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Nickelsberg v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
814 P.2d 1328
Cal.
1991
Check Treatment

*1 Aug. 1991.] S013121. [No. NICKELSBERG, Petitioner,

DIETER LOS ANGELES APPEALS BOARD and COMPENSATION WORKERS’ DISTRICT, Respondents. SCHOOL UNIFIED

Counsel A. Herreras and John William W. for Petitioner. Messer Rucka, & Rucka Lombardo McKenna and N. Michael as Amici O’Boyle, Curiae on behalf Petitioner. Tobin, Truce, & Hamrick Robert W. and Michael A.

Kegel, Gilpin Ingler Respondents.

Haworth, Bradshaw & Amici Curiae Chaney Taylor C. Gordon on behalf Respondents.

Opinion PANELLI, J. review determine We granted to whether workers’ com- pensation judge had Dieter petitioner to Nickelsberg (Nickelsberg) five more than conclude, the date of his original We did the Workers’ Compensa- tion Appeals (WCAB) Board and the Court of that the Appeal, workers’ compensation lacked judge jurisdiction to award to

indemnity Nickelsberg.

Facts Nickelsberg, District, a truck driver for Angeles the Los Unified School suffered industrial injuries to his back in in legs again 1976 and 1979. Nickelsberg with the stipulated district and State school with the Compen sation Insurance Fund that his had in injuries resulted temporary disability 6, 1979, 1981, January 8, from through June and in permanent disability percent. 663A also parties need stipulated Nickelsberg might further medical treatment cure or to relieve Pursuant injuries’ effects. to the stipulation, workers’ compensation judge awarded Nickelsberg indemnity for temporary and and further permanent medical treatment on 2, February 1983.

Nickelsberg underwent back July 1987. Pursuant to surgery original award, the school district paid for medical treatment. He Nickelsberg’s was 7, 1987, again 25, temporarily, totally disabled March November 1987. 8, 1988, nine of his 1979 from the date more than

On February He claimed his award. reopen filed a petition injury, Nickelsberg in Labor Code as defined disability” a “new and further that he had suffered that, was the new period He claimed because also award, he was his existing provided pursuant medical treatment by caused under Labor indemnity further entitled to recover 4656, 4656,1 Stats. (see by as amended as amended § Code section claim, the school 2913). In ch. opposition § the time and by that an additional award would be barred district contended and 5410. of sections 5804 limitations jurisdictional judge the workers’ Nickelsberg’s argument, Accepting 10,1988, on November further total disability indemnity awarded The WCAB the WCAB. reconsideration sought school district However, be- untimely. was determined that the school district’s petition erred judge determined that the workers’ compensation cause WCAB grant it decided to disability, further granting (§ (b).) its own motion. subd. reconsideration on that “an award the award. The WCAB determined The WCAB rescinded with it a commensu- carry treatment does not implicitly basis, WCAB con- On that rate award total disability.” of temporary *5 and section 5804 cluded that was barred Nickelsberg’s petition reopen award jurisdiction that the therefore lacked compensation judge workers’ affirmed. The Court of disability indemnity. Appeal total temporary Discussion2 for “[aggregate disability payments Former section 4656 that provided than 240 shall not extend for more single injury causing disability temporary within a five from the date of compensable years weeks period injury.” (Sen. (1977-1978 Reg.

Section 4656 amended in Bill was 1978. No. 1851 1978, 937, 1, Sess.) removed the Stats. ch. The 1978 amendment § 240-week within a disability 5-year limitation on aggregate temporary for or after postinjury period injuries occurring January on single injury statute now that for a “[ajggregate disability provides payments 1, 1979, disability shall not occurring prior January causing indicated. 1All further references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise Nickelsberg’s parties any disability arising 2We asked the to brief the issue from whether new, might compensable further medical treatment We have determined injury. constitute a and, require that resolution of this case does not that we address that like the Court issue we Appeal, only question compensation jurisdiction. decide the of the workers’ judge’s five extend more than within a compensable period for weeks single injury for a injury. disability from the date Aggregate payments H] 1, 1979, temporary partial or after occurring January causing on period weeks within a shall not extend for more than 240 compensable added.) (§ injury.” five the date of the italics years from Nickelsberg argues current of section Relying on version had to award further compensation jurisdiction workers’ judge than five original more indemnity must assumes that an initial award of “future treatment” include, reasonably “secondary be as a interpreted consequence,” award of future such disability indemnity resulting amended, treatment all awards and section removes limits on Nickelsberg argues Based on that disability. assumption, that the workers’ judge his simply enforced under 5803.3 argument is the understand- Implicit ing that the and provisions section 5804 for the amendment of an award4 in 5410 for an award of “new and further are disability”5 inapplicable. Merely The Workers’ Compensation Judge

