Byron Nicholson and wife Phyllis Nicholson (the “Insureds”) brought this action against First Preferred Insurance Company (the “Insurance Company”) under their homeowner’s policy with the Insurance Company. In their action, the Insureds sought to recover for damages to their dwelling, its contents and their dragster race car. The damages resulted from a fire at the dwelling. The property insured under the policy includes the “dwelling” and certain “unscheduled personal property.” Under the “unscheduled personal property” coverage provision, motor vehicles are excluded. However, the term “motor vehicles” is not defined in the exclusion provision. After a bench trial, the court rendered judgment that the Insureds recover the amount of $2,583.74 as damages to the dwelling and some of its contents. Concluding that the dragster race car “was and is a motor vehicle”, the court denied the Insureds’ claim for damages to the car. Each of the parties appeal from the judgment. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment.
The evidence shows that the Insureds’ car is modified and designed exclusively for dragster racing. They converted a stock, 1972 Chevrolet Vega into a dragster by removing the suspension and replacing it with a subframe, by placing “racing slicks” on the car which are illegal for ordinary highway driving, by placing a racing engine *562 in the car with a life of only 20-25 miles or two minutes of operation, by placing an oversized oil pan on the car, and by removing the windshield wipers, the lighting system and the horn. The car was not and could not be registered for public highway transportation. Furthermore, it would be highly impractical to use the ear for ordinary, transportational purposes.
On or about 28 April 1978, Insured Byron Nicholson was working on the ear in his garage, attempting to reroute the fuel line. The special, high-octane fuel used for the ear leaked onto a lighted work lamp. The lamp ignited the fuel and caused a fire. Portions of the garage, the house, and its contents suffered fire and/or smoke damage. The car was also damaged. The Insureds filed a sworn, proof-of-loss statement with the Insurance Company. The Insurance Company denied the claim and this action ensued.
The pertinent policy provision is:
PROPERTY INSURED
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COVERAGE B — UNSCHEDULED PERSONAL PROPERTY owned, worn or used by the Insured, including members of his family of the same household and, at the option of the Insured, property of others (except roomers or tenants) while on the premises of the described dwelling. Window or wall air-conditioning units shall be considered personal property.
EXCLUSIONS — Coverage B does not cover:
a. Animals and birds; aircraft; motor vehicles, except power mowers, golf buggies and farm equipment not designed for use principally on public roads; trailers and semi-trailers, except such vehicles (other than house trailers), designed for use principally off public roads and except boat trailers while on the premises of the described dwelling, (emphasis added);
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The insureds bring one point of error. By this point, they claim the judgment should be reversed because the trial court erroneously concluded that a dragster race car is a “motor vehicle” within the ordinary and usual meaning of the term, particularly since the insurance contract should be construed in a way to indemnify against loss.
In regard to this point, we are aware that the construction of undefined terms in insurance contracts is governed by two major principles. First, the terms used are given their ordinary and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows that the words were meant in a technical or different sense.
Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. Johnson,
In support of their position, the Insureds contend that a motor vehicle is a device that is self-propelled and transports persons or property upon roads or public highways, and that their dragster is not designed for or used to transport persons or property on a public highway. For their definition of “motor vehicle,” they rely on
International Ins. Co. in N. Y. v. Hensley Steel Co., Inc.,
We think the plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning of the word “motor vehicle” is a self-propelled vehicle designed for, intended to be used for, or actually used to transport persons and property over roads or highways, (emphasis added).
Id. at 66.
The Insureds further urge us to adopt the definition of “motor vehicle” contained in Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6675a-l(a) & (b) (Vernon 1977) (Regulation of Vehicles). That provision states:
The following words and terms, as used herein, have the meaning respectively ascribed to them in this Section, as follows:
*563 (a) “Vehicle” means every device in, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, except devices moved only by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
(b) “Motor Vehicle” means every vehicle, as herein defined, that is self-propelled. (emphasis added).
Under this provision, a “motor vehicle” would be limited to self-propelled devices used to transport persons or property upon a public highway. The Insureds also refer this court to the same definition contained in Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6701d, § 2(a) & (b) (Vernon 1977) (Traffic Regulations).
Notwithstanding the common definition given to the term “motor vehicle” in the
International Ins. Co.
case and by the statutes, we are persuaded that the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Slaughter v. Abilene State School,
By two cross-points of error, the Insurance Company contends that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in failing to find: (1) that there was no coverage for any loss under the policy because maintaining the race car sufficiently increased the hazards to avoid liability on the policy; and (2) that the policy was voided by the Insureds’ engaging in a business pursuit on the premises in contravention of their declarations in the policy. After reviewing the probative evidence in the record, we conclude that the Insurance Company failed to prove either of these propositions as a matter of law. See Shop Rite Foods, Inc. v. The Upjohn Company, No. 9231 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo, June 10,1981) (on motion for rehearing).
The policy in question states that the Insurance Company
may cancel
it if there is an “[i]ncrease in hazard within the control of the insured which would produce an increase in rate." The context of this provision is such that cancellation is optional with the Insurance Company and not a condition subsequent which will avoid liability. Nor does it appear to create an exclusion from coverage.
Contra, Knoff v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,
In the policy, the Insureds declared that there were no business pursuits conducted on the premises. The Insurance Company contends that it conclusively established that the Insureds were pursuing a business on the premises, by maintaining the race car, in contravention of the policy declaration. Although the evidence shows that the Insureds maintained the car on the premises and raced it with “the eternal expectation of someday winning” prize money, Insured Phyllis Nicholson definitely testified that neither she nor her husband were in the commercial business of racing, that it was “mostly hobby,” and that Insured Byron Nicholson did not work on anybody else’s race cars in the garage and get paid for doing it. The evidence falls short of conclusively establishing that the Insureds pursued a business on the premises in contravention of the policy declaration. Accordingly, we overrule the Insurance Company’s first and second cross-points of error.
In summary, we overrule the Insureds’ point of error and the Insurance Company’s two cross-points. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.