Nichols v. Progressive Northern InsuranceNichols v. Progressive Northern Insurance
Lead Opinion
¶ 1. This is а review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals,
¶ 2. Petitioners, Edward and Julie Niesen (the Niesens) and their homeowner's insurance carrier, Berry and Roxbury Mutual Insurance Company (BR-MIC), seek review of that unpublished decision of the court of appeals. The court of appeals allowed the claim of Shannon, Lee, Brooke, and Brittney Nichols (the Nichols) to proceed against the Niesens for common-law negligence. The Nichols claimed that the Niesens were social hosts, who did not provide any alcoholic beverages to underage guests, but allegedly were aware that minors were on their property consuming alcoholic beverages. After leaving the Niesens' premises, one of these guests allegedly caused injuries while driving intoxicated. The circuit court had granted the Niesens' and BRMIC's motion to dismiss the Nichols' complaint, after concluding that the complaint failed to state a claim in common-law negligence. The primary issue upon review is whether a claim for common-law negligence should be permitted against social hosts under these circumstances.
¶ 3. We reverse the decision of the court of appeals. Doing so, we hold that, based on public policy grounds, a claim for common-law negligence cannot be maintained against social hosts, such as the Niesens,
I
¶ 4. On June 5, 2004, the Nichols were in a motor vehicle on County Trunk Highway J in Columbia County, Wisconsin, when that vehicle was struck by another motor vehicle, driven by Beth Carr (Carr), which had crossed the highway's center line. The Nichols alleged that the accident was caused by Carr's "failure to properly manage and control the vehicle she was operating, due in part to the voluntary ingestion by her of intoxicating beverages." As a result of the accident, Shannon Nichols "suffered very severe personal injuries," and Brittney, Brooke, and Lee Nichols "suffered injuries requiring medical care and treatment."
¶ 5. On the night of June 4, 2004, and into the early morning of June 5, 2004, the Nichols alleged that "a large gathering of underage high school students" congregated and consumed alcohol at the premises controlled by the Niesens.
¶ 6. The Nichols contended that the consumption of alcohol by Carr was a substantial factor in causing the accident. Defendant Michael Shumate (Shumate),
¶ 7. The Nichols filed suit against Carr and her automobile insurance company, Progressive Northern Insurance Company (Progressive). The Nichols also filed a complaint against the Niesens and their homeowner's insurance company, BRMIC. Progressive settled for its policy limits with the Nichols, and was excused from further defense of Carr in this lawsuit. The Niesens then moved to dismiss the Nichols' complaint for failure to state a claim. The circuit court dismissed the Nichols' complaint, because it agreed with the Niesens that the Nichols' reliance on Wis. Stat. §§ 125.07(l)(a)3 and 125.035 (2003-04)
II
¶ 8. We begin with a discussion of the standard of review. This case is before us in the context of a motion to dismiss. A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs complaint. Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee,
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¶ 9. On review, the Nichols claim that the Nies-ens1 conduct was negligent, and that it was reasonably foreseeable that someone drinking on the Niesens' property would cause an accident. The Nichols argue that they are not seeking "an expansion of liability as it relates to alcohol law in Wisconsin." Instead, they contend that they are "simply asking that the Niesens' behavior be analyzed against [Wisconsin's] well-established negligence standard." The Nichols contend that this case does not merit unique consideration because alcohol was involved.
¶ 10. On review, the Niesens argue that knowledge of someone drinking on one's
¶ 11. Whether the Nichols' complaint states a claim for common-law negligence depends on whether they sufficiently pled facts, which if proven true, would establish all four required elements of an actionable negligence claim. Hoida, Inc. v. M & I Midstate Bank,
¶ 12. However, in Wisconsin, the elements of duty and breach are usually presented to the trier of fact in a question asking whether the defendant was negligent, and then the elements of causation and damages are addressed. See Wis JI — Civil 1005 (2006). Even if a plaintiff adequately establishes all four elements of a common-law negligence claim, Wisconsin courts have "reserved the right to deny the existence of a negligence claim based on public policy reasons . . . ." Hoida, Inc.,
¶
¶ 14. The court of appeals held that the Nichols had met this standard because they had "alleged that the Niesens knowingly permitted underage persons to drink alcohol on their property prior to the accident between Carr and the Nichols." Nichols, No. 2006AP364, unpublished slip op., ¶ 18. That court then stated that a "reasonable inference" from that allegation was that the Niesens "knew some of those underage students would drive away from their property after consuming alcohol." Id. The court of appeals then assumed that the Niesens must have known that some of these underaged individuals would drink to the point of intoxication, even though that allegation is not in the Nichols' complaint. Id.