A. Enforcing Was Not Nickelsberg’s Original Award Pursuant to Section 5803 indicated,

As Nickelsberg argues that an award of future medical includes, treatment as a award of implicitly consequence, secondary future temporary total treatment disagree. We Medical indemnity. (Burton are two different classes of benefits. orders, 3Section 5803 states: appeals “The board has its continuing over all division, decisions and awards made and entered under the of this provisions time, decisions and orders any rehabilitation unit established under Section 139.5. At upon interest, notice and after an opportunity given parties appeals heard is to the rescind, alter, order, may decision, award, board *6 any good appearing or amend or cause therefor. review, power diminish, increase, terminate, right “This grant includes the regrant, to or or division, awarded, within prescribed the limits by any this compensation upon grounds recurred, that the of the person in whose was favor the award made has either increased, diminished, or terminated.” rescinded, altered, 4Former section 5804 states part: in “No award compensation of shall be years or amended five date except upon party from the of the a a injury petition by in interest filed any within such five counterpetition seeking by other relief filed adverse party days original within 30 petition of the raising issues in addition those raised to by original petition.” such “Nothing 5Section 5410 states: chapter right any employee in this injured shall bar the of to institute proceedings for the compensation of collection five date of the within after the injury upon ground that the original injury has caused new and further or the need for vocational rehabilitation benefits. The the appeals of board these cases in continuing shall be a jurisdiction at all times within period. this The section not extend does provided limitation in Section 5407.” 294 (1980) Cal.Rptr. 112 Comp. Cal.App.3d Bd. Appeals [169

Workers’ that 72].) No the conclusion reported opinion supports award. benefit of a medical is a or disability merely secondary consequence Indeed, separate are disability indemnity treatment and “[m]edical different, com fulfill though which and distinct elements of surgical for medical and legislative liability goals. Employer plementary, in facilitate the speedy is worker’s provided major part services order his recovery employment. [Citation.] to maximize productive [or her] for the indemnity primarily is intended substitute Temporary disability income. stream of steady worker’s lost order maintain wages, compen has a dual function: to Permanent [Citation.] both for actual to work and for incapacity physical impairment sate (J. T. worker’s which or body, may may incapacitating. not [Citation.]” 327, 333 Thorp, Comp. Appeals (1984) Inc. v. 153 Cal.App.3d Workers’ Bd. case, in the “an 219].) As the noted Cal.Rptr. present WCAB [200 it a with implicitly carry award of further medical treatment does not Temporary disability indemnity.” commensurate award of work as a because disability, missing which is result of paid medical is a benefit and distinct from treatment. injury, separate Hence, indem- total disability errs Nickelsberg assuming award of is of an further nity merely secondary consequence argues treatment. Based on this mistaken assumption, award, when in an original future medical treatment included is amended, recover applicant allows whenever, as, are He is entitled long required. benefits and for as they benefits, contends, these he as a mere enforcement his under section We disagree.

The of section does not plain language support “The fundamental construction interpretation. purpose effectuate the of the to ascertain intent of the as to purpose lawmakers so intent, law. In determine we begin examining order to this [Citation.] v. Pieters 52 Cal.3d language (People statute. [Citation.]” 420].) P.2d 1978 amendment section 4656 removed the 240-week limitation on aggregate temporary this 5-year within a The removal of indemnity period. postinjury *7 limitation, however, can now imply disability does not temporary be awarded time and for a result of an any period as any future medical Such a of the amendment treatment. broad interpretation 5410 and abrogate jurisdictional would the time and limitations of sections (See, 297-299.) post, pp. amendment to section 4656 on the Nickelsberg bases his interpretation in the legislative process. the comments of various preenactment participants in Relations its enrolled bill report the of Industrial For example, Department temporary stated that law “[p]resent provides payment of 5 within a period shall not be for more than 240 weeks indemnity paid instances, In from the date of most injury. cases which concluded before this is reached. There are however long point in the need where an results for injury create a situation industrial hardship the time arbitrary more than 5 after the date of Due to surgery limit, and is the is then entitled to receive medical benefits employee only indemnity resulting from precluded receiving temporary disability these situations create hospitalization surgery. Although occurring rarely, an obvious that is difficult to defend.” & Services (Agr. Agency, hardship Bill Sen. Industrial Relations Com. Enrolled and Recommendations to Rep. (1977-1978 Sess.) Bill Aug. Governor on Sen. No. 1851 as amended Reg. 14, 1978, 1.) p.

