Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court:
The First District Appellate Court has granted this appeal on the ground of importance. The precise question here presented has never been passed upon by this court and there appears to be a conflict of opinion in the Appellate courts of this State.
The Appellate Court here affirmed the trial court’s judgment fixing liability on the defendant for violation of a section of the Uniform Traffic Act. The plaintiff charged that defendant, by its servant, negligently permitted its taxicab to remain unattended on a Chicago street without first stopping the engine or locking the ignition or removing the key, contrary to a section of said act. The undisputed facts reveal that a thief stole the taxicab and while in flight ran into plaintiff’s vehicle causing property damage. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint was based on the theory that the acts or omissions of the defendant did not constitute actionable negligence, nor the proximate cause of the damage. Briefly stated, plaintiff contended that the defendant’s violation of the statute was negligence and the proximate cause of the damage.
The statute in question, section 92 of article XIV of the Uniform Traffic Act, provides: “(a) No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing the key, or when standing upon any perceptible grade without effectively setting the brake thereon and turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway, (b) No person shall operate or drive a motor vehicle who is under fifteen years of age.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, chap. 951/2, par. 189; Jones Ann. Stat. 85.221.
The defendant takes the position that this particular statute is not an antitheft measure but is a traffic regulation, the violation of which could impose no liability on the owner or operator of the vehicle for the misconduct of a thief, for the reason that, under such circumstances, the violation of the statute is not actionable negligence in that the misconduct is neither negligence with relation to the resulting injury, nor its proximate cause. The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the statute is a safety measure for the benefit of the public; that its violation is prima facie evidence of negligence; and that reasonable persons might reasonably foresee that its violation could result in the consequences which occurred here. The plaintiff further contends that irrespective of the statute there would be a common-law liability under the same circumstances, and that in either event the questions of negligence and proximate cause are, under the facts alleged and admitted here, questions of fact and not questions of law.
The First District Appellate Court in Ostergood v. Frisch,
A repetitious review of the cases and decisions of the foreign jurisdictions cited in the parties’ briefs will serve no good purpose, as our Appellate Courts have already done so in a most scholarly manner. Suffice it to say here that the majority rule seems to hold there is no liability while the minority rule holds there is. Various distinctions, qualifications and limitations have been pointed out by both plaintiff and defendant in criticism of the cited cases. We have carefully studied the reasoning of our Appellate courts and the courts of the other jurisdictions, in the light of these distinctions, and conclude that the issue presented requires our determination of the following questions: (a) What was thelegislative intention? (b) Is the violation of the statute the proximate cause of the injury? (c) Is the act of the thief an intervening, independent, efficient force which breaks the causal connection between the original wrong and the injury?
Labeling of the statute does not solve the problem. Defendant urges that the statute is a traffic regulation and not an antitheft measure, and from this premise reasons to a conclusion of nonliability. It seems to argue that if it' were an antitheft measure liability would attach in this case. However, the Massachusetts court construed this type of provision as being an antitheft measure but found the injury to the plaintiff not within the harm intended to be prevented. (Sullivan v. Griffin,
Consequently, there enters into our consideration the question of foreseeability as to intervention of outside agencies not under the control of the person in charge of the motor vehicle. The drawing of lines of demarcation in problems of cause and effect is often difficult in the study of formal logic and these difficulties are not minimized in the field of jurisprudence. We cannot say that the legislature intended to distinguish between certain types of outside agencies without expressing such distinction. Such a distinction would be too tenuous a ground to serve as a basis for decision in view of the broad general sweep of the statutory language employed. The legislature has here used clear and express terms making it the duty of persons in charge of motor vehicles to do certain acts upon leaving their vehicles unattended. The motivation of such legislation is not the State’s desire to punish but rather its interest in public welfare for protection of life, limb and property by prevention of recognized hazards.
