erroneous. Nicolds reasonably relied upon information provided by the contract attorneys as to the applicable statute of limitations. Although we resolve this case on the first element of laches, requiring a demonstration of unreasonable delay or lack of diligence, we note that the district court failed to make specifiс findings of fact on the second element of laches, which requires a demonstration of injury or prejudiсe. Accordingly, the district court erred in dismissing Nicolds's petition for extraordinary relief based upon laсhes.
17 We reverse the dismissal of Nicolds's petition for extraordinary relief and remand to the district court for a determination of the petition on its merits after appropriate service on the Board of Pardons.