Nickelsberg also different of the highlights interpretation somewhat amendment of Assembly Ways section 4656 contained Means Committee staff Bill The of Senate No. 1851. states that analysis analysis intent bill was “to for totally benefits provide disability disabled limit. persons beyond 240 week contend existing Proponents that often surgery or other treatment is after an required years injury remove sergically etc.).” (Assem. implanted Ways devices (plates, pins, [sic ] Com., and Means (1977-1978 Bill Analysis Reg. Staff of Sen. No. 1851 14, 1978, Sess.) 1.) as amended Aug.

However, other portions legislative contradict history Finance, interpretation of Senate Bill No. 1851. For example, Assembly Insurance, and Commerce Committee of the bill states that the analysis removal of the limitation on “would provide for the payment of the workers’ compensation temporary long benefits as the continues.” for Finance, (Assem. Insurance, Com., & Commerce Bill of Sen. No. Analysis (1977-1978 Sess.) Reg. as amended May that,

This analysis of the bill indicates amending Legislature intended to remove of 240 weeks cap 5-year period the payment of disability and to allow an who is applicant continuously temporarily totally disabled to continue to receive benefits without an cutoff arbitrary date. Such an is also interpretation supported a consultant’s report to Senate Industrial Relations Committee. report states that the amendment eliminate proposed to section 4656 “would the 240-week limitation on the payment of benefits for temporary disability *8 long injury, instead shall continue as single provide such benefits disability L. Casey Young

as the continues." of Consultant (Rep. 1978) added.) the Relations Com. italics (Apr. p. Sen. Industrial Furthermore, the the mandated cost estimate of the bill prepared the “Although predict of Finance states: data is not available Department number of cases affected and the additional losses per [by amendment] case, cases, we believe that will be rare. In most either quite such cases or permanent stationary longer temporary, becomes and thus no are temporary disability the worker recovers 240 weeks long benefits before of Finance, 10, 1978) paid." p. of Mandated Estimate (Dept. (May Cost added.) italics statute, indicated, statements,

As these with the of language consistent that the amendment was intended to suggest permit to section 4656 receive as he or she is applicant long for as statements, continuously disabled without an cutoff date. These arbitrary however, suggest applicant, do not intended to Legislature permit benefits, based on an award future be able to invoke of whenever WCAB’s to award benefits he or she medical treatment requires for previous

Moreover, Finance, the financial impact of Department estimating of the the amendments would amendments to section indicated that affect few and that the amendment would be “very quite cases” the costs of small. “Losses will increase than 0.1 and thus no premium less percent increase will entities will necessary. governmental Thus insured local Estimate, Finance, incur no additional Mandated costs.” Cost (Dept, supra, 1.) at The mandated the amendment p. prepared by cost estimate of Department significant Finance further states: “We do not anticipate (Id. increases in to result from this bill.” These loss-experience conservative cost are of section estimates inconsistent with an interpretation 4656 that would indem- allow unlimited awards of case which future have nity every medical benefits been awarded. consistent, however, cost are estimates with an of the amend- interpretation ment as are only affecting continuously who disabled. applicants the bill would effect

Although Nickelsberg contends his interpretation cases, a limited only number of his proposed interpreta- implications tion are broad. often include an Settlements of workers’ claims each of future medical interpretation, care. Under Nickelsberg’s these cases would implicitly also include an award future *9 result, for this further temporary As a would be liable disability. employers it although contemplated original was not disability indemnity, total award. shown,

As and future medical bene- total indemnity serve distinct different compensation system. fits and roles workers’ negate Nickelsberg’s The different roles the two classes of benefits an that future conclusion an award of medical treatment includes implicitly Furthermore, future his- legislative award of total disability. of Senate Bill does support No. 1851 not tory conclusively interpretation allowing judge 4656 as workers’ to award unlim- ited secondary as a consequence Hence, of further award medical benefits. it incorrect to characterize the is of further award as mere enforcement of his under section 5804.

Moreover, Bill No. Nickelsberg’s interpretation of Senate 1851 would us to conclude the bill require somehow amended or altered the time and jurisdictional limits of sections 5410 or 5804 allow resumption tempo- rary disability indemnity whenever future an award of medical benefits in a period results of further temporary disability. We do not believe the Legislature intended such a broad result. argument contrary both clear statutory construction and well-established judicial Moreover, interpretation of 5410 and sections 5804. it controverts entire administration, scheme of workers’ compensation judicial which for time and provides jurisdictional limitations commencement of upon proceedings modifications of prior determinations.

