160 Mich. 582 | Mich. | 1910
This is another phase of the litigation which was before us in Nichol v. Murphy, 145 Mich. 424
The defendant claims (we quote from the brief):
*584 “(1) That that part of Act No. 82, Laws 1873, as amended [see 2 Comp. Laws, § 7282], which authorizes a receiver to sue members of such company in the circuit court where he was appointed, and authorizing the service of process in that and any other county of the State, is oppressive, unwarranted, and utterly void.
“(2) That at the time this action was commenced there were no valid claims against such insurance company; the statute of limitations having long since run against same.
“(3) That the defendant was deprived of a trial by jury in Hillsdale county, his home.
“(4) That defendant paid his assessments and other charges in full, and was discharged and relieved of all claims of any kind to said company or its receiver.
“(5) That the letter of December 11, 1899, was a valid call upon defendant for any and all amounts due or to become due from him to said company.
“(6) That the notification of Receiver Badgley of May 4, 1901, was a valid call in full for any and all amounts due or to become due to the receiver or receivers of said company, and in full for all liability of said defendant as a member of said company.
“ (7) That the statute of limitations is an absolute bar to the collection of this assessment.”
Groups 1 and 3 may be considered together. The defendant made no request for a jury trial. See In re Cox, 129 Mich. 635 (89 N. W. 440). The provisions of the statute thus attacked have been in force since 1873, and, so far as we know, no doubt has been cast upon the right of the legislature to enact such provisions in civil cases. If counsel so diligent as the one presenting these objections is unable to find an authority in point in a civil case, it is fair to assume no such authority exists. The cases to which he calls attention are all criminal cases.
Groups 2, 4, 5, and 6 are decided against the contention of appellant in the cases cited early in this opinion in which the receiver in this case was a party.
Judgment is affirmed.