The violation of the statute is prima facie evidencé of negligence under the prevailing rule of this State. (Johnson v. Pendergast,
Where an independent agency intervenes, the solution of the problem becomes aggravated. The rules are without substantial contradiction and are universally applicable, but their practical application yields varying and contradictory results. In Neering v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.
A further problem is presented when the independent agency is an illegal or criminal act. Wrongful acts of independent third persons, not actually intended by the defendant, are not regarded by the law as natural consequences of his wrong, and he is not bound to anticipate the general probability of such acts, anymore than a particular act by this or that individual. The rule applies a fortiori to criminal acts. The intervention of a criminal act, however, does not necessarily interrupt the relation of cause and effect between negligence and an injury. If at the time of the negligence, the criminal act might reasonably have been foreseen, the causal chain is not broken by the intervention of such act.
The doctrine of proximate cause was subjected to a thorough study and analysis in the case of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.
The law of probable cause holds that an injury which is the natural and probable consequence of an act of negligence is actionable and such an act is the proximate cause of the injury. The injury which could not have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated as the probable result of an act of negligence is not actionable, and such an act is either a remote cause, or no cause whatever of the injury. An injury that results from an act of negligence but that could not have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated as its probable consequence and that would not have resulted from it had not the interposition of some new and independent cause interrupted the natural sequence of events, turned aside their course, and produced it, is not actionable. (
The common law has established itself in the history of jurisprudence because of its flexibility in its recognition of and adaptation to changing times and mores'; and, as adopted by our legislature, “is a system of elementary rules and of general declarations of principles, which are continually expanding with the progress of society, adapting themselves to the gradual changes of trade, commerce, arts, inventions and the exigencies and usages of the country.” (Amann v. Faidy,
Justice requires that we do more than honor and respect prior judicial decisions, for if only these two considerations .were our guideposts then the path of jurisprudence would never change irrespective of a changing world. Cases similar in facts to the one at bar have reached the higher courts of this State, of Massachusetts, Minnesota, Indiana, Michigan, Louisiana, New York, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia, wherein experienced and learned lawyers and judges have differed on this question of probable cause. That reasonable minds can and have disagreed on this question cannot be denied. With these incontrovertible facts before us, we recall the reasoning of Justice Cardozo, that the range of reasonable apprehension is at times for the court, and at times, if varying inferences are possible, a question for the jury. The possibility of varying inferences in a case such as the one before us has been amply demonstrated. Certain facts may exist which a jury of reasonable men would consider as determinative in. leading to a conclusion of liability or nonliability, all according to the circumstances of the particular case. Assume a defendant violates the statute in question, yet before leaving the vehicle he secures the doors and windows. Or assume he has a reliable or an unreliable person nearby watching the vehicle for him. Or assume he leaves his car within view of a police officer who knows defendant and is acquainted with his habit of so leaving his car. Or assume the intervening third party drove the car carefully. Many other varying examples could be constructed which would have different material circumstances. The nature of the community, its population, the elements of time and space in innumerable aspects, may in certain cases be deemed material facts for a jury’s consideration.
We are in agreement with the court below in our belief that reasonable men might differ on the question where there were special circumstances surrounding the defendant’s violation of the statute which may be the proximate cause of the damage that followed. We do not mean to be understood as holding that given a cause similar to the facts in the Palsgraf case we would hold otherwise than in the majority opinion; we do, however, believe that under the circumstances as presented in the case before us we find no persuasive authority and no impelling reasoning for this court to hold, as a matter of law, that no actionable negligence can exist.
Questions of negligence, due care and proximate cause are ordinarily questions of fact for a jury to decide. The right of trial by jury is recognized in the Magna Charta, our Declaration of Independence and both our State and Federal constitutions. It is a fundamental right in our democratic judicial system. Questions which are composed of such qualities sufficient to cause reasonable men to arrive at different results should never be determined as matters of law. The debatable quality of issues such as negligence and proximate cause, the fact that fair-minded men might reach different conclusions, emphasize the appropriateness and necessity of leaving such questions to a fact-finding body. The jury is the tribunal under our legal system to decide that type of issue. To withdraw such questions from the jury is to usurp its function. Bailey v. Central Vermont Railway Co.