The WCAB is vested with the to conduct authority proceedings for recovery (§ 5300 et compensation. seq.) Concomi tantly, it is empowered with its continuing jurisdictional authority over all of orders, However, (§ decisions and 5803.) awards. this power is not unlim awards, ited. The WCAB’s under authority section 5803 its enforce commutation, including ancillary proceedings involving penalty assessment like, and the is not to confused with its limited jurisdiction to alter prior awards benefit at a later latter augmentation date. The action is subject the provisions of sections 5410 and (General Foundry Service Comp. Workers’ Appeals (1986) Bd. 42 Cal.3d 331 [228 124]; P.2d Broadway-Locust Co. v. Ind. (1949) Acc. Com. 92 Cal.App.2d 856]; 290-294 P.2d v. Olson Co. Cal.Comp.Cases Ruffin inferred, It that the 1979 may Nickelsberg suggests, not be amendment, aggregate temporary the 240-week limitation on removing manner any within a disability payments 5-year postinjury period, *10 either 5410 or the time or limitations of section jurisdictional modified conclusion, the liberal 5804. his on Nickelsberg supports relying section However, mandate the rule of liberal construction of section 3202.6 in construction stated section 3202 should not be used to defeat overall framework and fundamental rules of construction. statutory statutory Furthermore, in make way statutes should be such a as to interpreted other, (People them v. consistent with each rather than obviate one another. Pieters, 894, 899.) Cal.3d that the supra, 52 It is logical presume statutes, Legislature including was aware of the existence of all relevant 5804, sections and when it in section 4656. change 5410 considered the did as observed not Significantly, by Appeal, Legislature Court amend the broad specifically accomplish purpose sections 5410 and 5804 to in 4656. Nickelsberg suggests change motivated section Since the limita Legislature change jurisdictional did not explicitly (see of the Singh tions WCAB or the time limitations of section 5410 v. (1987) 15), Workers’ Nick Comp.Appeals Bd. 52 Cal.Comp.Cases accepting im elsberg’s Legislature contention would us to conclude that the require are plicitly repealed sections 5804 and 5410. Repeals by implication disfavored and are when statutes recognized only conflicting potentially 630, (Dew (1979) cannot be Appleberry harmonized. 23 Cal.3d 636 [153 219, however, 509].) P.2d between the Disharmony, 591 of section and and exists provisions only 4656 those of sections 5410 5804 if one takes—as does broad view of when Nickelsberg—an overly view disability indemnity may ignores be awarded. Such a both statutory classification of these sections7 and the Legislature’s presumed awareness, 4656, when it amended long history judicial section of the of sections and 43 interpretation (People v. Hallner 715, Cal.2d 393].) P.2d 6300) 6Section 3202 (commencing states: “This division and Division 5 with Section shall liberally purpose extending construed the courts with the their benefits for the

