Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal presents a bill filed for a declaratory judgment in Part I of the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee. The Chancellor denied the relief sought
Prior to the present controversy the complаinant operated a retail liqnor store at 500 Broad Street in Nashville and desiring to remove his рlace of business from that address to 417 8th Avenue South, and simultaneously to procure a State Liquor license at the new address, complainant applied to the defendant Mayor (1) for the approval of his application for a State liquor license, and (2) for the apрroval of the defendant Mayor,' of the change of the place of business from 500 Broad Street to 417 8th Avenue South. . .In the .orginal bill, complainant stated that the Mayor had approved both the application for the State Liquor license and the application for change of address. In his answer, the defendant Mayor admitted that he had approved the application for the liquor license but specifically denied that he had approved the application for change of address.
We think the action of the Chancellor in denying the relief sought and dismissing the bill must be approved for two reasons: (1) The Chancellor had a wide discretiоn under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, and where as here, a declaration could be made only after an investigation and determination of disputed facts, the, application for a declaration was properly refused. Hinchman v. City Water Co.,
Decree affirmed.
Rehearing
On Petition to Rehear.
Petition to rehear has been filed, in which it is insisted that the Court erred in affirming thе Chancellor’s decree, and in stating in our former opinion (1) that the bill as presented, was not properly one for a declaratory judgment, and (2) that it was necessary for the Chancellor to determine disputed issues of fact.
(1) The case was before us from the Chancery Court on broad appeal. Questions of law were, therefore, to be considered by us de novo. The members of this Court were unanimous in their conviction that the goal of the litigation, — the forcing of the Mayor of a municipality to issue a retail liquor license, was not as presented in the bill, a рroper matter for a declaratory judgment nor a matter contemplated by Code, secs. 8835-8847, for such relief. This defect in the bill was basic and disposed of the lawsuit, — compelling the Court tо affirm the result reached by the Chancellor while giving additional reasons of its own for so doing.
(2) In the original bill, it was charged specifically that the Mayor had approved the applicаtion of the complainant to change the location of his liquor business from an address on Brоad Street to an address on 8th Avenue, South, in Nashville. In his answer, the Mayor specifically denied thаt he had approved this applica
Petitioner admits that the Mayor did not aсt favorably on the application to transfer, but insists that the Mayor’s favorable action on the certificate of good moral character was “equivalent” to favorable action on the transfer This is a mere inference of petitioner’s with which the Chancellor did not agree. Clearly, if the refusal of the Chancellor to accept the inference of the petitioner was not arbitrary, but was supported by material evidence and reasonablе grounds, this Court has no authority to reverse. We find that the material evidence and reasonable grounds were supplied by the stipulation and the answer of the Mayor.
Petition denied.