Niccolls v. RuggNiccolls v. Rugg
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Lawrence
delivered the opinion of the Court:
This was a bill in chancery, filed in behalf of the minority of a religious society in the city of Bloomington, against the trustees elected by the majority, to prevent an alleged misappropriation of the church property. The record shows that the church in question was organized in 1833, as a Presbyterian body, the division of that denomination into old school and new school not having then occurred. This separation took place in 1838, and the Bloomington society, during the same year, attached itself to the new school organization. It so continued until 1848, when, with the consent of the presbytery of which it formed a part, it withdrew, and attached itself to the old school denomination. It thus remained until 1865, when a large majority of the church and congregation voted to sever their connection with the old school organization and return to
It is first urged, by counsel for appellants, that the withdrawal of a portion of the church, although a majority, from the old school denomination, was an abandonment of its rights of property, on the ground that a majority of a religious society have no right to abandon its tenets and doctrines, and still insist on the control of its property, which has been dedicated to the support of its peculiar faith. Conceding this to be correct, as the statement of a general principle, it clearly has no application to the present case. It is- shown by the record that there has been here no abandonment of the faith or doctrines which this church was originally founded to support. It is shown that the old school and new school branches of the Presbyterian church adopt
But, besides all this, the lot upon which the church edifice stands, was donated to that body while attached to the new school presbytery, and the building was commenced and well nigh completed before the church, in 1848, attached itself to the old school organization. In the face of this fact, it is difficult to see on what ground a court could hold that the majority of the church, by returning to their original church connections, have forfeited all rights of property in favor of those members of the society who prefer their existing ecclesiastical relations, or how the appellants can claim more than the distributive share of the property which the court has awarded to them.
It is also urged, that the constitution of the Presbyterian church does not recognize the right of a church or congregation to withdraw; and on this point the evidence of clergymen, taken in the case of Ferraria v. Vasconcellos, 31 Ills. 25, was admitted by agreement. From the testimony in that case, and in the one before us, it is clear that, though no written law of the church may recognize the right of withdrawal, yet, since the separation of this body into the two branches of old and new School, the right of churches to transfer themselves from one to the other of these branches, has been often exercised, and tacitly acknowledged. But in the face of the facts we have already mentioned, it is unnecessary to discuss ’ this question. The” property of this church has been acquired partly under one
It is further objected by appellants, that the rule adopted March 12, 1865, by which the right of voting in matters pertaining to the congregation, was thenceforth to be confined to persons contributing to the expenses thereof, was unreasonable, and contrary to the usages of the denomination, inasmuch as it denied a vote to certain members of the church in regular standing. The propriety of the rule may well be questioned, but as the record shows that no practical harm to the minority arose therefrom, the fact of its adoption is not a sufficient reason for overturning all these proceedings, and opening this quarrel afresh. This rule was adopted in March. In May the first vote was taken as to withdrawal, and a question having been raised on the regularity of that vote, the matter was again submitted to the congregation in June, and a resolution being offered to affirm the proceedings of the meeting held in May, it was carried by a vote of sixty-one to sixteen. At neither meeting was the right of voting denied to any member of the church seeking to exercise it. But besides this, it
It is said the right to vote should have been confined to church members. We are not of that opinion. It often happens that persons belonging to the congregation, but not members of the church proper, are among the largest contributors to the erection of church edifices and to the support of a clergyman, and on a question affecting the property of the congregation, their right to a voice cannot be reasonably questioned.
It is assigned, as a cross-error, that the court, in mating partition of the property, did not include, in the new school party, certain persons who were neither members of the church nor pew-holders, but were still members of the congregation. But we are of opinion that the court acted wisely. Mathematical nicety, in a matter of this sort, is not attainable or important. The precise number of persons who may, in a general sense, be called members of a religions congregar tion, it would be very difficult to determine, nor would it be easy to fix an age at which the children of a family should be held no longer represented by their parents. The only clear and satisfactory rule is that adopted by the circuit court, counting church members by virtue of their membership, and counting,
It is also urged, that the court improperly included, in the basis of its decree, certain persons who had not, for a considerable period, attended the church. But the church records showed that, at the date of the last vote, they were members in regular standing, and it further appears they still resided within the bounds of the church. On this question, the court properly held the church records conclusive.
* After having carefully examined this record, we are of opinion that the decree of the circuit court administers substantial justice, and it must be affirmed.
Decree affirmed.