¶ 15. The court of appeals framed the issue for the first element of the test for common-law negligence as "whether the Niesens owed a duty to refrain from knowingly permitting minors to consume alcohol on their property, thus enabling them, including Carr, to drive away from their property while intoxicated." Id. As a result, the court held that the first factor had been met because "it was reasonably foreseeable that permitting underage high school students to illegally drink alcohol on the Niesens' property would result in harm to some person or something," and because the Nichols had adequately "alleged the Niesens had a duty to refrain from knowingly permitting underage high school students from engaging in illegal alcohol consumption on their property." Id., ¶ 23.
¶ 16. Relying on its analysis of the first faсtor, the court of appeals also determined that the Nichols had appropriately alleged the second factor of an actionable common-law negligence claim, which is that the Nies-ens had breached a duty of care that they owed to the Nichols. Id., ¶ 24. The court stated, "Because the Nichols' complaint alleges the Niesens knowingly permitted and failed to supervise underage alcohol consumption on their property, it alleges 'a breach of their duty to exercise ordinary care.'" Id. The court of appeals also held that the Nichols' complaint had alleged " 'a causal connection between the defendant's breach of the duty of care and the plaintiffs injury ....'" Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 17. The court also held that the Nichols had established the third factor of a common-law negligence claim by showing " 'a causal connection between the defendant's breach of the duty of care аnd the plaintiffs injury....'" Hoida, Inc.,
¶ 18. The court of appeals further held that the Nichols had appropriately alleged the fourth factor of a common-law negligence claim, that they had suffered an actual loss or damage that resulted from the Niesens' breach. Hoida, Inc.,
¶ 19. For purposes of our public policy analysis, we will assume, without deciding, that the court of appeals was correct in holding that the Nichols had stated a common-law negligence claim. As we noted previously, even if a plaintiff adequately establishes all four elements of a common-law negligence claim, Wisconsin courts have "reserved the right to deny the existence of a negligence claim based on public policy reasons . . . ." Hoida, Inc.,
¶ 20. In turning to our analysis of the public policy factors that bear on the Nichols' common-law negligence claim against the Niesens, it is instructive to note what is not alleged by the Nichols. The Nichols do not allege that the Niesens provided alcohol to Carr, that the Niesens were aware that Carr (specifically) was consuming alcoholic beverages, that the Niesens knew or should have known that Carr was intoxicated, or that the Niesens knew or should have known that Carr was not able to drive her motor vehicle safely at the time of the accident. We note that there also is no allegation by the Nichols that the Niesens aided, agreed to assist, or attempted to aid Carr or any other person in the procurement or consumption of alcohol on premises under their control. There also are no allegations that the Niesens knew in advance that any underage individuals would be drinking.
¶ 21. Whether "public policy considerations preclude liability is a question of law that this court determines without deference to any other court." Gritzner v. Michael R.,
¶ 22. The first public policy factor upon which recovery against a negligent tortfeasor may be denied is when "the injury is too remote from the negligence . . . Stephenson,
¶ 23. The second public policy factor upon which recovery against a negligent tortfeasor may be denied is when "the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the tortfeasor's culpability ...." Id. Here, the Niesens and their insurer argue that the injury was wholly out of proportion to the Niesens' culpability. The Nichols made no allegation that underage individuals gathered at the Niesens' property because they knew that the Niesens would let them consume alcohol that was obtained elsewhere. Liability based on the Nichols' theory would be liability based solely on knowledge that someone was drinking, which is a generality and an inference rather than knowledge of spеcific facts about a specific guest. As a result, they claim that the injury in this case is wholly out of proportion to a social host's liability for the later driving by an unidentified guest who procured her alcohol from someone who was not at the party. In response, the Nichols argue that the Niesens should have foreseen that an automobile accident would occur when an intoxicated teenager drove away from their property.
