¶ 1 Robert Ney (Ney) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County granting summary judgment in. favor of Appellees Lawrence S. Axelrod, M.D. (Axelrod) and Medtox Laboratories, Inc. (Medtox). 1 We affirm.
¶ 2 On July 31, 1997, Robert Ney filed a negligence action against Appellees Axelrod and Medtox. Axelrod and Medtox had been hired by Ney’s prospective employer, Sulka-tronic Chemical, Inc. (Sulkatrоnic), to perform pre-employment drug screening on Ney’s urine samples. While Ney had been offered a job at Sulkatronic, the employer required drug screening as a final stage in the emplоyment-hiring process. When Ney’s urine samples tested positive for barbiturates, his application for employment was denied.
¶ 3 In his complaint, Ney alleges that Appellees negligently performed the drug *721 screening tests, 2 he asserts that he had never ingested any illegal substances, making it impossible to test “positively.” Ney also claims that the Appellees’ negligence precluded him from obtaining emplоyment at a significantly higher salary at Sulkatronic than his present job. Axelrod filed preliminary objections to the complaint that were denied by the trial court.
¶ 4 Appellees filed motions for summary judgmеnt alleging that they did not owe Ney a duty since they had been hired by Sulka-tronie, a third party, to perform the drug screening tests. On May 29, 1998, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Ney filed a timely notice of appeal from this order. On appeal, he presents the following issue for our review:
Where a prospective employee is damaged by the improper labeling аnd testing of a urine sample and the results improperly recorded deny him the offered employment position, should not those negligent parties responsible be liable to the prospective employee for their negligence?
¶ 5 Our standard of review in cases of summary judgment is well settled. This court will only reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment where there was an abuse of discretion оr an error of law.
Merriweather v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.,
¶ 6 Ney claims that as a matter оf public policy Appellees owed him a duty of care in handling his urine sample and reading the results of the test. Specifically, Ney asserts that as a result of Appellees’ negligence hе was denied employment at Sulkatronic and will be detrimentally affected in his pursuit of future employment.
¶ 7 To establish a viable cause of action in negligence, the pleader must aver in his complaint the following elements:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks.
2. A failure on the person’s part to conform to the standard required: a breach of the duty.
3. A reasonably close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury.
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interest of another.
Ferry v. Fisher,
¶8 Where a third party has sponsored a medical examination of a person and the person latеr alleges negligence on the part of the physician who performed the examination, that person cannot succeed on a negligence cause of action.
Tomko v. Marks,
¶ 9 In the present case, Ney did not contract for Appellees’ services or seek or recеive medical advice or treatment from Appellees. In fact, it is uncontroverted that the drug screening was performed by Appellees at the behest of Ney’s prospective emрloyer that required such testing as a matter of routine procedure for its hiring process. Accordingly, Ney did not have the required physician-patient relationship based upon a therapеutic purpose that would give rise to a duty on the part of Appellees. Tomko, supra ; Ferry, supra; Tri-County Big Brothers/Big Sisters, Inc., supra.
¶ 10 Despite this conclusion, Ney would have this court create a public policy exception to this generаl “no duty” rule and impose liability in the instant case upon Appel-lees. We refuse to do so.
¶ 11 In Tomko, the plaintiff also argued that the court should create a public policy exception and find the defendant liable for his negligence in failing to properly read his chest x-ray. The x-ray which had been ordered as part of a pre-employment examination indicated that the plaintiffs condition was normal when, in actuality, he had a cancerous condition. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s omission had denied him the opportunity of an early diagnosis. The Tomko plaintiffs pоlicy argument differed from Ney’s present claim on appeal, however, as it was based upon the public policy of a duty owed to patients by doctors. The Tom-ko court found that it could not imрose liability upon the defendant, even on policy grounds, due to the non-existence of a physician-patient relationship.
¶ 12 In the present case, Ney claims that the Appelleеs’ duty to properly perform the drug screening was owed not only to the party with whom it contracted (i.e., Ney’s prospective employer), but also to him because of the negative effects it will have upon his future applications for employment.
¶ 13 Based upon the facts of this case, we are not willing to create a theory of liability for negligent doctors or medical lаboratories that have contracted with third parties for employment-related testing. Such causes of action do not identify a substantial harm to an identifiable and readily discernable clаss of plaintiffs such that we feel compelled to create liability based on a public policy rationale.
Ervin v. American Guardian Life Assurance Co.,
¶ 14 Furthermore, we are reticent to lend credence to future plaintiffs’ claims that they have suffered a “loss of employment advancеment or opportunity” in such a situation where a plaintiff has not passed the final stages in a hiring process, and, therefore, is not even an “employee.” In fact, “[i]t has always been the rule thаt an employer may be selective about the persons he employs as long as he does not unlawfully discriminate among the applicants.”
Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Human Relations Comm. (English),
¶ 15 Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment because it is clear that Appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Merriweather, supra; Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. See also Ervin, supra (citing Texas case that found a doctor examining a job applicant on behalf of a prospective employer owes no duty to the applicant to diagnose a disease; the only care owed by such a relationship is to avoid injuring the applicant).
¶ 16 Order affirmed.
Notes
. This order is final and appealable as it disposes of all claims and all parties. Pa.R.A.P. 341(b);
Sweener v. First Baptist Church of Emporium,
. Specifically, Ney’s complaint alleges that the Appellees committed an error "in either the drawing or collecting, or the reading” of the sample.