126 Va. 49 | Va. | 1919
delivered the opinion of the court.
This appeal is from a decree of the Corporation Court of the city of Roanoke, construing the third clause of the will of Mrs. S. N. Nichols, deceased. So much, of the clause as is necessary to be stated is as follows:
“And I give authority to my said trustees, or the one acting, if they or he shall deem it judicious, to pay to any adult grandchild before the expiration of said ten years, the then share of such grandchild in the principal fund, provided that as a condition to such payment of any grandchild, he or she shall execute a proper bond with good surety to account for and pay back of the amount received, its pro rata share of what may thereafter come due to any after-born grandchild. And upon the expiration of said ten years and at the regular division of said principal trust fund, like bond and surety for such refunding shall be required from or on behalf of the respective legatees or distributees unless my said trustees, or the one acting, shall deem it wholly unnecessary.”
The ten years’ period reférred to in the third clause of testatrix’s will expired on February 10, 1917, since which date another grandchild of testatrix, Ralph St. George Nichols, has been born. The principal of the trust fund is still undistributed, and the sole question for our determination is whether under the terms of the third clause of the will this after-born grandchild is entitled to share in the trust fund.
This appeal is from a decree of the trial court resolving that question adversely to the after-born grandchild.
Read in its entirety, we find no ambiguity or obscurity in the third clause of the will. There seems no escape from the
In Woodruff v. Pleasants, 81 Va. 37, testator gave certain property in trust to his grandchildren by three of his sons, “now born or hereafter born, to be divided equally between them, my sons acting as trustees, each for his own family, * * * . and dividing out to each child, as he or she may come of age or marry, his due share of said estate. * * * Held: The property vested beneficially on testator’s death in the grandchildren then born, subject to open and let in after-born grandchildren.” See also, Buford v. North Roanoke Land & Imp. Co., 90 Va. 418, 18 S. E. 914; Bayly v. Curlette, 117 Va. 253, 259, 84 S. E. 642.
Our conclusion is to reverse the decree of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings to be had therein not in conflict with the views expressed in this opinion.
Reversed.