Being denied admission into the United States and held for deportation by ap-pellee, appellant brings this appeal to review аn order of the court below denying her petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant sought admission into the United States as the foreign-born daughter of Ngim Lin, an alleged citizen of the United States. In addition to applicant’s testimony, five witnesses testified on her behalf.
Ngim Lin, the alleged father, first arrived from China, at San Francisco on May 3, 1915. In the following October, he was issued a citizen’s return certificate, and was rеadmitted as a citizen upon his retuni from the Territory of Hawaii a year later. At that time he was asked how many children he had ever had, and he replied “One boy — no girls”. He also testified that the boy was named Ngim Tai, and that he was born December 5, 1915 (old calendar) or Octobеr 29, 1915 (new calendar). The alleged father applied for a citizen’s return certificate and in support thereof testified on Seрtember 19, 1922, that he had one boy and one girl, who were twins, born on February 4, 1916 (old calendar) or January 2, 1916 (new calendar) ; that his son’s name was Ngim Tаi and that the name oí his daughter (the alleged applicant here) was Ngim Yee. When the discrepancies in the testimony on the two different occasions were called to the alleged father’s attention, he testified that when he testified in 1916, he was' asked if he had a boy, but was not asked if he had a girl; that he did not testify in 1916 that he had no girls; and that as to the date of birth, he was misunderstood in 1916.
The alleged father, Ngim Lin, testified on December 7, 1934, in support of his application for predetermination of his citizenship status. He then testified that the twins were born on Jаnuary 2, 1916; that his son’s name was Ngim Jung Hon, and that the name of his daughter (the alleged applicant) was Ngim Ah Oy, the name appellant now claims, аnd that neither child had any other name than the one given except an indefinite one meaning “twin”.
Ngim Tin, an alleged paternal uncle оf the applicant, testified fo.r her that she was the daughter of Ngim Lin, but the witness admitted he had never seen the applicant. Whoe Tong, аn alleged maternal uncle, testified for applicant that applicant’s mother was his' half-sister, and that she had written him of the birth of twins in 1916, but the witness admitted he had never seen the applicant.
Witness Lan Wai Yee, who is unrelated to applicant, testified that she had met applicant in China, and after the witness had arrived in this country, applicant’s alleged father told the witness that applicant was his daughter. Witnеss Young Muey, unrelated to applicant, testified that he had met applicant twice in China.
A Board of Special Inquiry denied apрlicant admission into the United States, which decision was affirmed on appeal to the Secretary of Labor Applicant’s pеtition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied, hence this appeal.
Appellant makes a number of contentions, all to thе effect that the immigration authorities were wrong in refusing to believe evidence for applicant, o.r in weighing the evidence. It is unnecessary to state the contentions in this respect in detail. The controlling rule is stated in Lum Sha You v. United States, 9 Cir,
The other witnesses did not testify as to the claimed relationship. Assuming, without so deciding, that an inference of relationship from their testimony could be justified, it is clear that the questiоn arising involves the weight to be given to such testimony. In such circumstances, it was exclusively within the province of the immigration authorities to weigh such evidence. It therefore appears that the immigration authorities decided that appellant' had failed to sustain her burden, bеcause two witnesses were not believed, and because the other evidence was not of sufficient weight to overcome the burden. It follows that we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the immigration authorities. Mui Sam Hun v. United States, 9 Cir.,
The other contention arises under 8 U.S.C.A. § 152, which prоvides in part: “ * * * All aliens arriving at ports of the United States shall be examined by at least two immigrant inspectors at the discretion of the Secretary of Labor and under such regulations as he may prescribe. * * * Every alien who may not appear to the examining immigrant inspector at the port of arrival to be clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to land shall be detained for examination in relation thereto by a board of special inquiry. * * * The decision of an immigrant inspector, if favorable to the admission of any alien, shall be subject tо challenge by any other immigrant inspector, and such challenge shall operate to take the alien whose right to land is so challenged before a board of special inquiry for its investigation.” Appellee contends that this statute applies only to persоns seeking admission into the United' States as aliens, whereas appellant seeks admission as a citizen. We express no opinion as to the soundness of such contention but assume, for the purposes of this decision, that the above statute is applicable here.
Appellant contends that without a proper preliminary examination the Board of Special Inquiry had no jurisdiction to hold a hearing, and that the preliminary examination here was impropеr under the statute, because it was not held by at least two immigrant inspectors, but by only one of such inspectors.
The first quoted sentence of the statute is the only part thereof which mentions an еxamination by two immigrant inspectors. It provides for an examination “by at least
Affirmed.