Jаmes Lynn Nichols appeals the denial of his motion for new trial and his conviction for malice murder in connection with the fatal shooting of Rodwell Jones, Jr. Nichols challenges the admission of evidence of arms and ammunition found at his hоme which were not used in the shooting; the admission of certain evidence about the *402 victim; and the effectiveness of his trial counsel for failing to sufficiently object to the evidence of the found arms and ammunition and the State’s argument tо the jury regarding such evidence. For the reasons that follow, we reverse. 1
The evidence construed in favor of the verdicts showed that on the evening of June 6, 2005, Nichols and his then fiancée, Sherinda Redmond, stopped at a conveniеnce store in DeKalb County. Redmond went inside the store while Nichols remained in the car. As Redmond approached the register, Rodwell Jones, Jr. was ahead of her in line. Jones indicated to the store clerk that Redmond would pay for his items as well. Redmond and Jones argued. Redmond exited the store and handed her purchases to Nichols through the car’s open window. Jones left the store, walked by the couple’s car, and Jones and Nichols “exchanged words.” Jonеs was belligerent and shouted at Nichols; Redmond was involved in the argument. A bystander was concerned that there was going to be a physical confrontation and called 911 for assistance.
Jones walked toward another vehicle, but then returned to Redmond and Nichols’s car. Jones verbally threatened Nichols. When Jones got about an “arm’s length” from Redmond, Nichols got out of the car. Jones assumed a boxing stance and threw some punches at Nichols. Nichols drew a hаndgun. He fired nine shots at Jones in “rapid succession” or with a “momentary pause” after the first shot, and the remaining shots in “rapid succession.” Jones ran around the corner of the convenience store, and Nichols ran after him. It was difficult for Nichols to run because he was a large individual and had some mobility issues; he sometimes used a cane or a wheelchair. Jones got 100 to 150 yards down the road before he collapsed. He died from four gunshot wounds to the body, one of them in the back. Jones was found to be unarmed.
Nichols and Redmond drove home, packed some clothes, and left for Florida in the “big rig” that Nichols drove for a living. Nichols and Redmond returned to their home nine days later, where they were аrrested by police 45 minutes after their arrival.
1. The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Nichols guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which
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he was charged and convicted.
Jackson v. Virginia,
2. During a search of Nichols’s home at the time of his аrrest, the police discovered an “AK-type” rifle, a 12-gauge pump shotgun, and ammunition, none of which were used in the shooting of Jones. The pistol used in the shooting was never recovered. Yet, the State was allowed to introduce intо evidence both the rifle and the shotgun as well as photographs of these weapons; the State also placed in evidence the magazine for the rifle, three boxes and a bag of ammunition for the rifle, and a bag of shotgun аmmunition. The trial court permitted the introduction of the evidence after the State argued that it was admissible as part of the circumstances of the search and the res gestae of the arrest. 2 In closing, the State argued that such evidence demonstrated Nichols’s propensity for violence and killing and that the only purpose for the found weapons was to kill people.
Nichols contends that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence because it wаs irrelevant and prejudicial. We agree.
As a general rule, the circumstances connected with a defendant’s arrest are admissible, even if such circumstances incidentally place the defendant’s character in issue.
Benford v. State,
It is undisputed that the firearms and ammunition at issue were in no way involved in the fatal shooting of Jones. Compare
Dukes v. State,
As has been noted, the circumstances surrounding аn arrest are often admissible as part of the res gestae, but that is so in situations in which the arrest is contemporaneous or closely related in time to the offense and has a logical relation to the offense.
Shelton v. State,
The State asserts that the evidence was relevant becаuse Nichols claimed that he acted in self-defense, that he mistakenly thought Jones might have a gun, and that his arthritis prevented him from defending himself in any way other than shooting Jones. But again, the fact that Nichols may have possessed other fireаrms not involved in any manner in the shooting is not probative of the issue of whether he validly acted in self-defense or of the question of his intent in firing the pistol at Jones. Traylor, supra at 403 (2).
The State urges another basis for admission of the evidence was to contradict Nichols’s mother’s testimony that Nichols was not a troubled child, was non-violent, and was nurturing. However, the fact that Nichols may have possessed firearms and ammunition in his home does not demonstrate his state of mind as a child, that he lacked a nurturing personality, or that he was violent. Merely owning or possessing a firearm does not impute even bad character.
Traylor,
supra at 402 (2);
Henderson v. State,
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As is plainly shown by its comments and argument at trial, the State wanted the demonstrative evidence of the rifle, shotgun, and ammunition to show that Nichols had a propensity for violence and the inclination to kill people; therefore, he was not acting in self-defense or in the context of voluntary manslaughter when he fired at Jones. However, in order to show that a defendant has a propensity for certain behavior, the State must introduce evidence of the defendant’s other similar behavior.
Belmar v. State,
The trial court’s error in admitting the evidence requires that Nichols be given a new trial unless it can be found that it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment; in other words, reversal is not required if the evidence of Nichols’s guilt was so overwhelming that there was no reasonable probability that the verdicts of the jury would have been different in the absence of such error.
Belmar,
supra at 800 (3);
Johnson v. State,
3. Because it may become an issue on retrial, we address Nichols’s further contention that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence about Jones, i.e., that he was shot while he was returning from his grandmother’s memorial service, that he provided more emotional supрort for his mother than his siblings, and that Jones’s mother did not get to say goodbye to him. Evidence which tends to show the victim’s state of mind in regard to the defendant may be relevant in instances in which the defendant claims self-defense. See
Massey v. State,
4. The analysis and determination in Division 2 make it unnecessary to address Nichols’s remaining contentions regаrding the effectiveness of trial counsel.
Judgments reversed.
Notes
The fatal shooting occurred on June 6,2005. On August 15,2005, a DeKalb County grand jury indicted Nichols for malice murder, felony murder while in the commission of aggravated assault, and aggravated assault. Nichols was tried befоre a jury March 6-9, 2006, and found guilty of all charges. On March 21, 2006, he was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder; the felony murder conviction stood vacated by operation of law and the aggravated assault was found to be merged for the purpose of sentencing. A motion for new trial was filed on April 19, 2006, amended on December 18,2006, and denied on December 20,2006. Anotice of appeal was filed on January 18, 2007, and the case was docketed in this Court on February 19, 2007. The appeal was argued orally on May 14, 2007.
The trial court admitted the evidence after stating, “I think items that were collected as part of the search are permissible to admit. . . .”
One detective testified that he could not make any determination “relevant” to the shooting from the recovered rifle or shotgun. Another officer testified that no determinations as to how or why Jones was shot could be made from the weapons or ammunition.
The State urges that the “gun evidеnce” in Nichols’s residence was not negatively impacted by the nine-day delay because the “residence was in the same condition it would have been had the search warrant been executed an hour and forty-five minutes after the shooting, itself.” But, the State’s assertion regarding the status of the residence is mere speculation. Moreover, the fact that the residence may have been vacant for the nine days does not alter the temporal frame of the arrest in regard to the shooting.