Case Information
*1 TABITHA NEWTON,
Plaintiff, Case No. 6:05-cv-604-0rl-l8JGG -\'S - SUNTRUST BANK,
Defendant.
ORDER
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Su~nrnary Judgment (Doc. 12- 1. filed April 3,2006), to which Plaintiff responded in opposition (Doc. 19. filed April 13,2006). Plaintiff Tabitha Newton ("Plaintiff ') brings this action against Defendant SunTrust Bank ("SunTmst") in a one-count Con~plaint alleging that SunTrust tei-nlinated her employment for zsercising her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act of ("FMLA"), U.S.C. tj 2601. et seq. After reviewing the motions and memoranda filed by the parties, this Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff bsgan her ernpl~ylneilt with SunTrust Gn November 3. 1992. as a Sun Service (customer sei-vice) Specialist. Throughout her employment with SunTrust. Plaintiff' worked in Orlando. Florida. In August 1994, SunTrust promoted Plaintiff to the position of Consumer Loan Operations Specialist hi September 1996. SunTrust again promoted Plaintiff. this time to Cominercial Loan Processor 1V. Beginning in Plaintiff requested and was granted FMLA leave numerous times by SunTrust as a result of migraine headache *2 suffering (in addition to other ailments). On January 1,2003. SunTrust granted Plaintifrs request to be placed on intermittent FMLA leave due to migaine headaches. During this period of leave. the Commercial Loan Department to which Plaintiff was assigned relocated from Orlando to Atlanta, Georgia. Plaintiff chose not to relocate to Atlanta. and was instead given the option of either finding another position w i t h SunTrust or acccpting a severance package. Plaintiff procured a position as a SunTrust Loan Closing Specialist in the Orlando Business Banking Center under Center Manager Joe Borowslti ("Borowski"). effective August 1.2003.
Plaintiffs new position as a Loan Closing Specialist 2 was subject to an initial 90- day performance review by Borowski and Plaintiffs supervisor. Elba Litton. Prior to the 90- day review, i n October 2003, Plaintiff recertified her intermittent FMLA leave. On November 10. 2003. Plaintiff received her performance review. which rated her as a solid performer. Shortiy thereafter, from January through January 21, 2004. Plaintiff was incapacitated and absent fiom work due to back spasms. SunTrust granted PlaintifYs request for FMLA leave. and no adverse action was taken against Plaintiff as a result of this leave. SunTrust's sick leave policy is outlined as follows:
[E]niployees who are absent from work for three or more consecutive calendar days are required to submit a completed FMLANon FMLA Leave Forms Packet. This packct includes a Medical Certification Form that must be completed by the treating health care practitioner and turned into SunTrust's Leave Management Department within fifteen calendar days of the leave. This forn~ is used by the Leave Manage~nent Department to determine if the employee is cleared to rehim to work. whether any work restrictions exist. and whether the leave qualifies as FMLA leave. If the employee fails to submit the completed Medical Certification Fonn. or fails to do so in a timely manner, the employee may be denied sick leave pay Sor *3 the period of absence. Moreover, the absence ivill not be countcd as FMLA leave, and will not be protected from disciplinary consideration. In the latter regard, employees who are absent fi-om work for three or more consecutive calendar days and who do not provide medical certification for their absence sre subject to discipline up to and including termination from en~ployment. . . . Additionally, under SunTrust's attendance policy, en~ployees who exceed a certain number of absences within a specified time period are considered to be excessively absent and are subject to disciplinary action. Such disciplinary action starts with a verbal warning and works up to termination from employment. FMLA leave is specifically exempted from counting as an absence for purposes of this policy.
(Doc. 12, at 4-5.)
Plaintiff has acknowledged her awareness of tlis policy during her employment with Sunirust. (& Pi. Depo., 86:6-89:4. Jan. 24, 2006.) Two specific examplcs of Plaintiffs previous dealings with the SunTnlst FMLA policy are as follows:
1) Plaintiff received a verbal warning during 2003 for excessive non-FMLA leave. 2) From h4arcl1 22 to March 25,2004, Plaintiff was absent from work due to an insect bite and an allergic reaction to the medication taken to treat the bite. Plaintiffs health care provider did not complete the Medical Certification Form and, as a result. was paid sick leave onlv for the first two days of her absence: the third day was treated as unpaid leave.
On April 19.2004, Plaintiff went to see her physician, Dr. David Quintyne ("Dr. Quintyne") for an earache. Dr. Quintyne told Plaintiff to stay home from work through April 2004. Because of a complication. Plaintiff was referred later that week to an ear. nose and throat specialist who told her to stay home fsom wosk Llu-ough April 30,2004. Plaintiff sent a Medical Certification Form ("the Fonn") to Dr. Quintyne on April 27.2004. via fa. 1
for him to complete and execute. Dr. Quintyne had filled out this form previous times for *4 Plaintiff. On May 3. Dr. Quintyne filled out the Form. indicating that I'laintiffwould be out of work from April 27 through May 3, and that she was released to return to work, without restrictions, on May 4. 2004. On i'vlay 5, Dr. Quintyne revised the Form to indicate that PlaintilY ivas incapacitated until May 4. 2001. and that Plaintiff'\vould return to ~ o r k on hilay 2004. Dr. Quintyne made these changes by handwriting over what he had previously tvritten. and initialed each of these changes (the SunTnist Medical Certification Form indicates that any revisions should be initialed and dated by the physician).
