In
Nick v. State Highway Comm.
(1961), 13 Wis. (2d) 511,
The court relied on the reasoning of
Carazalla v. State
(1955),
In the present proceedings, Mrs. Nick seeks a permit to construct a driveway from her property to Highway 30. The commission denied her application without a formal heаring, asserting that any additional access points would not be in the public interest. Mrs. Nick believed that she was entitled to a hearing and appealed to the circuit court'. That court dismissed her petition for review of the commission’s determination, and we are in accord with that judgment.
In 1951, prior to the time of Mrs. Nick’s acquisition of the property in question, the State Highway Commission declared Highway 30 to be a controlled-access highway. Mrs. Nick’s predecessor in interest, Mr. Reinders, had the same opportunity which was available to all other interested parties to challenge the dеsignation of Highway 30 as a controlled-access highway at a public hearing.
*494 Notice of the hearing was given by publiсation pursuant to sec. 84.25 (1), Stats. The statutory notice provisions were reasonably calculated to apрrise interested parties of the impending action. See 1 Merrill, Notice, pp. 510, 511, sec. 518.
Mrs. Nick argues that an abutting owner would not be concerned about the 1951 public hearing or disturbed by the absence of individual notice for the reasоn that the owner would expect to receive compensation if his property rights were later affectеd by the denial of a driveway permit. We are unable to accept this theory of a continuing, dormant right to challenge the propriety of the original hearing. The mistaken expectation of compensation did not give the landowner the right to take a belated appeal from the 1951 hearing. As we said in the previous Nick Case, at page 518a:
“We hold that the relief оf judicial review of the administrative decision provided by statute is the exclusive remedy, with right of appeal from the reviewing court to the supreme court, per sec. 227.21, Stats. Appellant did not exhaust her remedy of judicial review.”
Mrs. Nick сan hardly complain because she did not get notice of the 1951 hearing; she did not acquire any interest in the real estate until over four years after the hearing. She knew or should have known of the status of Highway 30 at the time of her purchаse. Since her predecessor in interest did not appeal the commission’s decision, the circumstances of the hearing in 1951 can be of no benefit to Mrs. Nick in her present claim for a driveway permit. In the earlier Nick Case, at page 515, we said:
“The time to review the commission’s procedure and determination long since expired and those questions were not beforе the trial court nor before this court. The only question properly before the court is the question of whether Reinders’ *495 grantee, the petitioner, has a right to compensation for the restriction of direct access from her рroperty to Highway 30.”
Thus, Mrs. Nick has no current right to a hearing based upon the 1951 action on the part of the commission. Furthеr, the statutes do not provide for a hearing upon her current application for a permit to build a driveway. There is nothing in sec. 84.25, Stats., which would authorize the hearing she seeks, nor can she qualify under sec. 227.01 (2). In the latter statute, the refеrence to a “hearing required by law” presupposes either (1) a hearing expressly provided for by the regulating statute or administrative rule, or (2) a hearing necessitated constitutionally by the requirements of due process.
If there wеre allegations of fraud or corruption on the part of the Highway Commission, due process would require a full heаring on such issues; court review of the record would also be available to fulfil the requirements of due process. However, mere inconsistency on the part of the commission is not sufficient to necessitate a hearing. An administrative agency is not bound by its prior determinations. In
Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Public Service Comm.
(1954),
“However, it is not within our province to determine whether the findings of the commission here are consistent with those made by it in another case.”
See 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, p. 528, sec. 17.07.
*496
Mere inconsistency on the part of an administrative agency does not of itself rise to the dignity of a violation of the constitutional right to equal protection before the law. The United States supreme court, in
Snowden v. Hughes
(1943),
“The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or рurposeful discrimination. . . . But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, . . .”
In our opinion, the inconsistencies averred by Mrs. Niсk do not warrant the holding of a plenary hearing in order to comply with due process or equal protection of the law. If the petitioner’s claim of arbitrary action on the part of the commission were sufficient to neсessitate a judicial-type hearing, the commission would have a virtually impossible task in fulfilling the legislative responsibilities delegated to it by law. See
Ashwaubenon v. State Highway
Comm. (1962), 17 Wis. (2d) 120,
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.