Barbara A. NICHOLS, Plaintiff, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, and U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Defendants.
Civil Action No. 11-910 (RCL)
United States District Court, District of Columbia.
Dec. 14, 2011.
250 F. Supp. 2d 250
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.
Barbara A. Nichols, Forestville, MD, pro se. Javier M. Guzman, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
I. Hostile Work Environment
Ms. McLaughlin argues that “Mr. May‘s confrontations with her and with other female employees” amounted to an “abusive work environment.” Her claim is untenable. “Title VII does not provide a cause of action for ‘ordinary tribulations in the workplace.‘” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275. To prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that her employer subjected her to “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult” that is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim‘s employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399). Ms. McLaughlin‘s allegations of confrontations with Mr. May are simply not “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment.” Id. As such, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Ms. McLaughlin‘s claim of a hostile work environment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff presents no basis to find that the events of which she complains occurred because of sex or race discrimination. Nor has plaintiff alleged sufficient acts from which a reasonable juror could find that Defendant created a hostile work environment. Plaintiff has, however, presented a genuine issue of material fact with respect to her claim that she was retaliated against by not receiving a cash award for her work on the Disney Pipe Bomb investigation. Thus, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant‘s motion for summary judgment [Dkt. #34]. A memorializing order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff Barbara A. Nichols, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In a 140-page complaint, Nichols alleges that she was subjected to discrimination on the basis of her race while employed at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives in violation of
I. BACKGROUND
In her complaint, Nichols states that from 1977 to 2007 she was employed by the agency now known as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and now located within the United States Department of Justice. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6. In 2000, she filed an administrative complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII. Nichols v. Truscott, 424 F.Supp.2d 124, 130 (D.D.C.2006). Her complaint was investigated; after a three-day hearing an EEOC administrative law judge found no discrimination. Id. The Department of Justice adopted the decision of the administrative law judge, and Nichols brought suit in federal district court. The district court dismissed certain claims because Nichols had not exhausted her administrative remedies, id. at 133-35, and entered summary
Nichols filed a second administrative complaint in 2006, again alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII. Compl. ¶¶ 55-58. In addition to making new allegations, Nichols “restate[d] the issues involving years 1996-1999,” which she had “raised in her 2000 complaint” but now asserted “were never adjudicated.” Id. ¶ 57. The complaint was investigated, id. ¶¶ 137-77, but no hearing was held. Id. ¶ 182. Instead, an administrative law judge entered summary judgment against Nichols. Id. ¶ 183. The Department of Justice adopted that decision, id. ¶ 190, and Nichols appealed to the Director of the EEOC Office of Federal Operations, who affirmed it. Id. ¶¶ 203-04. After her motion for reconsideration was denied, id. ¶ 220, Nichols brought this action.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Nichols Cannot Sue the EEOC for Mishandling Her Complaint
Defendants argue that Nichols cannot sue the EEOC for mishandling her administrative complaint. They are correct. “Congress has not authorized, either expressly or impliedly, a cause of action against the EEOC for the EEOC‘s alleged negligence or other malfeasance in processing an employment discrimination charge.” Smith v. Casellas, 119 F.3d 33, 34 (D.C.Cir.1997) (per curiam). Because “no cause of action against the EEOC exists for challenges to its processing of a claim,” such a challenge is “properly dismissed ... for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. This Court therefore does so.
B. Nichols‘s Complaint Violates Rule 8
Defendants next argue that the length and incoherence of Nichols‘s complaint violates
The statement should be plain because the principal function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial. The statement should be short because [u]nnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.’
Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir.1988) (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1281, at 365 (1969)) (citations omitted); see also Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 669 (D.C.Cir.2004) (quoting Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42 (quoting 5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1281, at 365)); Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C.1977) (“The purpose of [Rule 8] is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether res judicata is applicable.“). Moreover, Rule 8(d)(1) requires the allegations supporting that claim to be “simple, concise, and direct.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d)(1). “Taken together,” these rules “underscore the emphasis placed on clarity and brevity by the federal pleading rules.” Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 669 (quoting In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 702 (3d Cir.1996)) (quoting 5 WRIGHT & MILLER § 1217, at 169 (2d ed. 1990)) (referring to a superseded version of Rule 8). Their enforcement “is largely a matter for the trial court‘s discretion; Rule 41(b) authorizes the court to dismiss either a claim or an action because of the plaintiff‘s failure to comply with the Federal Rules.” Id. (citation omitted).
Far from being a collection of simple, concise, and direct allegations supporting short and plain statements of each claim, Nichols‘s complaint is “prolix, redundant, bloated with unnecessary detail, and full of vituperative charges.” Unfoldment, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 2007 WL 3125236, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2007). “The complaint contains an untidy assortment of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments.” Id. at *2 (quoting Brown, 75 F.R.D. at 499). In 385 paragraphs spread over 140 pages, Nichols describes the manner in which the EEOC, which is not a proper party to her suit, has handled her allegations. She lists the dates and times of most every event associated with her administrative hearing, states the postage paid on a variety of packages, and describes the affect of several administrative law judges. She musters this confounding detail in an attempt to show that the Department of Justice and the EEOC were engaged in an elaborate conspiracy “to preclude and prevent plaintiff from revealing the prohibited employment practices that occurred.” Compl. ¶ 52(b).
Moreover, it appears that some of those alleged practices were already the subject of an earlier suit. For instance, Nichols alleges that “co-workers remov[ed] her sweaty bra from her gym bag and spread[] it across [her] computer keyboard” and “cut[] her radio headset cord into three parts.” Compl. ¶ 228(b). Nichols raised these allegations before, see Nichols, 424 F.Supp.2d at 139, but the district court found that she had “failed to establish any relation between the alleged harassment and [her] membership in a protected class.” Id. at 140. Much of Nichols‘s current complaint appears to be an attempt to re-litigate her earlier case. The deficiencies of her pleading, however, make it impossible for the Court to determine the extent to which her current claims are barred.
In addition to her hazy conspiracy theory and potentially barred claims, Nichols clearly intends to assert a viable Title VII claim: that her former employer discriminated against her on the basis of race in reassigning her from Washington, DC to Martinsburg, WV. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 80, 82. She may also intend to assert other viable claims. This Court stands ready to adjudicate them, but it cannot decipher Nichols‘s allegations in their present form. Because Nichols‘s complaint omits the required “short and plain statement” of her claims,
III. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes by summarizing its holdings. First, the law does not allow Nichols to sue the EEOC for mishandling
For the reasons discussed at greater length above, it is this 14th day of December hereby
ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against the EEOC is GRANTED and those claims DISMISSED with prejudice; and further
ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8 is GRANTED and the remaining claims DISMISSED without prejudice. An appropriate judgment accompanies this memorandum opinion.
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH
Chief Judge, United States District Court