protection persons injured employment.” in the course of their jurisdictional 7The conclusion that the amendment of section 4656 does not alter other or supported by analysis given time limitations is legislative placement of the and classification 4656, 5410, 5803, 2, 4, sections chapter part and 5804. Section 4656 is found division 2 of in the Labor Code. “Computation chapter Part 2 is entitled and 2 is Compensation,” 5803, 5804, contrast, 5410, designated “Compensation placed Schedules.” are Sections and part “Compensation Proceedings.” Section 5410 entitled “Limita part chapter tions of Proceedings,” “Findings and chapter sections 5803 and 5804 are in entitled and Awards.” evident, With these unlikely Legislature classifications so it is that the intended that the implicitly amendment to section 4656 would limitations for alter either time initiating proceedings under jurisdictional or the restrictions of sections 5803 and 5804. Furthermore, amend conclusion that the public supports sound policy the time and abrogate ment section 4656 does not jurisdictional serve mere do not express limits of sections 5410 and 5804. Those sections express legislative concern for stale statutes concern barring claims. obligations. and benefit finality the determination of certainty tempo T he own limited to award power WCAB’s of its interpretation recognizes more rary original injury than five in Broadway-Locust this need for and As was Co. v. certainty finality. stated Com., Ind. Acc. 293: “This supra, long continued Cal.App.2d page has led interpretation by powers necessarily the commission of its own itself industry recognize to liabilities adjust responsibilities *11 consistent with well as . . . It is important understood limitations to time. . . . that the cost insurance be compensation overall should [workers’] ascertainable with reasonable order that business certainty operations may be adjusted accordingly and . . enabled to agencies may operate state . be greatest with the measure efficiency liability and competency. Contingent unlimited as to time for which the now would result argues commission great confusion. or his carrier would employer No insurance know what might claims from cases settled and written off.”8 emerge long since the Finally, WCAB’s own that the determination workers’ compensation 4656, amended, judge lacked under further jurisdiction section as to award temporary total disability is entitled to on review. significant respect judicial case, In the instant following workers’ award of compensation judge’s further total temporary granted WCAB disability indemnity, reconsider- 5900, ation its (§ on own motion. (b).) subd. The WCAB found that original “award of further medical with treatment does not it implicitly carry a commensurate award of and disability,” total concluded temporary Nickelsberg’s petition was time agreed barred. The Court of with the Appeal WCAB that “the workers’ lacked award compensation judge jurisdiction to further temporary total WCAB’s indemnity.” interpretation jurisdictional its authority grant to new further disability, and as reconsideration, expressed its decision on on not this only persuasive issue, its and interpretation application of these three statutes is entitled to 4656, amended, 8Based on section’ as Foundry General Service v. and our decision in Comp. Workers’ 243, Appeals Bd (1986) 124], Cal.Rptr. 42 Cal.3d 331 721 P.2d [228 Appeal Court of in this case that might proper indicated it reserve WCAB to jurisdiction to award temporary disability indemnity hospitalization surgery related to or occurring years more than five after the date of injury. We note General Foundry Comp. Service v. Workers’ Appeals Bd. was not decided until approximately Also, Nickelsberg four after received his initial award. as observed Appeal, Nickelsberg Court WCAB jurisdiction did not reserve to award further we disability. Consequently, have no in the case present occasion to determine authority whether the WCAB have does award jurisdiction reserve more than five the date of the 300 Auto. (See Nipper review.9 judicial respect upon significant California 854, 35, P.2d (1977) 19 Cal.3d [136 Risk Plan

Assigned interpretations administrative respect have accorded generally 743] [“We erroneous, factors and, them significant have deemed clearly of a law unless [Citations.]”]; Mc- Mudd v. statutory meaning purpose. in ascertaining that the 10].) We conclude P.2d Cal.2d Colgan was correct the relevant statutes application WCAB’s interpretation Nickelsberg’s petition and adds further conclusion support is barred. recover Total Temporary Receive Further Nickelsberg Is Not Entitled to

B. Disability Indemnity of section the amendment rejected Nickelsberg’s interpretation

Having had judge if compensation determine the workers’ we still must laws to of the workers’ under another section interpreta- Given our disability. Nickelsberg petition considering Nickelsberg’s which precludes tion of section can only action under an enforcement merely *12 (1) the WCAB in time if: at this disability point recover for 5804; (2) he had or award under section original to amend its authority had had filed a and under section 5410 a “new and further disability” suffered evident, that Nick- we conclude will recovery. claim for As become timely avenues of either of these two his within cannot elsberg bring petition recovery. possible Compensation the Workers’ The Determined That Correctly

1. WCAB 5804 Judge Lacked Jurisdiction Under Section recover on his be able to Nickelsberg might The under which theory first to jurisdiction if had the WCAB disability claim for is circum- in certain allows a party, amend his award. Section 5804 original rescind, alter, stances, award. original amend an file a or petition However, the original filed within five of years a must be such petition 5804; see, ante, 293, 4.) original his (§ fn. suffered p. 5, 1979, filed for further petition and his injury January on 8, his to reopen Because Nickelsberg’s petition on 1988. February injury, original five from the date of his award was filed more than also, where the WCAB (1987) Cal.Comp.Cases 343 9See Co. 52 Olson Glass Ruffin permits an award rejected argument amendment to section that the According surgery.” such as contingency, some happening “upon subterfuge to nothing more than a would be Ruffin, to the WCAB in an award . . . “[s]uch {Ibid.) and 5804.” Code Sections 5410 Labor jurisdiction avoid the limitation of contained in lacked compensation judge determined that the workers’ correctly WCAB award under section 5804 to alter or amend the original for further provide disability.

2. “New Further Disability” further “new and petition second avenue is for possible recovery An under section institute disability” may proceedings, employee five injury, within the date of the for collection original that has new and ground injury caused compensation upon original see, case, 5410; ante, (§ 5.) further In the disability. present fn. p. he Nickelsberg initially filed his that reopen claiming his award petition had In his trial suffered new to section 5410. disability pursuant however, memorandum day filed same as the petition, argued that he was seeking enforcement of his pursuant section 4656.