Plaintiff did not return to work until May 6,2004. Plaintiff claims that she did not receive the Form until the morning of May 6, when she went to Dr. Quintyne's office herself to pick up the Form, in its revised status. prior to reporting to work. IJpon returning to work, Plaintiff submitted thc 170rm as well as a doctor's note covering the period from April to April 23, 2004. On May 7. 2004. the day after Plaintiff returned to work. she was informed that the doctor's note covering the period from April 19-23 was not acccptablc. and that she would have to submit a Medical Certification Form for those dates. Plaintiff claims that she then contacted Dr. Quintyne's office, whereupon someone told her to change the Form herself and that Dr. Quintyne would sign off on the changes. Plaintiff subsequently changed the Form to indicate an absence from April through May Plaintiff made this change bv using ~vhiteout over the original date of April 27. 2004. Plaintiff then submitted the altered Form to SunTrust without Dr. Quintyne's initials indicating his approval of the change.
Alier the alterations in the Form were brought to the attention ofthe I-luman Resources Generalist. Deborah Watson ("Watson"). and the Leave Management Department *5 Case Manager, Stephanie Brazill ("Brazill"). Borowski met with Plaintil'f in his officc to discuss the Form. The Sun'Trust Assistant Center Manager. Janice White ("Whitc"). was also prcscnt at the meeting. Plaintiff told Borowski that Dr. Quintyne's office had made the changes to the Form. At approximately the same time as the Borowski-Plaintiff nlceting was taking place. Brazill called Dr. Quintyne's office and was informed that the office had not made the uninitialed changes to the Form. and that the office never used ivhiteout to make changes to any medical forms. Brazill passed this information onto Watson. who subsequently met with Borowski and White. As a result of the meeting. it was determined that Plain~iff had been evasive in her responses. and that if the doctor's office had not made the changes to the Form. then Plaintiffmust have made them herself. (Doc. 13-2 at 2, tiled .April 2006.) Based upon this determination. Borowski testified at his deposition that he decided to terminate PlaintiSS because she failed to be honest in her responses to his questions regarding the Form. (Id.) Roroivski felt that he could not trust Plaintiff \\-it11 sensitive customer financial information if she was evasive in answering his questions about the Form. (Id.)
Borowski. still on May 7. called Plaintiff into his office. where he again asked her who had made the changes to the Form. Plaintiff responded that she did not make the change and that Dr. Quintyne's office must have done it. At this point. Boroivski terminated Plaintiff for not being forthcoming about her Medical Certification Form.
Al'ter her termination. Plaintiff obtained statements and a letter from Ilr. Quintyne, on behalf of hin~self and his office. explaining that someone from his ol'lice had told *6 Plaintiff it was okay lor Plaintiff to change the date on the Form herself. and that it urould be changed in the office as wcll. Plaintiffs tern~lation stood. however. and she thereafter filed this lawsuit alleging that SunTrust urongfully tern~inated her in retaliation for exercising her rights under the FMLA.
11. ANALYSIS
A. Su~nmcrry Jlrdgnient S t ~ ~ n d u r d
A court will grant sununary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions. answers to interrogatories, 'and admissions on file. together with affidavits. if any, show that thcre is no - genuine issue as to any inalerial fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c): see. ex.. Stachel v. Citv of C a w Canaveral. 5 1 F. Supp. 2d 1326. 1329 (M.D. Fla. 1999). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case under the applicable substantive law. Disputed issues of material fact preclude the entry of sun~marql judgment. but factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary do not. Anderson v. Liberty Lobbv. Inc, 477 U.S. 242. 248 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material Sact exists. Celotex C o i p v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 17, 324-25 (1 986). In determining whether the moving party has satisfied its burden. the Court considers all inferences drawn froin the underlying facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and resolves ail reasonable doubts against the moving party. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574. 587-88 ( 986). The moving party ma) rely solely on his pleadings to satisfj its burden. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. A non-moving party bearing *7 the burden of proof, however. must go beyond the pleadings and submit affidavits. depositions. answers to interrogatories. or adnlissions that designate specific facts indicating there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. If the evidence offered by the non-n~oving party is nlerely colorable, or is not significantly probative. the Court may grant summary judgment. Anderson. 477 1J.S. at 219-50. Similarly, s u m n i a ~ judgmcnt is ~nandated against a party \vho Sails to prove an essential element of its case. Celotes, 477 U.S. at 322. C'o~mr 1: F A U Retuliution C'ltrinl
Plaintiff claims that SunTrust wrongfully tenninatcd her for csercising her mcdical leave rights under the FMLA. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that 29 U.S.C. 261 5 allows for two types of claims: "[I ] interference claims. in which an employee asserts that [her] employer denied or otherwise interfered with [her] substantive rights under the Act, and [2] retaliation claims, in which an employee asserts that [her] employer discriminated against [her] because [s]he engaged in activity protected by the Act." I-Iurlbert v. St. klarv's Health Care Svs.. Inc., 439 F.3d 1286. 1293 (I th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strickland I-. Watcr Works and Sewer Bd. of the Citv of Birmingham. 239 F.3d 1 199. 1206 (1 th Cir. 2001)). To prove a FMLA retaliation claim, a plaintiff niust prove that the employer acted with the requisite retaliatory intent. Because Plaintiff has not presented any direct evidence of retaliatory intent. the Court looks to thc Smliliar three-step burden-shiliing framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Cow. v. Green. 41 1 U S . 792 (1973). Strickland. 239 F.3d at 1207.