¶ 24. The third public policy factor upon which recovery against a negligent tortfeasor may be denied is when "in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm. .. ." Id. Here, the Niesens and their insurer argue that, in retrospect, it was too highly extraordinary that the negligence would have brought about the harm in question. The Nichols did not allege that the Niesens knew that Carr was unfit to drive. In retrospect, they claim that it was highly extraordinary that the Niesens' generalized knowledge that someone, at some point, had been drinking on the property that they controlled should have brought about the accident by Carr, as a result of the alcohol procured from Shumate. In response, the Nichols allege that the injuries they suffered were exactly the types of injuries that should be expected when an underage, intoxicated person operates a motor vehicle.
¶ 25. The fourth public policy factor upon which recovery against a negligent tortfeasor may be denied is when "allowing recovery would place too unreasonable a burden upon the tortfeasor . ..Id. Here, the Nies-ens and their insurer argue that allowing recovery against the Niesens in this case would place upon them an unreasonable burden. The Nichols did not allege that the Niesens allowed underage drinking, only that they knew about underage drinking at some point during the evening. Liability for a social host whо did not specifically know of the particular person drinking and who did not provide the alcohol places too unreasonable of a burden on that social host. Furthermore, such a requirement would force social hosts to do such things as check identification cards, screen all guests for alcohol consumption, and figure out who is driving and then
¶ 26. The fifth public policy factor upon which recovery against a negligent tortfeasor may be denied is when "allowing recovery would be too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims. .. ." Id. Here, the Niesens and their insurer, BRMIC, argue that there is a likelihood for fraudulent claims, as underage drinkers might testify that they had, at some time, been at a person's property to trigger that person's liability. Regardless of when, how much, or where the underage guest had been drinking or regardless of the source of the alcohol, they claim that a social host will be sued when underage drinkers and their alcohol-providers attempt to shift at least part of their responsibility to the social host. In response, the Nichols assert that such cases are not susceptible to fraud, because there usually will be several witnesses to testify as to what occurred.
¶ 27. The sixth, and here perhaps the most significant, public policy factor upon which recovery against a negligent tortfeasor may be denied is when "allowing recovery would have no sensible or just stopping point. . . ." Id. We conclude that this sixth factor is applicable to preclude liability against the Niesens. In Stephenson, this court refused on public policy grounds to permit a recovery against a defendant who did not carry through on his promise to drive an intoxicated co-worker home. That co-worker later caused the death of another person in an automobile accident. Id., ¶¶ 41-51. The defendant had made the promise so that the bartender would continue to serve alcohol to his intoxicated co-worker. Id., ¶ 2. While we concluded that the defendant had breached a duty , that he owed to the plaintiff by not following through on his promise to drive his intoxicated co-worker home, we held that the plaintiffs claim should have been dismissed. Id., ¶ 50. We did so because "the possibilities for expanding liability would simply have too much potential to grow out of control," and also would "threaten to run counter to the legislative enactments regarding immunity." Id.
¶ 28. Here, the Niesens and their insurer argue that there would be no sensible or just stopping point if the court of appeals' decision stands. They claim that the decision of the court of appeals would put tort law on the path of strict liability for anyone who owns property in Wisconsin, and who knows even scant details of an underage person consuming alcohol on the property under his or her control. They argue that the next step, beyond such a proposed expansion in common-law negligence liability, may be tó include in the framework of liability not just social hosts but anyone who knows that an underage person was drinking on property that is not even under their control, or to include anyone, not just property owners, who knows that any underage individual has had too much to drink. We are not persuaded by the Nichols' argument that the facts of this case would limit the dramatic expansion of liability that the Nichols seek.
