217 Conn. 361 | Conn. | 1991
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether an attorney who represents a client in obtaining a zoning change and in other matters relating to certain real property is entitled to file a mechanic’s lien under General Statutes § 49-33.
Section 49-33 (a) provides that “[i]f any person has a claim for more than ten dollars for materials furnished or services rendered in the construction, raising, removal or repairs of any building or any of its appurtenances or in the improvement of any lot or in the site development or subdivision of any plot of land . . . the building ... or the lot or . . . the plot of land, is subject to the payment of the claim.” (Emphasis added.) The dispositive issue in this case is whether the legislature intended to include attorneys performing services for clients in connection with the rezoning of land and related real estate matters among the persons entitled to file mechanic’s liens when it expanded the scope of § 49-33 in 1974 by adding the phrase “or in the improvement of any lot or in the site development or subdivision of any plot of land.” See Public Acts 1974, No. 74-310.
The defendant contends that the legal services it performed for the plaintiff constitute services rendered in the improvement, the site development, and the subdivision of the property, as these terms are used in § 49-33 (a). It claims that because the statute does not exclude attorneys from the class of persons entitled to file mechanic’s liens, the services it provided fall within the purview of the statute when it is interpreted liberally. The plaintiff asserts that the trial court properly ruled that the defendant could not file a mechanic’s lien because the 1974 amendment was not intended to expand the scope of § 49-33 (a) to include persons whose services do not enhance the property in some physical
The starting point in any case involving a question of statutory construction must be the language used by the legislature. King v. Board of Education, 203 Conn. 324,332, 524 A.2d 1131 (1987); Verdona. Transamerica Ins. Co., 187 Conn. 363, 366,446 A.2d 3 (1982). “ ‘Where the words of a statute fail to indicate clearly whether the provision applies in certain circumstances, it must be construed by this court . . . .’ Board of Trustees v. Freedom of Information Commission, 181 Conn. 544, 550, 436 A.2d 266 (1980). Under our rules of statutory construction, this court is to be guided by the language, purpose and legislative history of the statute in question.” Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hospital, 204 Conn. 399, 405, 528 A.2d 805 (1987).
The guidelines for interpreting mechanic’s lien legislation are well established. Although the mechanic’s lien statute creates a statutory right in derogation of the common law; Camputaro v. Stuart Hardwood Corporation, 180 Conn. 545, 550, 429 A.2d 796 (1980); Gruss v. Miskinis, 130 Conn. 367, 370, 34 A.2d 600 (1943); its provisions should be liberally construed in order to implement its remedial purpose of furnishing security for one who provides services or materials. H & S Torrington Associates v. Lutz Engineering Co., 185 Conn. 549, 553, 441 A.2d 171 (1981); Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co., 183 Conn. 108,115, 438
This court has previously examined the effect of the 1974 amendment to § 49-33 (a). In Camputaro v. Stuart Hardwood Corporation, supra, we considered whether a contractor’s work in road building and site preparation was lienable under § 49-33 prior to the 1974 amendment. We concluded that the contractor was not entitled to file a mechanic’s lien because “cases construing the language of [§ 49-33 prior to the 1974 amendment] have required, as a condition of lienability, that the work done be incorporated in or utilized in the building (or the appurtenance) to be constructed, raised, removed or repaired.” Id., 552. We concluded that one of the purposes of the 1974 amendment was to eliminate this requirement that the work be incorporated or utilized in a building or appurtenance. Id., 553-54. Finally, we noted that “[although the legislative history of the amended § 49-33 is, as is often true,
As a threshold matter, we note that the language of the 1974 amendment appears to have extended the coverage of § 49-33 to two distinct types of services: (1) services rendered in the improvement of any lot; and (2) services rendered in the site development or subdivision of any plot of land. Although the defendant claims that the services it provided fall within both of these categories, it relies upon this apparent distinction in arguing that we must interpret these categories separately in determining what types of services fall within the purview of § 49-33 (a). Our review of the legislative history leads us to conclude otherwise.
The original version of Senate Bill No. 275, which became Public Acts 1974, No. 74-310, extended the scope of § 49-33 (a) only to services rendered “in the
Further, the legislative history provides no support for the defendant’s claim that the legal services it provided were intended to be included within the phrase
The defendant also claims that its services resulted in an “improvement” of the land because the change in zoning enhanced the value of the land.
Our conclusion is further supported by a practical construction of the statute. “ '[G]eneral words and phrases may be restricted in meaning to adapt their meaning to the subject-matter in reference to which they are used.’ Barber v. Morgan, 89 Conn. 583, 588, 94 Atl. 984 [1915].” Greenwich Trust Co. v. Tyson, 129 Conn. 211, 222, 27 A.2d 166 (1942). “In construing a statute, common sense must be used and courts must assume
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1973) § 49-33, as amended by Public Acts 1974, No. 74-310, provides in pertinent part: “mechanic’s lien, precedence.
The services provided by the defendant included the following: (1) preparing and presenting zoning applications to the town of Seymour zoning commission in order to change the zoning designation of portions of the land; (2) representing the plaintiff in discussions with the town engineer and the town planner; (3) obtaining and renewing a permit authorizing the plaintiff to operate a quarry on the site; and (4) appearing before inland wetlands and zoning agencies for subdivision of the portion of the land zoned residential. The plaintiff sought the zoning change in conjunction with its unsuccessful effort to sell or lease a portion of the land.
