47 P. 888 | Or. | 1897
Lead Opinion
Opinion by
This is an action to recover for assessments levied upon unpaid capital stock of a private corporation. About June 18, 1893, some thirteen persons, among whom were Guy Posson, who signed for two shares; J. E. Juston, for four; F. C. Barnes, for ten; and H. Pease, for three — subscribed the following agreement, each placing opposite his name the number of shares presumably intended to be taken: “We, the undersigned, each in consideration of the promise of the other, agree to subscribe for and take the number of shares of the capital stock set opposite our respective names of a company to be incorporated for the purpose of operating- a fertilizer, feeding and fattening stock and poultry; and, if obtainable, collecting and disposing of swill, and other purposes of like nature; said 'company to be incorporated in accordance with the laws of the State of Oregon, with a capital stock of $15,000, divided into 150 shares of the value of $100 each.” There were seventy-eight shares subscribed for upon this paper, representing $7,800. On the 7th day of October, 1893, three of the subscribers executed, duly acknowledged, and caused to be filed and recorded in the proper offices, articles of incorporation, incorporating the Oregon Fertilizing Co., specifying the object and business thereof to be “to transport wood, produce, and garbage, and to crema’. 2
It was urged at the hearing that the defendants ought to be estopped from alleging that the Oregon Fertilizing Company is not a corporation duly incorporated and organized in all respects as contemplated by law, inasmuch as they are subscribers or purchasers of stock subsequent to the alleged completed organization of the company; that, having dealt with the company in its corporate capacity, and having entered into contractual relations with it, they have recognized its existence as a body corporate, and that now, when sued upon their obligation to it as such a body, they should not be permitted to deny
This question disposed of, we come to another, more complex in its nature, and that is whether there has been an organization of the plaintiff corporation under and in pursuance of the general statutes providing therefor. The regularity of the execution and filing of the articles of incorporation is conceded. The persons subscribing the articles are known as the incorporators, and their powers and duties are purely statutory. They.may open books and receive subscriptions to the capital stock; “they shall give notice to the subscribers to meet” at such time and place as they may designate for the purpose of electing directors; they shall act as inspectors at the first meeting for that purpose, certify who are elected, and appoint the time and place of their first meeting. This enumeration comprises the substance of their powers: See section 3222, Hill’s Code. These are all acts necessary to and in furtherance of the completion of the organization. The organization is completed only when directors have been elected, and they have elected a president and secretary, which it is contemplated they shall do at their first meeting. From the time of the first meeting of the directors,
Incidental to this question, it is argued that the purposes designated in the articles of incorporation do not correspond with those set forth in the preliminary subscription, and therefore that Posson and Juston cannot be held to be subscribers. We presume that ordinarily a material departure in this respect will avoid the original agreement, but in this case the persons named have construed the purposes to be one and the same by participation in the organization under the articles of incorporation, or, rather, to speak more concisely, they have assented to the departure, if such it may be termed: Knox v. Childersburg Land Co., 86 Ala. 180 (5 South. 578).
Again, it is urged that if the primary subscription is sufficient to bind the subscribers to the capital stock of the concern, then, Barnes and Pease not being present, and having no notice of the first meeting, and not having waived the same by writing or otherwise, the election of directors was irregular and void. We are not to be understood as passing upon the sufficiency of this paper within itself, but that, considering the subscription thereto of Posson and Juston, in connection with their subsequent acts, they were properly recognized as stockholders, and hence that one-half of the capital stock was represented at the organization of the company. The fact that Barnes and Pease had not been notified of the meeting could not furnish grounds for objection by those subscribers present and participating therein; they have not
The defendants, if subscribers to the capital stock, became such after the organization, and the want of notice to Barnes and Pease could not affect them; so that they are in no better position to object to the regularity of the organization on that account than those participating in the first meeting. The result is that, in so far as they are concerned, the company was duly incorporated, and this result is reached, not because they are estopped by having dealt with it, but because it was legally organized prior to their subscription to the capital stock.
For the purpose of estopping the plaintiff from asserting its due and legal organization, it is alleged in the answer in abatement that plaintiff had theretofore instituted an action in a justice’s court against Guy Posson for assessments made by the company upon his alleged subscription to the capital stock; that a trial was had upon the sole issue whether Posson was a subscriber at the date of the attempted organization; and that it was determined by the judgment that he was not. It is claimed that, as the same question is necessarily involved in determining in this action whether the plaintiff was duly organized, the plaintiff is estopped to assert its truth, the judg
Reversed.
Rehearing
Decided April 19, 1897.
On Motion for Rehearing.
(48 Pac. 474.)
Opinion by
Since the opinion was rendered in this cause, we have been favored with an elaborate brief upon respondents’ motion for a rehearing, urging with commendable earnestness that the court is in error in holding that the plaintiff is not estopped to prosecute this action by reason of the judgment rendered and given in Posson’s favor in the justice’s court. In our anxiety to be right, we have at much pains re-examined the question, but find no reason for receding from our former position. One line
Willoughby v. Chicago Junction Railway Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 656, was a case instituted by plaintiff in behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated who should come in and be made parties to the suit, in deciding which the court said: “From the very form and nature of these suits, each stockholder must be considered as represented; for if he is in sympathy with the complainant he may become a party complainant by application to the court, if he is in sympathy with the threatened action of the company, he is represented by and in the corporation, which is a necessary party to the suit.” This was held to fall within a class of cases where a duty is incumbent upon
Rehearing Denied.