¶ 30. We agree with the Niesens and BRMIC that allowing recovery here would have no sensible or just stopping point. As this court noted in Stephenson, allowing liability under such circumstances would provide too much potential for the out of control growth of liability, which would "run counter to the legislative enactments regarding immunity." Id., ¶ 50 (footnote omitted). Liability for injuries that are caused by an underage, intoxicated individual has always been premised upon the affirmative acts of a defendant, such as procuring, furnishing, or dispensing alcohol for that underage individual. Liability has never been premised on the conduct that the Nichols alleged. See, e.g., id.; Smith v. Kappell,
¶ 31. If the Nichols' claim were allowed to proceed, the expansion of liability might also include liability for parents who allegedly should have known that drinking would occur on their property while they were absent, based on the proclivities of teenagers in a given area to consume alcohol. Imposing such liability would be only a short step away from imposing strict liability upon property owners for any underage drinking that occurs on property under their control. As Judge David G. Deininger stated in his dissent in the court of appeals, "if liability is permitted to extend to parents and property owners who fail to 'supervise and monitor the activities on their property,'" as the Nichols contend of the Niesens, "then parents or other owners of property occupied by sixteen- to twenty-year-olds" would "be well-advised to never leave home, or if they must, to ensure that all underage persons go elsewhere as well. I conclude the potential burdens imposed by permitting a recovery on the facts alleged in this case are, as in Stephenson, unreasonable and unrealistic." Nichols, No. 2006AP364, unpublished slip op., ¶ 44. As a result, even assuming that the Nichols had pled a viable claim for common-law negligence against the Niesens using the four-factor test, we are satisfied that the Nichols' claim should be barred on public policy considerations, since allowing recovery here would have no sensible or just stopping point.
¶ 32. We are satisfied that whether to expand common-law negligence to cover situations like the one alleged here is more appropriately a decision for the legislature rather than for this court. If there is to be such an expansion of common-law negligence to cover facts such as those presented here, that decision, which involves policy choices, should be made by the legislature. We encourage the legislature to address the question of whether to hold social hosts accountable for the types of actions alleged in this case.
¶ 33. We are aware that no prior Wisconsin case has held a social host liable for the results of a guest's intoxication when that social host did not provide the alcohol. Furthermore, Wis. Stat. § 125.035 abrogates immunity only for vendors and social hosts who supply alcohol to underage drinkers. Nothing in the Wisconsin statutes renders the Niesens' conduct unlawful. Liability has never
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¶ 34. As a final point, we note that the court of appeals' decision could be read as, at least, implicitly suggesting that Hoida had overturned or backed away from cases such as Gritzner,
¶ 35. For example, the majority in the court of appeals stated that Hoida held that "[d]uty has not become just another policy factor. ... In a nutshell, Hoida returned Wisconsin negligence law to its pre-Bowen[
¶ 36. Where the majority in the court of appeals may have caused some confusion in its reading of Hoida is that it seemed to believe that this court had somehow returned to an emphasis on duty and foreseeability as a way of limiting liability in a negligence case. While that has been a legitimate inquiry, liability in negligence cases in Wisconsin more often has been limited by consideration of public policy factors, as shown in the Rockweit and Gritzner decisions.
¶ 37. In Hoida, we held that a subcontractor who incurred losses on a construction project, when the general contractor and the property owner fraudulently misappropriated about $650,000 of the project's construction loan proceeds, had not provided sufficient facts to controvert the defendant-lenders' "prima facie showing that it did not breach the duty of ordinary care under the circumstances . . . ." Hoida, Inc.,
¶ 38. We disagreed with Hoida's claims and held that Hoida's negligence claim against M&I Midstate Bank was precluded because the bank did not breach the
¶ 39. In Rockweit, a young child, Anthony Rock-weit, sued an invited guest, Ann Tynan (Tynan), for alleged negligence for failing to extinguish hot embers from a campfire in a fire pit that Anthony Rockweit later fell into, causing him severe injuries. Rockweit,
¶ 40. Rockweit argued that Tynan, being one of the last people to go to bed at the campground that evening "had a duty to extinguish the fire because it was foreseeable to a reasonable person that someone could be hurt if she did not do so." Id. at 420. While this court found that Tynan owed Rockweit a duty of care under Wisconsin law, we held that public policy factors precluded liability against Tynan, even though Rockweit had established all four elements of a common-law negligence claim. Id. at 425.