General Statutes § 49-35a provides in pertinent part: “application for REDUCTION OR DISCHARGE. FORMS. HEARING. ENTRY FEE. (a) Whenever one or more mechanics’ liens are placed upon any real estate pursuant to sections 49-33, 49-34, 49-35 and 49-38, the owner of the real estate . . . may make application ... to the superior court . . . that a hearing or hearings be held to determine whether the lien or liens should be discharged or reduced.”
Our research has uncovered only one case in which a similar issue has been addressed. In Sooner Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Mobley, 645 P.2d 1000, 1003-1004 (Okla. 1981), an attorney who secured the marital home for the husband in a divorce proceeding was unsuccessful in claiming that he was entitled to a mechanic’s lien for his services. This case provides little guidance, however, because it involved a different type of legal service than that in the present case.
After reviewing the legislative history, we stated that “Public Acts 1974, No. 74-310 expanded the scope of General Statutes § 49-33 to include the terms ‘the improvement of any lot’ and ‘the site development or subdivision of any plot of land.’ It is the first of these additions, ‘the improvement of any lot,’ that is at issue in the present case. In commenting on an amendment to the bill, which was subsequently enacted as Public Acts 1974, No. 74-310, the reporting committee chairman in the House of Representatives stated: ‘We still have an extension of the mechanic’s lien even though we don’t have an extension of the time to file it. You can file it against the property or sub-division whereas heretofore you could only file it against the house that was being worked on, the building.’ And again, in response to the question, ‘Does he contend that it’s the amendment that extends the applicability of the land or is it the bill itself . . .’ the reporting committee chairman, Representative Newman responded: ‘The bill, of course, sir.’ 17 H.R. Proc., Pt. 9, 1974 Sess., pp. 4138, 4140. Compare the comments of the reporting committee chairman in the Senate, Senator Rome, who stated: ‘The bill now as amended would provide that sub-dividers of land, persons who might also be doing site work on the land would have lien rights. The question is, under the existing court adjudications, whether or not that (sic) have or have not those rights. This clearly spells it out. They do . . . .’ 17 S. Proc., Pt. 3,1974 Sess., p. 1338.” Camputaro v. Stuart Hardwood Corporation, 180 Conn. 545, 554-55 n.6, 429 A.2d 796 (1980).
Representative Hoyte G. Brown, Jr., the sponsor of House Amendment A to Senate Bill No. 275, stated that the amendment “restricts the filing of the mechanic’s lien by a contractor. A contractor, such as a surveyor, can file such a lien against the lot of the subdivision on which he has rendered services or furnished materials. Under the bill as it appears in the files the contractor could file his lien against any or all lots of the subdivision. This power of the contractor could cause problems for people doing title search. A title search could show no lien when in fact a lien does exist against the lot being sold. The amendment allows title searchers to request waivers of any lien from the contractors working on the lot being sold. Under the bill in the file the title searcher must receive waivers from any contractor working on any and all the lots of the subdivision.” 17 H.R. Proc., Pt. 10, 1974 Sess., pp. 4970-71.
Representative Carl R. Ajello, added that “[s]ome of us were concerned that you could have an entire subdivision land [sic] and placed in default on its mortgage and otherwise interfere with its credit standing by virtue of the default of someone who was taking only a minuscule part in the building of one project within the subdivision. At the same time recognizing that one who renders services in the layout or site improvement work should have the opportunity to lien the entire subdivision.” Id., p. 4971.
Further support for this conclusion is provided by the title of Senate Bill No. 275, which was, even prior to its amendment by House Amend
The record is not clear as to whether the defendant actually sought or obtained approval for the subdivision of the property. For the purposes of our analysis, we can assume that the defendant did indeed provide legal services related to the subdivision of the land.
See footnote 6, supra, for references to surveyors in the legislative history of the 1974 amendment.
Representative Thomas M. Kablik asked the following question concerning the effect of the language in Senate Bill No. 275 referring to the “subdivision” of a plot of land: “[A]t what point does this ability to lien commence. For instance, if the developer is in the process of preparing preliminary drawings on the subdivision . . . then he goes and makes his application but for one reason or another it’s either turned down, or let’s say it’s turned down, his work, for instance, that was done from the time of application to the time of turn down . . . for instance, an engineer who had designed the entire thing. Would he then have a lien on the entire parcel even if the subdivision didn’t occur?” (Emphasis added.) 17 H.R. Proc., Pt. 10, 1974 Sess., pp. 4977-78.
Representative Hoyte G. Brown, Jr., responded: “It’s my opinion, yes. I want to double check that though.” Id., p. 4978. There is no indication in the legislative history that Representative Brown later reached a different conclusion on this issue.
Although we note that the legislative history of Senate Bill No. 275 appears to indicate that, at least in certain circumstances, surveyors and engineers may file mechanic’s liens, we do not address the nature of these circumstances. See Sisk v. Zukowski, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 346699 (June 29,1988); see generally annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 996.
The plaintiff argues that General Statutes § 49-33 (a) should be interpreted as including only those services which physically enhance the property or which lay the groundwork for physical enhancement. We decline to address the merits of such an interpretation of § 49-33 because it is not necessary to the resolution of the present case. When the issue becomes ripe for deci
Although there is no evidence in the record concerning whether the zoning change actually did increase the value of the land, we will assume that it did for the purposes of our discussion.