For the foregoing reasons, it is our opinion that the Appellate Court was correct in affirming the judgment of the municipal court of Chicago.
Judgment affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
"• The majority opinion is contradictory within itself. It first concludes that section 92 of article XIV of the Uniform Traffic Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, chap. 95^, par. 189,) is not an antitheft statute, but is, in fact, a public safety measure. Although the opinion fails to answer in specific fashion its question as to what harm the legislature foresaw and attempted to prevent by the passage of this act, it does ultimately determine that the statute was to prevent accidents caused by a thief in stealing the vehicle. This determination is manifest by the majority’s adoption of the Appellate Court determination. The majority thus finds the statute, or at least that part of the statute rendering it unlawful to fail to remove the keys from a parked vehicle, to be an antitheft measure.
The complaint filed by appellee alleged that the thief “obtained possession of the said taxicab or motor vehicle of the Defendant aforesaid, and in an attempt to steal the same and in making his escape after the said theft, ■ ran the said taxicab or motor vehicle against the automobile of the Plaintiff.” Appellant moved to strike and dismiss the complaint and stood by his motion. It is entirely impossible to determine from the record how far from the theft scene or how soon after the theft the accident occurred. It is entirely without the bounds of reason to impose liability upon the cab company for an accident occurring at a great distance or a considerable time after the actual theft, or at a time when the thief was no longer in actual flight from the place of his crime."
The majority concludes that all parts of this statute, except that portion referring to the keys, indicate an intention on the part of the legislature to prevent harm to the public by an inadvertent or negligent movement of a parked vehicle, or through its being driven by a young person devoid of experience, judgment, knowledge, or maturity. It finds that the legislature’s purpose in relation to those portions of the statute was not to deter theft. However, the majority then concludes that the portion directing the removal of the keys from the vehicle was to prevent the operation of the vehicle and possible public harm by a thief in flight. The slightest experience renders everyone cognizant of the fact that the removal of automobile ignition keys is only a minor deterrent, if any, to the theft of an automobile and a subsequent flight from detection and pursuit. Consequently, it is only reasonable and logical to construe the legislature’s intention in the passage of this portion of the statute in the same light as is attributed to the remainder of the section. One can only conclude, therefore, that the legislature required the removal of the key to prevent a mere negligent or inadvertent starting of the automobile and an ensuing uncontrolled movement thereof. Obviously the legislature could not presume by such legislation to prevent a wilful movement of the vehicle by an unauthorized person. It is generally recognized that one may leave a motor vehicle standing unattended in a public street temporarily, without being guilty of negligence, provided he takes the ordinary precautions of securing it by the appliances with which it is equipped for that purpose, and that if it is thereafter set in motion by the wilful or negligent act of a third person, such wilful or negligent act will be deemed the proximate cause of the accident or injury resulting therefrom and the owner will not be liable. (
It is correctly stated by the majority that the entire statute makes the failure to remove the key prima facie evidence of negligence. However, such prima facie evidence of negligence is not absolute negligence, and does not of itself create liability. It creates liability only where such negligence is the proximate cause of the injury. It cannot be the proximate cause of the injury where an independent agency intervenes.
This section, not being an antitheft measure, and not making the failure to remove the key an absolute act of negligence, cannot constitute the proximate cause of this injury. But for the intervention of the theft the failure to remove the key could not have caused this injury. Moreover, unless the thief was in immediate flight from the scene of his theft, the act of thievery could not even be a factor contributing to the injury. In the latter case the failure to remove the key could not have the slightest connection with the subsequent accident and injury.
It is, therefore, impossible under the facts as evidenced by the record, and under the dictates of this statute, to impose liability upon the defendant cab company. The Appellate Court judgment should be reversed.