¶ 41. We held that" 'once it is determined that a negligent act has been committed and that the act is a substantial factor in causing the harm, the question of duty is irrelevant and a finding of nonliability can be made only in terms of public policy.'" Id. (citations omitted). A finding of nonliability on the basis of "public policy is a question of law which the court alone deсides." Id. (citations omitted). Our decision "to deny liability is essentially one of public policy rather than of duty or causation." Id. (citation omitted). We stated that this approach represents the minority viewpoint of Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co.,
¶ 42. The Rockweit court then listed the six public-policy factors described in detail previously in this opinion, and we held that the imposition of liability against Tynan, who did not "start, maintain, or provide any necessary incendiary materials for the fire[,] .. . would place an unreasonable
¶ 43. In Gritzner, the parents of a four-year-old girl, Tara, who was sexually abused by a ten-year-old neighbor, Michael, brought suit against Michael's mothеr and her boyfriend, Roger Buhner (Buhner). Gritzner,
¶ 44. The lead opinion upheld prior caselaw that the claim for negligent failure to warn was not a viable claim, but allowed the negligent failure to control claim to go to trial. Id., ¶ 5. The lead opinion also held that the negligent failure to warn claim was prohibited by public policy considerations, whereas the failure to control claim was not barred by public policy considerations givеn it could be "impos’ed on distinct, narrow grounds that do not raise the same public policy considerations that preclude liability for failure to warn." Id. Buhner was aware that Michael had "engaged in inappropriate sexual acts with another child or children, including his half-sister." Id., ¶ 7.
¶ 45. In Gritzner, we reiterated our position in Rockweit that "Wisconsin courts address public policy concerns directly, rather than asking whether the defendant owed a 'duty' to the particular victim." Id., ¶ 24 (footnote omitted). As a result, in a negligence case, a defendant's conduct " 'is not examined in terms of whether or not there is a duty to do a specific act, but rather whether the conduct satisfied the duty placed upon individuals to exercise that degree of care as would be exercised by a reasonable person under the circumstances.
¶ 46. In Gritzner, the lead opinion then looked to the public policy factors described previously in this decision, reiterated the legal conclusions discussed in Rockweit, and held that imposing liability for negligent failure to warn would allow liability with no definable and sensible starting or stopping point. Id., ¶¶ 34, 36.
¶ 47. We reiterate that Gritzner and Rockweit are still good law in Wisconsin. Nothing in Hoida was intended to overrule or change the principles of law expressed in Gritzner and Rockweit. While liability has been limited in a negligence case based on the absence of a duty, liability in the vast majority of negligence cases in Wisconsin is guided, when determining whether to limit liability, by consideration of public policy factors, as Gritzner and Rockweit demonstrate.
V
¶ 48. We reverse' the decision of the court of appeals. Doing so, we hold that, based on public policy grounds, a claim for common-law negligence cannot be maintained against social hosts, such as the Niesens, who allegedly were aware that minors on their property were consuming alcohol, but who did not provide the alcohol, when an underage guest later allegedly caused an
¶ 49. By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.
Notes
Nichols v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 2006AP364, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2007).
The premises actually were owned by SweetWater Farms, Inc., but the Niesens were alleged to have controlled the premises "for their own benefit or for the benefit of said corporation."
The Nichols' Second Amended Complaint spells the name "Shumate," but the Niesens' brief spells the name "Schumate." We will utilize the spelling in the Nichols' complaint.
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. We note that, while the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers, in an amicus brief, introduced arguments based on Wis. Stat. § 125.07(l)(a)4, the Nichols did not plead a violation of this subsection in any of the three versions of their complaint. Accordingly, such arguments are not properly before this court, and we will not address them.
The reliance by the Nichols and the Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers (now, the Wisconsin Assoсiation for Justice) in their respective briefs on Koback v. Crook,
Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
Wisconsin Stat. § 125.035(4)(b) provides that a provider is not immune from civil liability if the provider of alcohol beverages knew or should have known that the underage person was under the legal drinking age and if the alcohol beverages prоvided to the underage person were a substantial factor in causing injury to a third party.
Concurrence Opinion
¶ 50. {concurring). I agree with the majority opinion that a claim for common law negligence cannot be maintained in the present case. I agree, however, with the reasoning of the circuit court rather than the reasoning of this court: The decision in the present case rests on legislative policy, not on judicial public policy grounds.
¶ 51. Wisconsin Stat. § 125.07(1)(a)4. provides that "no adult may intentionally encourage or contribute to a violation of sub. (4)(a) or (b)." When § 125.07(l)(a)4. is read together with (4)(a) and (b), the statute (relevant to the facts of the instant case) declares that nо adult may intentionally encourage or contribute to an underage person procuring alcohol beverages from a licensee or permittee or intentionally encourage or contribute to an underage person knowingly possessing or consuming alcohol beverages. Any adult violating this statute may be subject to a civil forfeiture or convicted of a misdemeanor.