The term and further disability” “new is not defined statute and its meaning is not entirely (Pizza Comp. clear. Hut San v. Workers’ Diego, Inc. However, Appeals 131].) Bd. Cal.App.3d [143 Court one has described a and further as “a Appeal disability” “new addition to that for which the employer previously provided (Id. benefits as required by statute.” “The ‘further phrase disability’ for presupposes such addition to which were timely or which proceedings commenced already was (Kauffman paid [(1918)] v. Industrial Accident Com. 37 Cal.App. 690]). 502-503 R has It also been recognized significance ‘[s]ome ’ *13 given must be (See to the word “new.” Westvacoetc. Com. Corp. Ind. Acc. [(1955)] 136 300].)” (Id. 825.) at Cal.App.2d 64-68 P.2d p. “ The Court of Appeal Hut ‘New further noted: and further Pizza can disability a develop only after or an cessation temporary disability interruption of temporary disability by a of nondisablement. A new period period temporary . . is a and further disability . new . . . disability. [ft] Historically, change in physical necessitating condition further medical treatment had been considered new and disability further whether not or accompanied time lost by (Cal. from work. Workmen’s Compen [Citation.]’ (Cont.Ed.Bar 4.21, 108-109; Hanna, sation Practice 1973) see also pp. § Law of [Cal. Employee Injuries (2d ed.)] Workmen’s Compensation 9.03[2].) Thus, § new ‘[cjommonly, and further recur disability refers to a treatment, rence of temporary a new for disability, need or of a change temporary (Cal. disability.’ into a Work permanent 12.12, men’s Compensation (Cont.Ed.Bar 1973) Practice 410.)” p. § {Pizza Bd., supra, Cal.App.3d Comp. Appeals Inc. v. Workers’ Diego, Hut San disability.” further indeed a “new and be disability may Nickelsberg’s dis he received injury, industrial After 8,1981. 6,1979, received a He June through January ability indemnity nondisable After a period rating percent. of 66¾ permanent result, seeks ment, he now 1987. As a July had surgery back Nickelsberg March period indemnity total disability 25, 1987. through November however, dis- if Nickelsberg’s decide we need not

In the final analysis, does, If would petition it his disability. a new and further as ability qualifies not, be only action could If it his does be under section untimely noted, However, as previously award. to amend his brought petition untimely. 5804 would also such an action under section

Conclusion 4656 that of section court an interpretation seeks from this award of when an unlimited would provide either not justified is medical treatment is made. Such interpretation Hence, the workers’ statutory intent or sound construction. legislative clear lacked to award judge Nickelsberg. affirmed.

The of the Court of judgment Appeal Lucas, J., Arabian, J., Baxter, J., C. concurred. of La- amendment

BROUSSARD, J. Legislature’s 1978 Dissenting. The in Nickels- allow workers was intended to expressly bor Code section 46561 recover- while indemnity total disability to obtain berg’s position intent, seizes but rather does not honor that ing majority from surgery. amendment, in neither the supported upon interpretation I respectfully defeats the amendment’s purpose. nor its language history, *14 dissent.

I. outcomes accept in which we are constrained statute by There are cases the implore In recourse is to unjust. only are those cases our manifestly that indicated. the Code unless otherwise 1All further references are to Labor lies remedy sanctioned remedy judicially to enact a when Legislature case, however, In the took Legislature the courts’ the instant beyond powers. had otherwise relieve workers of a burden the statutes injured action to those workers. placed upon amending the in beyond Legislature,

It is that question in which considered the of workers the plight exactly position ante, 295.) A staff (See legislative finds at today maj. p. himself. opn., “Proponents the amendment stated: analysis accompanying specifically [of the contend that often or other treatment surgery required amendment] (As . injury after an to remove devices . . .” [surgically] implanted Com., (1977- sem. Sen. Bill No. 1851 Ways Means Staff Analysis 14, 1978, Sess.) 1.) as amended One Reg. Aug. p. agency, commenting bill, on the “There which create a pending hardship noted: are . . . cases situation where an industrial in the need more than injury surgery results for after the date limit of the Due to the time the arbitrary [of statute], prior is then entitled to receive medical benefits employee only and is from precluded receiving temporary disability indemnity resulting hospitalization surgery. Although occurring rarely, these situa tions create an obvious that is difficult & Services hardship (Agr. to defend.” Sen. Agency, Industrial Relations Enrolled Bill and Recommen Rep. Com. (1977-1978 Sess.) dations to Governor on Sen. Bill as Reg. No. 1851 14, 1978, 1.) amended Aug. p.

