Niagara Fire Insurance v. Boon

76 Ark. 153 | Ark. | 1905

Hile, C. J.

Boon had a policy of insurance in appellant’s company on his store building, and the adjoining building burned, injuring the intervening brick wall, the roof and front of his building. The adjuster of the insurance company and Boon failed to agree on the amount of damage, and the company invoked the arbitration clause of the policy. The clause was in the usual form of such clauses in standard Are insurance policies, providing that each party select a competent and disinterested appraiser, and the appraisers to select a competent and disinterested umpire. The appraisers were required to estimate the loss, stating separately the sound value and damage, and, failing to agree, to submit their differences to the umpire, and the .award of any two in writing should be binding. The appraisers were selected, and they selected an umpire.

The preponderance of the evidence establishes the facts to be that the appraisers radically disagreed, one demanding an estimate based on a new wall, and the other based on a slight damage to the wall. The appraiser selected by the insurance company then called in the umpire, and it seems that he and the appraiser for the company differed more radically than he and the other appraiser. Then the appraiser for the insurance company withdrew, and the umpire and the other appraiser made the award in conformity to the policy. This suit was brought on the award, and the company had it transferred to chancery on allegations impeaching the award and seeking to set it aside. The case was tried by the chancellor, and there is much conflict in the evidence; but, as stated, a preponderance sustáins the facts briefly outlined above, and which version comes accredited by the chancellor.

1. Objections are made to much testimony: to some because elicited by leading questions; to other because opinion evidence was admitted from witnesses not properly qualified as experts; and for some other reasons. The case was heard before the chancellor, and he is presumed to have disregarded all incompetent testimony ; and on trial de novo here the case is weighed solely on the competent testimony. Hence there is no profit in discussing these objections.

2. It is insisted that the appraisers selected by the insured did not estimate on the basis required by the policy, and thereby departed from the terms of the submission.

The point turned on whether the old wall was to be treated as worthless, or an estimate made on its damaged condition. There is much evidence to sustain the appraiser in his opinion that it would have to be taken down, and the value of it would not compensate the expense of tearing it down. Even if wrong in his opinion on that subject, there is not sufficient evidence against it to set aside the award as founded in mistake. Judge Sanborn thus stated the rule:

“An agreement of appraisal is a contract. Appraisers who make an award under such an agreement are presumed to have ácted in accordance with the law and the terms of the contract, and the burden of proof is on those who attack their award to establish the contrary by convincing evidence. Every reasonable intendment and presumption is in favor of the award, and it should not be vacated unless it clearly appears that it was made without authority, or was the result of fraud or mistake, or of the misfeasance or malfeasance of the appraisers.” Bernard v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 41 C. C. A. 170.

The evidence satisfies the court, as it did the chancellor, that the award was fairly made. Certainly, it cannot be said that it clearly appears that it was the result of fraud, mistake, misfeasance or malfeasance of the appraiser or the umpire. The evidence against it on material questions is that of the appraiser selected by the company and the adjuster, and they are contradicted by the other appraiser and umpire and other testimony strongly sustaining the latter.

3. There is much said about the bias and partisanship of the appraisers, but no evidence is apparent to sustain a disqualification of them on this account, within the rule on that subject recently announced by this court in National Fire Ins. Co. v. O’Bryan, 75 Ark. 198.

4. It is contended that the arbitration was dissolved by the appraisers, and the award made by the umpire and one appraiser, acting as appraisers after the appraisers had agreed to dissolve, and that this was contrary to the terms of submission, which provided for the umpire to only act when the appraisers submitted their differences to him.

The evidence satisfies the court that the appraiser selected • by the insurance company called upon the umpire to settle the differences, and, finding him more difficult to agree with than the appraiser, then withdrew. There is some evidence that the withdrawal was under the direction of the adjuster, who learned of the situation of affairs. That is not important here; for it is thoroughly settled that an arbitration cannot be defeated, after it is properly submitted, by the withdrawal of one of the appraisers during the investigation. Ostr. Fire Ins. § 291; Bradshaw v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 137 N. Y. 137.

Other questions are discussed as to the revocation of the arbitration by the withdrawal of the appraiser on account of the arbitrary action of the other appraiser, and other questions based on the theory of appellant that the appraiser acted without the scope of the submission and improperly. But the court is satisfied from the evidence that the appraisers’ conduct was not within any of the grounds for impeaching the ¿ward; hence it is unnecessary to pursue the subject further. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the award as to the value. Even if it was not an accurate valuation, it would not be open to attack unless so grossly erroneous as to indicate bad faith or other grounds to set aside the award.

The judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice McCurroch disqualified and not participating.