NICHOLAS SHONER v. CARRIER CORPORATION
No. 20-56327
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
April 14, 2022
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-07030-CAS-E
Bеfore: PAUL J. KELLY, JR., MILAN D. SMITH, JR., and DANIELLE J. FORREST, Circuit Judges.
FOR PUBLICATION
NICHOLAS SHONER, Plaintiff-Appellant, and PAUL CORMIER, Plaintiff, v. CARRIER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 8, 2021 Pasadena, California
Filed
Before: PAUL J. KELLY, JR.,* MILAN D. SMITH, JR., and DANIELLE J. FORREST, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Kelly
SUMMARY**
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
The panel vacated the district court‘s judgment rеgarding plaintiff‘s federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) claim, and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff Nicholas Shoner filed a class action against air conditioner manufacturer Carrier Corporation alleging that his air conditioner was defective, and assеrted state law claims and a federal MMWA claim.
The panel affirmed the district court‘s dismissal of Shoner‘s state law claims in a separate memorandum disposition.
Although the MMWA is a federal statute, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over an MMWA claim if the amount in controversy is less than $50,000.
The panel next considered whether Shoner could includе attorneys’ fees toward the MMWA‘s $50,000 jurisdictional threshold. Shoner‘s MMWA claim was premised on Carrier‘s alleged breach of express and implied warranties pursuant to Michigan law. Neither of these statutes grant a prevailing plaintiff attorneys’ fees. Shoner contended that he could recovеr attorneys’ fees because he also asserted a Michigan Consumer Protection Act claim. The panel held that even if this claim was included in his lawsuit, the Act makes clear that attorneys’ fees are not available in a class action. Because Shoner brought this claim as part of a putative class action, he is not entitled to attorneys’ fees under state law. The panel concluded that Shoner cannot include attorneys’ fees in the MMWA‘s amount in controversy, and his MMWA claim cannot meet the statutory threshold.
Tenth Circuit Judge Kelly concurred that the district court lаcked jurisdiction to consider Shoner‘s MMWA claim on the merits. He dissented from the majority‘s conclusion that attorneys’ fees available under fee-shifting statutes may be included in the MMWA‘s $50,000 amount in controversy requirement because the court need not resolve this issue. Judge Kelly doubted that attorneys’ feеs were meant to be included in the amount in controversy calculation under the MMWA.
COUNSEL
Timothy N. Mathews, Chimicles Schwartz Kriner & Donaldson-Smith LLP, Haverford, Pennsylvania; James C. Shah, Miller Shah LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Sara S. Tatum, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, New York, New York; K. Winn Allen, Devin S. Anderson, and Christian S. Daniel, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, D.C.; for Defendant-Appellee.
OPINION
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Nicholas Shoner brought a putative class action alleging express and implied warranty claims pursuant to state law, along with a federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA) claim.
In 2018, Shoner filed a class action lawsuit against air сonditioner manufacturer Carrier Corporation alleging that his air conditioner was defective. Shoner asserted various state law claims and a federal MMWA claim. The district court had jurisdiction over Shoner‘s state law claims pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA),
Although the MMWA is a federal statute, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over an MMWA claim if the amount in controversy is less than $50,000.
II.
The MMWA “provides a cause of action for express and implied warranty claims under state law.” Floyd, 966 F.3d at 1032. The statute precludes federal jurisdiction in the following circumstances:
(A) if the amount in controversy of any individual claim is less than the sum or value of $25;
(B) if the amount in controversy is less than the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this suit; or
(C) if the action is brought as a class action, and the number of named plaintiffs is less than one hundred.
Four circuits have held that attorneys’ fees are “costs” within the meaning of the MMWA and are excluded from the $50,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. See Ansari v. Bella Auto. Grp., 145 F.3d 1270, 1271 (11th Cir. 1998); Suber v. Chrysler Corp., 104 F.3d 578, 588 n.12 (3d Cir. 1997); Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1069 (5th Cir. 1984); Saval v. BL Ltd., 710 F.2d 1027, 1032-33 (4th Cir. 1983). Of these circuits, however, only the Fourth Circuit analyzed this issue. The others simply adopted Saval‘s reasoning. See id. By contrаst, the Seventh Circuit includes attorneys’ fees toward the MMWA‘s amount-in-controversy requirement but does not explain its departure from the other circuits. See Burzlaff v. Thoroughbred Motorsports, Inc., 758 F.3d 841, 844-45 (7th Cir. 2014).