Under the rubric of McDonnell Dourrlas. a plaintiff must first set forth apr-irzta.ficie case and prove: (1 ) she engaged in a stahitorily protected activity: (2) she experienced an adverse employment action: and (3) there is a causal connection behveen the protected activity and the adverse action. McDonnell Dourrlas. U.S. at S02; I-Iurlbert. 439 - F.3d at 1297. If the plaintiff'establishes aprin~cr facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to "articulate a legitinlate reason for the adverse action." Hurlbert. 439 F.3d at 1297. The plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendant's proffered reason for the employment action was merely pretest for the action. i.e.. that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment action. Id.
There is no question that Plaintiff was engaged in a statutorily protected activity (use of medical leave rights under the FMLA) and that Plaintiff sufTered an adverse employment action (termination). Next. Plaintiff must show that there is a causal connection benveen the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Plaintiff fails to bring forth evidence linking her request for leave in April 2004 and her termination from e~~lployment in May 2004. However, "[c]lose temporal proximity between protected conduct and an adverse employment action is generally 'sufficient circunlstantial evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact of a causal connection."' Id. at 1298 (quoting Brungart v. Bellsouth Tclecomms.. Inc., 23 1 F.3d 791, 799 (1 1 th Cir. 2000)). Therefore, it is necessary for SunTrust to articulate a legitimate reason for the termination.
SunTrust proffers that it terminated Plaintiff because of her lack of honesty regarding the Medical Certification Form. SunTrust explains that Plaintiff was not terminated as a *9 result of her reqzresr for medical leave: rather, the decision to terninate Plaintiff ~ v a s m because of her lack of hor7esty regarding her medical leave.
Under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Plaintiff n m t offer suficient elridence to show an issue of material fact as to SunTrust's non-discriminatory reason. i.e.. that SunTrust's reason was rnerel~ pretest. "If the plaintiff fails to proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether each of the defendant's proffered reasons is preteshlal. the defendant is entitled to summary judgment." Wascura v. Citv of S. Miami. 247 F.3d 1238. 1243 (1 It11 Cir. 2001) (citing Cha~man v. A1 Tramp., 229 F.3d 101 2. 1024-25 ( I l th Cir. 2000)).
Plaintiff claims in her Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment that she was terminated so that SunTrust would save money on any severance package to which she may have been entitled. (& Doc. 19 at .) Plaintiff has offered no evidence to the Court of any retaliatory intent on the part of SunTrust in her termination from the company. Plaintiff has merely alleged that it is her belief that she has been discriminated against. Mere speculation on the p,m of Plaintiff cannot serve 3s basis for a claim. "Conclusory allegations of discrimination. without more. are not sufiicient to raise an inference of pretest or intentional discrimination where [an employer] has offered . . . estensive evidence of legitimate. non- discriminatory reasons for its actions." Carter v. bliami. 870 F.2d 578. 585 ( 1 l th Cis. 1989) (quoting Young v. Gen. Foods Corn., 840 F.2d 825. 830 (1 1111 Cis. 1988)).
Plaintiff also argues that pretext is shown by SunTrust's decision to ignore ackno\vledgments from Dr. Quintync's office that Plaintiff may have been given permission *10 from the ofice to alter the Form. Ho~vever. even if Plaintiff had been given permission to alter the Form, the termination decision was made because of Plaintiffs lack of honesty to hcr supenkors \vith rcgasd to the alteration of the Forni. Plaintiffhas lhiled to directl\v address SunTrust's proffered non-ciiscriminarory reason for Plaintiffs temlination (her lack of honesty). "An employcr may fire an cmployes for a good season. a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts. or for no reason at all. as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason." Nix v. WLCY RadioRahall Commc'ns., 738 F.2d 1 18 1, 1 1 S7 (1 1 th Cir. 1984). Because Plaintiff fails to establish that SunTrust's explanation for the termination is merely pretext for a discriminatoq purpose. Plaintiffs claim must fail.
111. CONCLUSION Defendant's Motion for Sumnary Judgment (Doc. 12- filed April 2006) is accordingly GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to ENTER JUDGhlENT on behalf of Defendant Sunl'rust Bank and CLOSE THE CASE. day of June, 2006.
DONE and OIIDERED in Orlando, Florida on this JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties