286 F.3d 687 | 3rd Cir. | 2002
Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, ALITO and BARRY, Circuit(cid:13) Judges.(cid:13) (Filed: April 11, 2002)(cid:13) CHRISTOPHER H. SCHUBERT(cid:13) MICHAEL J. GAVIN (Argued)(cid:13) Riley, Riper, Hollin & Colagreco(cid:13) 102 Pickering Way(cid:13) Suite 200(cid:13) Exton, PA 19341(cid:13) JAMES C. DALTON(cid:13) Riley, Riper, Hollin & Colagreco(cid:13) 240 Daylesford Plaza(cid:13) P.O. Box 568(cid:13) Paoli, PA 19301(cid:13) Counsel for Appellant(cid:13) ZYGMUNT R. BIALKOWSKI, JR.(cid:13) (Argued)(cid:13) Margolis Edelstein(cid:13) Oppenheim Building, Suite 3C(cid:13) 409 Lackawanna Avenue(cid:13) Scranton, PA 18503(cid:13) Counsel for Appellee,(cid:13) Kingston Township(cid:13) DONALD H. BROBST (Argued)(cid:13) Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, LLP(cid:13) 15 South Franklin Street(cid:13) Wilkes-Barre, PA 18711-0075(cid:13) WILLIAM F. ANZALONE(cid:13) Anzalone Law Offices(cid:13) 98 South Franklin Street(cid:13) Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701(cid:13) Counsel for Appellees,(cid:13) William F. Anzalone et al.(cid:13) OPINION OF THE COURT(cid:13) ALITO, Circuit Judge:(cid:13) Nextel Partners, Inc. ("NPI"), a wireless(cid:13) telecommunications joint venture, wishes to construct a(cid:13) personal wireless communications tower on private(cid:13) 2(cid:13) property in Kingston Township, Pennsylvania. Unable to(cid:13) obtain variances, NPI entered into negotiations with the(cid:13) Township but never formally applied for a building permit.(cid:13) Instead, NPI filed this action in federal district court,(cid:13) asserting claims under a provision of the federal(cid:13) Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("TCA"), 47 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 332(c)(7)(B)(i), and 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The District Court(cid:13) dismissed, and we affirm.(cid:13) I.(cid:13) NPI is participating in the creation of a national wireless(cid:13) network to provide "enhanced specialized mobile radio(cid:13) service," which integrates several different types of wireless(cid:13) service. See Appellant’s Br. at 4-5. NPI determined that, in(cid:13) order to cover an area that includes segments of three(cid:13) major highways, it needed to build a 150-foot "monopole"(cid:13) tower and related facilities ("a telecommunications facility")(cid:13) on or near certain property that it leased from Daniel(cid:13) Voitek in Kingston Township. In July 1999, NPI submitted(cid:13) to the Kingston Township Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB) a(cid:13) "validity challenge" to the Kingston zoning ordinance. NPI(cid:13) alleged, among other things, that the ordinance violated the(cid:13) TCA. NPI claimed that, although the TCA provides that(cid:13) state and local laws "shall not prohibit or have the effect of(cid:13) prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services," 47(cid:13) U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(i)1, the Kingston ordinance on its face(cid:13) did not allow wireless telecommunications facilities(cid:13) anywhere in the Township. In the alternative, NPI sought(cid:13) the issuance of use and dimensional variances and"such(cid:13) other interpretations, waivers and/or variances as may be(cid:13) required" to build the proposed facility. Appellant’s App. at(cid:13) 41.(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 1. The statute, in pertinent part, provides as follows:(cid:13) The regulation of the placement, construction, and modification of(cid:13) personal wireless service facilities by any State or local government(cid:13) or instrumentality thereof . . . shall not prohibit or have the effect(cid:13) of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services.(cid:13) 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(i) (2000).(cid:13) 3(cid:13) The ZHB conducted a hearing and issued a written(cid:13) decision on October 7, 1999. The ZHB agreed with NPI that(cid:13) the Township’s ordinance did not permit wireless(cid:13) telecommunication facilities in any zoning district, and the(cid:13) ZHB recommended that the Township amend the(cid:13) ordinance. However, the ZHB denied NPI’s application for a(cid:13) use variance. It concluded that the proposed site was "not(cid:13) a proper location for a monopole tower," "[g]iving due(cid:13) consideration to topography, adjoining uses and the public(cid:13) health and welfare." Appellee’s App. at 39. The ZHB also(cid:13) observed that NPI had not proven that the property could(cid:13) not be developed in conformity with the provisions of the(cid:13) zoning ordinance or that denial of the use variance would(cid:13) result in an unnecessary hardship.(cid:13) The TCA allows an aggrieved party to file an action in a(cid:13) court of competent jurisdiction within 30 days after a "final(cid:13) action or failure to act by a State or local government or(cid:13) any instrumentality thereof." 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(v).(cid:13) NPI, however, did not file its TCA action in federal district(cid:13) court until 57 days after the ZHB denied its application.(cid:13) Instead, NPI first attempted to negotiate with the(cid:13) Township’s Board of Supervisors and its Solicitor. Precisely(cid:13) what occurred during these discussions is disputed.(cid:13) NPI alleges that, at a meeting on November 3, 1999, the(cid:13) Township conceded that its ordinance was invalid,(cid:13) promised to issue the permits necessary for the tower, and(cid:13) agreed to extend the deadline for filing an action to contest(cid:13) the ZHB decision. NPI states that, in reliance on this(cid:13) agreement with the Township, it withheld filing the(cid:13) complaint that it had planned to file on November 5 (within(cid:13) 30 days of the ZHB’s October 7 decision). The Township, by(cid:13) contrast, denies that the parties ever reached a final(cid:13) settlement. According to the Township, the parties merely(cid:13) came to a general framework for a "tentative resolution,"(cid:13) and no final agreement to issue a building permit was ever(cid:13) reached. Appellee’s Br. at 7. The Township acknowledges,(cid:13) however, that it agreed to an extension of the time during(cid:13) which NPI could file an action in federal court contesting(cid:13) the decision of the ZHB. The Township’s position is(cid:13) consistent with what is apparently the only document(cid:13) generated by the November 3 meeting: a letter dated(cid:13) 4(cid:13) November 4, 1999 from NPI’s counsel to the Township’s(cid:13) Solicitor. The letter described their agreement as a"general(cid:13) framework" and a "tentative resolution." Appellant’s App. at(cid:13) 64. It confirms arrangements for NPI to pick up a permit(cid:13) application, but it does not indicate that the Township had(cid:13) promised to issue a building permit. NPI never filed a(cid:13) permit application.(cid:13) On December 3, 1999, NPI filed this action in the United(cid:13) States District Court for the Middle District of(cid:13) Pennsylvania, naming both the ZHB and the Township as(cid:13) defendants and asserting both federal and state-law claims.(cid:13) After property owners intervened in the action, NPI filed an(cid:13) amended two-count complaint that named the Township as(cid:13) the sole defendant. Count I of the amended complaint(cid:13) asserted a claim directly under the TCA. Count I averred(cid:13) that the Township was violating the TCA because its(cid:13) ordinance had the effect of prohibiting the provision of(cid:13) personal wireless service. As relief, Count I sought a writ of(cid:13) mandamus and an injunction requiring the Township to(cid:13) permit construction of a telecommunications facility on the(cid:13) Voitek site, as well as damages and other relief. Count II(cid:13) asserted a similar TCA claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 and(cid:13) requested damages and attorney’s fees.(cid:13) While this action was pending before the District Court,(cid:13) the Township amended its ordinance in April 2000. On(cid:13) its face, the new ordinance allowed wireless(cid:13) telecommunications facilities to be built in the Township. In(cid:13) July 2000, the District Court dismissed NPI’s action. The(cid:13) Court held that the claim asserted in Count I was barred(cid:13) because NPI had not commenced its action within 30 days(cid:13) after the ZHB denied its application. The Court held that(cid:13) the 30-day rule was "jurisdictional" and could not be(cid:13) extended. In addition, the Court opined that the April 2000(cid:13) amendment of the ordinance had rendered Count I moot,(cid:13) and the Court stated that it would have dismissed this(cid:13) count as moot "even if the thirty-day limitations period had(cid:13) been satisfied." The Court dismissed Count II for failure to(cid:13) state a claim on which relief may be granted. The Court(cid:13) 5(cid:13) held that a federal TCA claim may not be asserted under(cid:13) S 1983. This appeal followed.2(cid:13) On appeal, NPI argues that the claim advanced in Count(cid:13) I of its amended complaint was timely and that a TCA claim(cid:13) may be asserted under S 1983. We will address each of(cid:13) these arguments in turn.(cid:13) II. (cid:13) Although the TCA recognizes that the states retain(cid:13) primary authority for land use regulation, the Act places(cid:13) certain specified restrictions on the regulation of personal(cid:13) wireless service. See 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7). The key(cid:13) provision says that state and local regulations may not(cid:13) either "unreasonably discriminate among providers of(cid:13) functionally equivalent services" or "prohibit or have the(cid:13) effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless(cid:13) services." 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(i). State and local(cid:13) governments and instrumentalities are also enjoined to "act(cid:13) on any request for authorization to place, construct or(cid:13) modify personal wireless service facilities within a(cid:13) reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed(cid:13) . . . taking into account the nature and scope of such(cid:13) request." 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). In addition, "any(cid:13) person adversely affected by any final action or failure to(cid:13) act by a State or local government or any instrumentality(cid:13) thereof that is inconsistent with [47 U.S.C.S 332(7)(B)(7)](cid:13) may, within 30 days after such action or failure to act,(cid:13) commence an action in any court of competent(cid:13) jurisdiction." 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).(cid:13) In this case, as noted, the District Court dismissed Count(cid:13) I of NPI’s amended complaint on the ground that NPI did(cid:13) not commence its action within 30 days after the decision(cid:13) of the ZHB. NPI maintains, however, that the District(cid:13) Court’s holding was based on an erroneous understanding(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 2. In October 2000, NPI applied for a permit under the new Kingston(cid:13) ordinance, as amended in April 2000. But in February 2001, the ZHB(cid:13) denied this application. NPI challenged this denial by filing a complaint(cid:13) in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania (Docket(cid:13) No. 1856-C (2001)).(cid:13) 6(cid:13) of the claim asserted in Count I. That claim, NPI states,(cid:13) was not based on the decision of the ZHB (which had been(cid:13) dropped as a defendant) but on the Township’s continued(cid:13) failure to amend its ordinance, which was inconsistent with(cid:13) the TCA.3 NPI therefore argues that the 30-day limitations(cid:13) period in 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) did not begin to run(cid:13) until the Township amended its ordinance on April 12,(cid:13) 2000. See Appellant’s Br. at 16. It is apparently NPI’s(cid:13) position that during the entire period up to April 12, 2000,(cid:13) the Township was continuously engaged in a "failure to act(cid:13) . . . that was inconsistent with [47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(7)(B)]."(cid:13) 47 S U.S.C. S 33(c)(7)(B)(v).(cid:13) Read generously, Count I of the amended complaint may(cid:13) assert two separate TCA claims. The first -- and plainly the(cid:13) chief -- claim is that the Township violated the TCA by(cid:13) failing to approve the construction of NPI’s proposed(cid:13) facility. The second is that the prior Kingston ordinance(cid:13) was inconsistent on its face with the TCA and that NPI(cid:13) should receive relief from having to comply with that invalid(cid:13) ordinance. We hold that the first claim does not fall within(cid:13) 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(B)(7)(v) because NPI never filed with the(cid:13) Township a request for approval of its proposed facility. We(cid:13) hold that the second claim is moot.(cid:13) A.(cid:13) We turn to NPI’s claim that the Township violated the(cid:13) TCA by failing to approve its proposed facility. The language(cid:13) of 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(B)(7)(v) permitting an aggrieved party(cid:13) to commence an action to challenge a "failure to act" must(cid:13) be read in conjunction with the previously noted provision(cid:13) requiring state and local governments and instrumentalities(cid:13) to act within a reasonable time on "any request for(cid:13) authorization to place, construct, or modify personal(cid:13) wireless service facilities." 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(B)(7)(iii). Thus,(cid:13) if a state or local government or instrumentality fails to act(cid:13) on a "request for authorization to place, construct, or(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 3. In view of this argument, we need not and do not decide whether a(cid:13) claim contesting the decision of the ZHB would have been time-barred(cid:13) despite the Township’s agreement to extend the time for NPI to file an(cid:13) action under the TCA.(cid:13) 7(cid:13) modify [a] personal wireless service facilit[y]," 47 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 332(c)(B)(7)(iii), that "failure to act" is actionable under 47(cid:13) U.S.C. S 332(c)(B)(7)(v). Here, if NPI had filed such a request(cid:13) with the Township and the Township had failed to act on(cid:13) the request, the Township’s failure to act would be deemed(cid:13) a denial and could be challenged in court.(cid:13) It is undisputed, however, that NPI never filed with the(cid:13) Township a building permit application or any other(cid:13) "request for authorization to place, construct, or modify(cid:13) personal wireless service facilities."4 Yet the main thrust of(cid:13) Count I of NPI’s amended complaint is that the Township(cid:13) violated the TCA by failing to approve construction of its(cid:13) proposed telecommunications facility on the Voitek site.(cid:13) Similarly, the primary relief sought in Count I is the(cid:13) issuance of a writ or injunction requiring the Township to(cid:13) grant such approval.5 To the extent that Count I challenges(cid:13) the Township’s failure to approve NPI’s facility, we hold that(cid:13) it does not fall within 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(B)(7)(v). In the(cid:13) absence of a request to approve the construction of a(cid:13) facility, the failure to approve the facility is not a "failure to(cid:13) act" within the meaning of this provision.(cid:13) For a similar reason, we also see no merit in NPI’s(cid:13) alternative argument that the 30-day period did not begin(cid:13) to run until November 3, 1999, "the date that the Township(cid:13) agreed to issue a building permit to NPI to remedy the(cid:13) deficiency with its Ordinance." Appellant’s Br. at 16.(cid:13) Assuming for the sake of argument that the Township(cid:13) orally agreed during the settlement discussions to issue a(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 4. Moreover, even if NPI had applied to the Township for a building(cid:13) permit, the Township apparently lacked the power to act on such an(cid:13) application under state law. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53 S 10909.1(a)(3)(cid:13) (West 1997) (conferring upon the zoning hearing board "exclusive(cid:13) jurisdiction to hear and render final adjudications" over appeals from the(cid:13) decision of the zoning officer, including "the granting or denial any(cid:13) permit, or failure to act on the application therefor . . . .").(cid:13) 5. Count I requested that the District Court"[i]ssue a Writ of Mandamus(cid:13) and enter preliminary and permanent injunctions directing Defendant(cid:13) Kingston Township, to grant approval of NPI’s telecommunications facilty(cid:13) to permit the use of the Property for a telecommunications facility(cid:13) including a 150’ monopole in accordance with NPI’s Application."(cid:13) Appellant’s App. at 26a.(cid:13) 8(cid:13) building permit, the fact remains that NPI never applied to(cid:13) the Township for a permit. Accordingly, the Township did(cid:13) not engage in the type of "failure to act" that is actionable(cid:13) under 47 U.S.C. S 332(c)(B)(7)(v).(cid:13) B.(cid:13) We now consider the second claim that we perceive in(cid:13) Count I, i.e., that the old Kingston ordinance was(cid:13) inconsistent on its face with the TCA and should not be(cid:13) enforced against NPI. We affirm the dismissal of this claim(cid:13) on the ground that it is moot.(cid:13) Under Article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution,(cid:13) federal judicial power extends only to cases and(cid:13) controversies. If a claim no longer presents a live case or(cid:13) controversy, the claim is moot, and a federal court lacks(cid:13) jurisdiction to hear it. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,(cid:13) 750 (1984). This requirement must be met "through all(cid:13) stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate."(cid:13) Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472 477 (1990).(cid:13) If a claim is based on a statute or ordinance that is(cid:13) amended after the litigation has begun, the amendment(cid:13) may or may not moot the claim, depending on the impact(cid:13) of the amendment. See Nextel West Corp. v. Unity(cid:13) Township, 282 F.3d 257, (3d Cir. 2002).(cid:13) As we recently noted, "if an amendment removes those(cid:13) features in the statute being challenged by the claim, any(cid:13) claim for injunctive relief ‘becomes moot as to those(cid:13) features.’ " Unity Township, 282 F.3d at 262 (quoting(cid:13) Khodara Envtl., Inc. v. Beckman, 237 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir.(cid:13) 2001)). On the other hand, an amendment does not moot a(cid:13) claim for injunctive relief if the updated statute differs only(cid:13) insignificantly from the original. See Unity Township, 282(cid:13) F.3d at 262. Similarly, a request for a declaratory judgment(cid:13) that a statutory provision is invalid is moot if the provision(cid:13) has been substantially amended or repealed. See id. at 263(cid:13) n.5; see also Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404(cid:13) U.S. 412, 414-15 (1972).(cid:13) Here, if we read Count I as seeking an injunction against(cid:13) enforcement of the old ordinance and a declaratory(cid:13) 9(cid:13) judgment that the old ordinance violated the TCA(cid:13) because it entirely prohibited the construction of(cid:13) telecommunications facilities in the Township, the 2000(cid:13) amendment rendered those requests for relief moot. In(cid:13) Unity Township, we held that a claim for injunctive relief(cid:13) was not mooted by an amendment to an ordinance because(cid:13) the plaintiff had adduced evidence that the prohibitive(cid:13) effect of the ordinance had not been substantially altered.(cid:13) Here, by contrast, NPI did not attempt to make such a(cid:13) showing. It did not compare the effect of the original(cid:13) ordinance and the amended ordinance. Instead, NPI(cid:13) appears to rely on a dubious bit of inductive reasoning:(cid:13) until NPI receives a permit, which it still does not have after(cid:13) the amendment, the ordinance necessarily violates the TCA(cid:13) on its face. That is simply not how the statute operates.(cid:13) III.(cid:13) We now turn to the question whether the District Court(cid:13) correctly dismissed Count II because a TCA claim may not(cid:13) be asserted under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. Section 1983 provides(cid:13) a private right of action against any person who, acting(cid:13) under color of state or territorial law, abridges"rights,(cid:13) privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and(cid:13) laws" of the United States. See also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448(cid:13) U.S. 1, 4 (1980). In order to seek redress underS 1983, a(cid:13) plaintiff "must assert the violation of a federal right," and(cid:13) not merely a violation of federal law. Golden State Transit(cid:13) Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989). Thus, a(cid:13) plaintiff alleging a violation of a federal statute may not(cid:13) proceed under S 1983 unless (1) the statute creates(cid:13) "enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the(cid:13) meaning of S 1983" and (2) Congress has not"foreclosed(cid:13) such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself."(cid:13) Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423(cid:13) (1987). See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National(cid:13) Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that S 1983(cid:13) actions were impliedly precluded under the Federal Water(cid:13) Pollution Control Act).(cid:13) A plaintiff asserting a statutory claim under S 1983 has(cid:13) the initial burden of demonstrating that the statute creates(cid:13) a substantive right. See Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329(cid:13) 10(cid:13) (1997). If the plaintiff carries this burden, a rebuttable(cid:13) presumption arises that a S1983 claim is available, and the(cid:13) burden shifts to the defendant to show that a S1983 action(cid:13) was explicitly or implicitly precluded by the statute. See(cid:13) Wright, 479 U.S. at 423. One way that a statute may(cid:13) implicitly preclude a S1983 action is by creating a(cid:13) comprehensive remedial scheme. See Sea Clammers , 453(cid:13) U.S. at 20; Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011 (1984)(cid:13) (holding that S 1983 actions were impliedly precluded under(cid:13) the Education of the Handicapped Act); see also Farley v.(cid:13) Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 102 F.3d 697, 703 (3d Cir. 1996)(cid:13) ("The Supreme Court has held that in enacting the U.S.(cid:13) Housing Act, Congress did not specifically foreclose a S1983(cid:13) remedy by enactment of a comprehensive scheme of(cid:13) remedial mechanisms").(cid:13) A key distinction between schemes that are sufficiently(cid:13) comprehensive to preclude a S 1983 claim and those that(cid:13) are not is the availability of private judicial remedies under(cid:13) the statute giving rise to the claim. "In both Sea Clammers(cid:13) and Smith v. Robinson, the statutes at issue themselves(cid:13) provided for private judicial remedies, thereby evidencing(cid:13) congressional intent to supplant the S 1983 remedy."(cid:13) Wright, 479 U.S. at 427. In Wright, by contrast, the Court(cid:13) found "nothing of that kind" in the housing statute at(cid:13) issue, and the Court ultimately concluded that S 1983(cid:13) remedies were not precluded. Id. Similarly in Blessing, the(cid:13) Court reasoned that S 1983 remedies might be available(cid:13) under the statute at issue because "[u]nlike the federal(cid:13) programs at issue in [Sea Clammers and Smith, this(cid:13) statute] contains no private remedy--either judicial or(cid:13) administrative--through which aggrieved persons can seek(cid:13) redress." Blessing, 520 U.S. at 348 (analyzing Title IV-D of(cid:13) the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. S 651 et seq.).(cid:13) Applying this analysis to the TCA, we hold that the TCA(cid:13) implicitly precludes an action under S 1983 by creating a(cid:13) comprehensive remedial scheme that furnishes private(cid:13) judicial remedies. While the remedial scheme provided by(cid:13) the TCA is not complicated, we believe that it is(cid:13) comprehensive in the relevant sense: it provides private(cid:13) judicial remedies that incorporate both notable benefits and(cid:13) corresponding limitations. Allowing plaintiffs to assert TCA(cid:13) claims under S 1983 would upset this balance.(cid:13) 11(cid:13) Under the TCA, an aggrieved party may file an action in(cid:13) any court of competent jurisdiction. 47 U.S.C.(cid:13) S 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The TCA requires that such an action be(cid:13) filed within a very short period -- 30 days -- after an(cid:13) adverse decision or failure to act, and the Act(cid:13) correspondingly requires the court to "hear and decide such(cid:13) action on an expedited basis." Id. This streamlined review(cid:13) may work to the benefit of plaintiffs and defendants in(cid:13) different ways. For plaintiffs, it may provide speedy redress(cid:13) for violations of the Act. For defendants, assuming for the(cid:13) sake of argument that damages may be recovered under the(cid:13) TCA itself,6 quick review may diminish the amount that(cid:13) may be recovered. We also find it important that the TCA(cid:13) makes no provision for attorney’s fees, and it is of course(cid:13) "the general rule in this country that unless Congress(cid:13) provides otherwise, parties are to bear their own attorney’s(cid:13) fees." Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 533 (1994);(cid:13) see also Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y,(cid:13) 421 U.S. 240, 247-62 (1975).(cid:13) If a plaintiff alleging a violation of the TCA could assert(cid:13) its claim under S 1983, the remedial scheme of the TCA(cid:13) would be upset. A plaintiff would be freed of the short 30-(cid:13) day limitations period and would instead presumably have(cid:13) four years to commence the action. See 28 U.S.C. S 1658.(cid:13) The court would also presumably be freed of the obligation(cid:13) to hear the claim on an expedited basis. Perhaps most(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 6. We do not decide this question but note that when a statute creates(cid:13) a private right of action but does not specify what remedies are available,(cid:13) the availability of all appropriate remedies is generally presumed. See(cid:13) Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992).(cid:13) As a matter of practice, however, the typical relief in cases like the one(cid:13) before us has been injunctive. See Omnipoint Communications v. Town of(cid:13) Lincoln, 107 F. Supp. 2d 108, 120-21 (D. Mass. 2000) (observing that(cid:13) "the majority of district courts . . . have held that the appropriate remedy(cid:13) for a violation of the TCA is a mandatory injunction"). Four district(cid:13) courts have expressly held that damages are not available under the TCA(cid:13) itself. See AT&T Wireless v. City of Atlanta, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1362-(cid:13) 64 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (reversed on other grounds); Primeco Personal(cid:13) Communications Ltd. P’ship v. Lake County, 1998 WL 565036 (M.D. Fla.(cid:13) July 20, 1998); Virginia Metronet v. Board of Supervisors of James City(cid:13) County, 984 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Va. 1998); Illinois RSA No. 3 v. County(cid:13) of Peoria, 963 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Ill. 1997).(cid:13) 12(cid:13) important, attorney’s fees would be available. TCA plaintiffs(cid:13) are often large corporations or affiliated entities, whereas(cid:13) TCA defendants are often small, rural municipalities. Such(cid:13) municipalities may have little familiarity with the TCA until(cid:13) they are confronted with a TCA claim, and in land-use(cid:13) matters they may generally rely on attorneys who may(cid:13) likewise know little about the TCA. See Omnipoint(cid:13) Communications v. Penn Forest, 42 F. Supp. 2d 493, 506(cid:13) (M.D. Pa. 1999). Allowing TCA plaintiffs to recover(cid:13) attorney’s fees from such municipalities might significantly(cid:13) alter the Act’s remedial scheme and thus increase the(cid:13) federal burden on local land-use regulation beyond what(cid:13) Congress intended. We are therefore persuaded that the(cid:13) TCA contains a remedial scheme that is sufficiently(cid:13) comprehensive to show that Congress impliedly foreclosed(cid:13) resort to S 1983.(cid:13) We are aware that a panel of the Eleventh Circuit, in a(cid:13) decision that was later vacated, reached a contrary(cid:13) conclusion. See AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,(cid:13) 210 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds,(cid:13) 223 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2000), but we respectfully(cid:13) disagree with the reasoning of that decision.7 The vacated(cid:13) _________________________________________________________________(cid:13) 7. No other federal court of appeals has addressed this question. The(cid:13) District Court decisions are split, but most contain little or no analysis.(cid:13) For decisions holding that a TCA claim of the type involved here may be(cid:13) asserted under S 1983, see, for example, Cellco P’ship v. Hess, 1999 WL(cid:13) 178364 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 1999); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Southern New(cid:13) England Tel. Co., 27 F. Supp. 2d 326 (D. Conn 1998); APT Minneapolis,(cid:13) Inc. v. City of Maplewood, 1998 WL 634224 (D. Minn. Aug. 12, 1998);(cid:13) Smart SMR of New York v. Zoning Comm’n of the Town of Stratford, 995(cid:13) F. Supp. 52 (D. Conn. 1998); Cellco Partnership v. Town Plan & Zoning(cid:13) Comm’n of Farmington, 3 F. Supp. 2d 178, 186 (D. Conn. 1998).(cid:13) Omnipoint Communications v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Chadds Ford(cid:13) Township, 1998 WL 764762 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Sprint Spectrum v. Town of(cid:13) Easton, 982 F. Supp. 47 (D. Mass 1997).(cid:13) For contrary decisions, see, for example, Omnipoint Communications v.(cid:13) Charlestown Township, 2000 WL 128703 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Omnipoint(cid:13) Communications v. Easttown Township, 72 F. Supp. 2d 512 (E.D. Pa.(cid:13) 1999); Omnipoint Communications v. Foster Township, 46 F. Supp. 2d(cid:13) 396 (M.D. Pa. 1999); Omnipoint Communications v. Penn Forest, 42 F.(cid:13) Supp. 2d 493 (M.D. Pa. 1999); National Telecomm. Advisors, Inc. v. City(cid:13) of Chicopee, 16 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D. Mass. 1998).(cid:13) 13(cid:13) decision relied on the TCA’s savings clause, which provides(cid:13) that the Act is not to be construed "to modify, impair, or(cid:13) supercede Federal, state, or local law unless so provided in(cid:13) such Act or amendments." Pub. L. No. 104-104S 601(c)(1),(cid:13) 110 Stat. 143 (1996) (reprinted in 47 U.S.C. S 152,(cid:13) historical and statutory notes). However, our holding in this(cid:13) case -- that the relevant provision of the TCA does not(cid:13) create a right that is enforceable under S 1983 -- does not(cid:13) mean that the TCA in any way modified, impaired, or(cid:13) superceded S 1983. We do not hold that enactment of the(cid:13) TCA had any effect on S 1983; we simply hold that the TCA(cid:13) itself did not create a right that can be asserted under(cid:13) S 1983 in lieu of the TCA’s own remedial scheme. See Sea(cid:13) Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20 n. 31 (holding, despite savings(cid:13) clause, that comprehensive remedial schemes of water(cid:13) pollution statutes impliedly foreclosed resort toS 1983).(cid:13) IV(cid:13) For the reasons explained above, the Order of the District(cid:13) Court, issued in favor of Kingston Township and against(cid:13) NPI, is AFFIRMED.(cid:13) A True Copy:(cid:13) Teste:(cid:13) Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals(cid:13) for the Third Circuit(cid:13) 14