¶ 52. The complaint alleges that the Niesens were negligent. It does not allege that the Niesens intentionally encouraged or contributed to an underage person procuring alcohol beverages from a licensee or permit-tee or intentionally encouraged or contributed to an underage person knowingly possessing or consuming alcoholic beverages.
¶ 53. Although the statutes do not bar all negligence causes of action relating to adult behavior, alcohol beverages, and underage persons, Wis. Stat. § 125.07(l)(a)4., in my oрinion, provides a "sensible and just stopping point" to the Niesens' liability under the circumstances set forth in the complaint in the instant case relating to underage drinking on the Niesens' property.
¶ 54. I write further to express my reservations about the court of appeals' sketchy analysis of Wis. Stat. § 125.07(l)(a)3. in its decision in the present case and its dismissal of the Niesens' complaint alleging a cause of action under § 125.07(l)(a)3.
¶ 55. The complaint alleges that the Niesens knowingly permitted and failed to prevent the illegal consumption of alcohol beverages by underage persons on premises under their control "contrary to Section 125.07(l)(a)3."
¶ 56. Section 125.07(l)(a)3. prohibits an adult from "knowingly permit[ting] or fail[ing] to take action to prevent the illegal consumption of alcohol beverages by
¶ 57. Although the parties do not raise this issue before this court, it is arguable that the word "premises" in Wis. Stat. § 125.07(l)(a)3. is not used, as the court of appeals held, in its defined meaning to be an area described in a municipal license authorizing the sale of alcohol beverages or in a Department of Revenue permit issued under chapter 125. The word "premises" in § 125.07(l)(a)3. is limited to premises owned by an adult or under the adult's control, and the last sentence of § 125.07(l)(a)3. provides as follows: "This subdivision does not apply to alcohol beverages used exclusively as part of a religious service."
¶ 58. If thе word "premises" in Wis. Stat. § 125.07(l)(a)3. means an area described in a municipal license authorizing the sale of alcohol beverages or in a Department of Revenue permit issued under chapter 125, rather than property, as the court of appeals concludes, why would the legislature explicitly prohibit an adult from knowingly permitting or failing to prevent the illegal consumption of alcohol beverages by underage persons on premises under the adult's control and also explicitly state that the prohibition does not apply to alcohol beverages used exclusively as part of a religious service? The court of appeals' interpretation of § 125.07(l)(a)3. is puzzling.
¶ 59. Moreover, Wis. Stat. § 125.07(l)(a)3. appears to be the only provision within § 125.07 in which the legislature has used the word "premises" without modifying it. Elsewhere in § 125.07, the legislature denotes licensed or permitted premises.
¶ 60. When Wis. Stat. § 125.07(l)(a)3. is read in context and in its entirety, the word "premises" in § 125.07(l)(a)3. seems to mean property, not an area described in a municipal license authorizing the sale of alcohol beverages or in a Department of Revenue permit issued under chapter 125.
¶ 61. For the reasons set forth, I concur in the mandate.
The complaint alleges that the Niesens were negligent in failing "to take reasonable steps to supervise and monitor the activities on their property, which on information and belief included a large group of minors consuming alcohol. On information and belief the Niesens were aware that the minors on their property were consuming alcohol."
Wisconsin Stat. § 125.02(14m) defines "premises" to mean "the area described in a license or permit." Section 125.02(9) dеfines "license" to mean "an authorization to sell alcohol beverages issued by a municipal governing body under this chapter." Section 125.02(13) defines "permit" to mean "any permit issued by the [Department of Revenue] under this chapter."
fAccording to the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau's Bill Drafting Manual, § 3.01 at 63 (2007-2008), the word "subdivision" refers to 3. of § 125.07(l)(a).
See Wis. Stat. § 125.07(3)(a) (regulatingunderage persons' right to enter, knowingly attempt to enter, or be on "premises for which a license or permit for the retail sale of alcohol beverages has been issued"); Wis. Stat. § 125.07(3)(b) (specifying a forfeiture penalty for a licensee or permittee who permits an underage person to enter or be on "a licensed premises"); Wis. Stat. § 125.07(4)(a)2. (making it a violation for an underage person to possess or consume alcohol beverages "on licensed premises" unless the underage person is accompanied by a parent, guardian or spouse who is not underage); Wis. Stat. § 125.07(4)(a)3. (making it a violation for an underage person to enter, knowingly attempt to enter "licensed premises" in violation of § 125.07(3)(a)).