It is rare that legislative will in the history give explicit guidance us such and, instance, interpretation of I by statutes this am bewildered majority’s suggestion that history this is “contradicted” or otherwise invalid. The “other portions of the cited legislative majority do not history” by support majority’s suggestion that total was intended to be limited to cases workers who had suffered involving Rather, continuous temporary total relied disability. reports upon majority each stated that for would indemnity disability continue for long as as the continues. These statements are indubitably true. Yet the italicizes certain as majority phrases if to suggest the words in each instance were intended to emphasize the Legislature wished to limit recovery suffered continuously.2 amended statute reference deletes all occurring and therefore cannot be read to support that, proposition five temporary to be more than paid legislative 2The history support of Nickelsberg’s position expressly also noted that the state, additional cost to the negligible. if Senate Bill No. 1851 were would be This passed, material refutes the majority’s speculation that the cost of Senate Bill No. 1977-1978 Session, Regular implemented if legislative history, discussed in the would be necessarily ante, (See significant. maj. opn., *15 continuously. after the years injury, the date must be suffered Moreover, (See such interpretation fundamentally an is inconsistent § that, with the “where an industrial legislative history recognizing injury in results the need for than 5 date of surgery injury,” more after the an injured is in because employee placed situation” that em- “hardship “is from ployee resulting precluded receiving temporary disability indemnity from the and hospitalization surgery.”3

II. cases, case, In in as future in many this treatment is awarded major indeterminate in the anticipation surgery at an time future. Section amended, any was not to allow instance of total be awarded than five an more but for case injury, particular provided arises as a result the medical treatment when the disability is, view, through the award. initial in my Because the inseparable treatment, I from the believe that award of future medical treatment with it a implicitly carries provision

should that medical treatment disabling.4 we must

Preliminarily, note that workers’ laws’ compensation provi- sions for injured employees’ medical treatment are unequivocal: employees are entitled to whatever treatment needed to cure and relieve from the Thus, XIV, effects of the industrial article of the section California medical, Constitution for such requires provision surgical, hospital “full 3It is important to note that the majority affirmatively rejects interpretation never of the proffered amendment to by Nickelsberg, legislative section but assert that “the merely history of conclusively [Nickelsberg’s interpretation]” Senate Bill No. 1851 does support not ante, (maj. opn., added) light “contradictory” at italics history of the discussed in the majority opinion. Accordingly, interpreting (e.g., a court in the future section 4656 determine compensation judge whether a workers’ may tempo reserve to award rary total disability) legislative must consider by Nickelsberg, how the history presented well as that presented by majority, the question presented affects to that court. 4The majority, making a policy argument in favor of misstates position, grossly its position implications that [Nickelsberg’s] advocates: “the proposed interpre tation are broad. Settlements of workers’ claims often include an award of future Nickelsberg’s interpretation, medical care. Under implicity each of these cases would result, also include an of future temporary disability. employers As a would be liable for this indemnity, although was not contemplated it ante, (Maj. opn., 296-297.) award.” pp. fact, Nickelsberg only argues In every award of implicitly future medical treatment carries with it disability indemnity resulting medical treatment. future interpretation comports Such an legislative amending with intent in i.e., would impact have far less majority, than the straw man attacked an award of by the future medical treatment that any includes an award for occurrence disability, including disability totally provided pursuant unrelated to medical treatment injured award. worker’s

305 other remedial treatment relieve the effects of as is to cure and from requisite (Italics injury such . . . .” added.) Section which establishes entitled, treatments to which injured are also employers workers requires “Medical, a range broad and provide surgical, treatments: chiropractic, treatment, medicines, hospital including nursing, surgical sup- and crutches, . . . to cure or relieve plies, apparatus reasonably required (Italics the effects provided by employer.” from shall be injury added.)