The MMWA does not define “costs,” and as the Fourth Circuit recognized, the statute gives way to “two equally troublesome interpretations.” Saval, 710 F.2d at 1033 n.9. The Fourth Circuit ultimately concluded that attorneys’ fees were “costs” in
Examining the MMWA‘s text, we must part ways with our sister circuits. We find no reason to interpret the phrase “exclusive of interests and costs,” in the MMWA differently from how we interprеt the same language in the diversity and CAFA jurisdiction provisions. See
We hold that attorneys’ fees are not “costs” within the meaning of the MMWA and therefore may be included in the amount in controversy if they are available to prevailing plaintiffs pursuant to state fee-shifting statutes.1 We have defined the “amount in controversy” as “all relief to which the plaintiff is entitled if the action succeeds.” Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 795. The amount in controversy “includes any result of the litigation, excluding interests and costs, that ‘entails a payment’ by the defendant.” Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, 840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007)). As the Supreme Court explained, when a plaintiff asserts a claim based on a statute with a fee-shifting provision, “[t]he amount so demanded [becomes] part of the matter put in controversy by the complaint, and not mere ‘costs’ excluded from the reckoning by the jurisdictional and
removal statutes.” Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 290 U.S. 199, 202 (1933). If an underlying state statute authorizes attorneys’ fees to a successful litigant, these fees become part of the amount “put in controversy” through an MMWA lawsuit. Id.
The strongest reason the Fourth Circuit provided to adopt its interpretation of the MMWA is the canon against superfluity. See id. at 1032. This canon guides us to “infer that Congress did not intend to make any portion of a statute superfluous.” In re Pangang Grp. Co., 901 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2018). The Fourth Circuit explained that if attorneys’ fees are included in the amount in controversy, the $25 individual claim limit in
Moreover, as the Fourth Circuit recognized, the text of the MMWA‘s $25 individual claim limit itself “does not exclude ‘interests and costs’ from the amount in controversy.” Id. at 1032 n.7. The Fourth Circuit did not contend with this difficulty, instead concluding that “[t]he omission must have been unintentional.” Id. When interpreting an unclear statutory provision, we cannot simply assume an omission was “unintentional,” particularly when that very omission tips the scale in favor of one interpretation over another. “It is beyond our province to rescue Congress from its drafting errors, and to provide for what we might think ... is the preferred result.” Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 542 (2004) (quoting United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 68 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
We agree with the Fourth Circuit, however, that the MMWA‘s jurisdictional hurdles were meant “to restrict access to federal courts.” Saval, 710 F.2d at 1033. Our statutory construction is consistent with that purpose. It will not allow “trivial or insignificant actions” to flood federal courts because the underlying state statutes must still authorize attorneys’ fees. Id. at 1030 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7724). Moreover, “district courts are well equipped to determine ... when a fee estimate is too speculative.” Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 795. This case is a good example. Even if Shoner were statutorily entitled to attоrneys’ fees, such fees must still amount to approximately $48,734 before Shoner could bring his individual MMWA claim—at most, worth $1,266—to federal court.
Lastly, it is worth noting that at the time the MMWA was enacted in 1975, the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction was $10,000. See Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 (1958) (raising the amount in controversy to $10,000); Pub. L. Nо. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (raising the amount in controversy to $50,000). The MMWA has not been amended since its enactment, and its amount-in-controversy requirement has remained $50,000.
III.
We now consider whether Shoner can include attorneys’ fees toward the
Nevertheless, Shoner contends he can recover attоrneys’ fees because he also asserted a Michigan Consumer Protection Act claim.
CONCLUSION
The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Shoner‘s MMWA claim on the merits. “If a federal court lacked jurisdiction to decide an issue before it” we may exercise appellate jurisdiction to correct the error. In re Di Giorgio, 134 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, we vacate the district court‘s judgment regarding Shoner‘s MMWA claim and remand with instructions to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Costs on appeal are awarded to Appellee.
VACATED and REMANDED with instructions to dismiss.
KELLY, Circuit Judge, сoncurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. Shoner‘s MMWA claim on the merits. I respectfully dissent from the court‘s conclusion that attorneys’ fees available under state fee-shifting statutes may be included in the MMWA‘s $50,000.00 amount in controversy requirement under
Additionally, notwithstanding the similar language of
Finally, I dо not think that the Seventh Circuit has definitely decided this issue, as the court in Burzlaff v. Thoroughbred Motorsports, Inc., 758 F.3d 841, 845 (7th Cir. 2014), only addressed the MMWA‘s amount in controversy requirement in a