179 A.D.2d 1037 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1992
The subject agreement contains a broad arbitration provision requiring that "[a]ny dispute of fact between the parties
Ordinarily, where there is a broad arbitration clause, the question of compliance with contractual notice provisions is for the arbitrator to decide (see, Matter of City School Dist. [Poughkeepsie Pub. School Teachers Assn.] 35 NY2d 599, 607; Matter of City of Albany [Pomakoy], 142 AD2d 775, 776, lv denied 73 NY2d 870). However, where the agreement expressly states that compliance with the contractual notice provision is a condition precedent to arbitration, the question of compliance is for the court to decide (see, Matter of United Nations Dev. Corp. v Norkin Plumbing Co., 45 NY2d 358, 364; Matter of Raisler Corp. [New York City Hous. Auth.], 32 NY2d 274, 282; Matter of Wilaka Constr. Co. [New York City Hous. Auth.], 17 NY2d 195; Chanry Communications v Circulation Mgt., 156 AD2d 633). In the instant matter, the agreement expressly states that compliance with the claim and notice requirements of the agreement is a condition precedent to the initiation of arbitration procedures. Under the circumstances, Supreme Court should have conducted a hearing to resolve the factual issues concerning compliance (see, Matter of Frouge Corp. [New York City Hous. Auth.], 26 AD2d 269, 272). (Appeal from Order and Judgment of Supreme Court, Erie County, Mintz, J. — Arbitration.) Present — Denman, P. J., Pine, Balio, Lawton and Davis, JJ.