In order to cure and relieve himself or the effect of the injury, herself from the injured has after employee option no but to follow doctor’s orders The treatment surgery. be may essentially affirmative—e.g., undergo rigorous physical it therapy—or may essentially negative—e.g., be to avoid instance, strenuous In this was physical activity. required absent himself from work while from the recuperating treatments. As matter, it policy should be clear that full remedial treatment of provision for an industrial should not be limited injury artificially to medical expenses alone, but rather should resources for an provide necessary employee procedures disabled medical from those fully recuperate procedures. and, The majority in an indulges academic exercise that evades issue accordingly, sheds no light on whether can be paid to an to an employee pursuant award of future medical treatment. Typically, medical treatment and are disability indemnity considered separate ante, Thus, distinct (See elements of compensation. maj. opn., the purposes of assessing (Burton penalties Comp. Appeals v. Workers’ Bd. (1980) 112 72]) Cal.App.3d or Cal.Rptr. assuring that an employee [169 with asbestosis may get medical treatment before manifests itself (J. Thorp, T. Inc. v. Workers’Comp. Appeals Bd. Cal.App.3d 219]), courts properly draw a distinction between these However, classes of benefits. the fact that are different they classes of benefits does not determine the issue that placed squarely has been before the court today: May directly that results covered medical treatment be awarded incident award of future medical treatment?

An injured worker sorely needing major surgery more than five the date of his or her injury will be assured that actual cost of the covered, treatment will under yet the majority’s he or she cannot holding least, be compensated under an (at existing without an express jurisdiction) reservation of for his or her time out of work.5 For treatments majority 5The opinion does not possibility disability arising rule out the that worker’s new, from medical may treatment compensable injury purposes in itself constitute a for the *17 like of off work for several months without Nickelsberg’s, prospect being the Some workers will have compensation may prove prohibitively expensive. least, as as is long possible. no alternative but to for forgo surgery—at he When the or she can by assuring worker’s interest is thus served sustained as the disability receive for of, treatment, to, result and incident an of future medical award award instances, should In both the indemnity. be to include other interpreted courts and the fit Legislature have seen treatment, they

incident to medical in of the are spite general premise (See of [allowing compensation different classes of benefits. 4600 § incident to a medical one expenses day examination]; (1969) Bd. 268 Comp. App. Caldwell v. Workmen’s 912, day 917 for an award of one Cal.App.2d Cal.Rptr. [allowing [74 517] diagnosis for time lost incident to a medical Thus, ac- alleged industrial the courts and the have injury].) Legislature if that medical an em- knowledged treatment is a practical impossibility ployee cannot afford to the time off from work. That same rationale forgo me that our should Nick- persuades provide workers’ statutes compensation for the time he needs elsberg compensation recuperate surgery, well as for the costs of the treatment itself. context,

In might another a rigid distinction between “classes of benefits” here, however, be in we supported obligated are policy; interpret relevant in statutes favor. Section 3202 commands that injured worker’s with provisions of this code “shall be construed courts liberally the purpose extending injured their benefits for the protection persons in the course of their not a rule which courts employment.” provision This (See, their discretion limit or but is a mandate. may disregard, 465, e.g., (1948) Industrial Indem. Exch. v. Ind. Acc. Com. 87 Cal.App.2d 75].) 467 P.2d When “a of the Act is of an provision susceptible [197 interpretation either beneficial or detrimental we are injured employee called ... upon adopt construction beneficial to such employee.” (Liptak (1926) 635].) 42 Industrial Acc. Com. Cal. P. 200 [251 **6 Hundreds of cases this reported support apply principle.* My analysis (Cf. Rodgers Comp. Appeals v. Workers’ Bd. (1985) workers’ laws. Cal.App.3d 571-574 [injury employer- incurred in the course of [214 303] new, provided rehabilitation constitutes a compensable injury].) are, course, 6There construing circumstances a statute justified which court is not “unmistakable in favor injured limiting of the worker. A construction may required by Ranch, (Earl Ltd. v. Industrial Acc. Com. language (1935) of a statute” 4 Cal.2d [53 (Ruiz 154]), “Legislature’s P.2d expressed ignored and the intent as in the statute” cannot be v. Industrial Acc. Com. 229]; see Fuentes v. Workers’ 45 Cal.2d P.2d of the issues the inevitable conclusion that we must the inter- yields adopt of the statutes at pretation issue that would afford opportu- to collect nity indemnity.

III. above, For the reasons I discussed would reverse the of the judgment Court of Appeal.

Mosk, J., Kennard, J., concurred. Bd, Comp.Appeals 449]). Cal.3d P.2d Yet this is not such a case. There is no language unmistakable and no expression legislative intent justify denying injured employee position temporary total best, disability indemnity. At the most majority’s argument put does is forward an 4656, and, alternative construction of section given two reasonable constructions of that statute, this required court is by law to adopt the permit recovery construction which will benefits the injured worker.

Case Details

Case Name: Nickelsberg v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
Court Name: California Supreme Court
Date Published: Aug 30, 1991
Citation: 814 P.2d 1328
Docket Number: S013121
Court Abbreviation: Cal.
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