Flаintiff, Russell L. Newton III, appeals by leave granted from an order summarily dismissing his claims against defendant, Bank West, which claims were based on defendant’s practice of charging a document preparation fee in residential real estate mоrtgage loan transactions. We affirm.
After leave to appeal was granted by this Court, the appeal was held in abeyance pending our Supreme Court’s decision in Dressel v Ameribank,
We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Kraft v Detroit Entertainment, LLC,
The MCPA is a remedial statutory scheme designеd “to prohibit unfair practices in trade or commerce and must be liberally construed to achieve its intended goals.” Forton v Laszar,
In Smith, the Court interpreted the phrase “specifically authorized” as used in § 4(1)(a). The plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract and violatiоns of the MCPA after the defendant insurer refused to pay insurance benefits. Smith, supra at 448-449. The trial court determined that the MCPA did not apply to activity regulated by the State Commissioner of Insurance (now Office of Financial and Insurance Services). Id. at 452-453. This Court revеrsed, ruling that a “commonsense reading” of § 4(1)(a) revealed that the Legislature did not intend to exempt illegal conduct from the MCPA. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co,
[W]hen the Legislature said that transactions or conduct “specifically authorized” by law are exempt from the MCPA, it intended to include conduct the legality of which is in dispute. Contrary to the “common-sense reading” of this provision by the Court of Appeals, we conclude that the relevant inquiry is not whether the specific misconduct alleged by the plaintiffs is “specifically authorized.” Rather, it is whether the general transaction is specifically authorized by law, regardless of whether the specific misconduct is prohibited. [Smith,460 Mich 465 (emphasis added).]
See also Kraft, supra at 541.
Applying the standard established by the Supreme Court in Smith, we conclude that the residential mortgage loan transactions fit squarely within the exemp
Similarly, under the state Savings Bank Act, the residential mortgage loan transactions at issue are specifically authorized. MCL 487.3401(v) provides that a savings bank may “make, sell, purchase, arrange, participate in, invest in, or otherwise deal in loans оr extensions of credit for consumer purposes,” including secured liens in real estate. Savings banks are subject to examination by the Commissioner of the Office of Financial and Insurance Services concerning conditions and affairs of the bаnk. MCL 487.3209. The commissioner may hold hearings if a bank is engaging in unsafe or unsound practices in conducting the business of that bank or is violating rules or laws. MCL 487.3215(1). If the commissioner finds that an unsafe or unsound practice, or charged violation, is established, he may issue and sеrve a cease and desist order and require affirmative action to correct the conditions resulting from the practice or violation. MCL 487.3215(3). The commissioner has additional supervisory powers over savings banks. For example, he may susрend a director or officer of a savings bank under certain circumstances. MCL 487.3217. Further, the RESPA applies to the residential real estate loans provided by the state’s savings banks. See MCL 487.3203; 12 USC 2602(1). As previously noted, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development has the authority to investigate facts,
We find no merit in plaintiffs argument that the language of MCL 445.917 and MCL 445.903(1)(o) conclusively establish that the MCPA applies to rеal estate mortgage loans made by banks. MCL 445.917 gives the Commissioner of the Financial Institutions Bureau (now the Office of Financial and Insurance Services) jurisdiction concurrent with the Attorney General to take action against a state or federаlly chartered bank that engages in unlawful acts under the MCPA. While this provision undoubtedly expresses an intent by the Legislature to allow the investigation of banks for violating the MCPA, banks engage in a host of transactions unrelated to the making of residential mortgagе loans. We decline to engage in a sweeping review of all of the possibilities in which the MCPA may apply to banks, and we emphasize that, by our decision in this case, we are not ruling that the banking industry as a whole is exempt from the provisions of the MCPA. Rаther, we find that the specifically authorized mortgage loan transactions are exempt.
MCL 445.903(1)(o) prohibits the causing of a probability of confusion or misunderstanding of terms or conditions of credit if credit is extended in a transaction. This provision also expresses an intent by the Legislature to generally include credit transactions within the purview of the MCPA. This language, however, does not require a finding that the exemption of § 4(1) (a) is inapplicable to mortgage loan transactions.
Finally, we are not persuaded by defendant’s argument that all businesses are regulated and, thus, the MCPA has no meaning if this Court exempts regulated businesses from the MCPA. We do not hold that regulated businesses are exempt from the MCPA. The focus of our inquiry is whether particular transactions are “specifically authorized” under laws administered by regulatory boards or officers acting under laws of this state or the Unitеd States. Smith, supra; Kraft, supra. Under the facts of this case, the MCPA claims fail as a matter of law because the residential mortgage loan transactions are exempt.
Affirmed.
Notes
The hud-1 statement is a standard real estate closing document promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (hud).
In his statement of the questions presented, plaintiff raised the issue whether a nonlawyer engages in the unauthorized practice of law when it prepares legal documents and charges a fee for doing so. He also raised a separate issue whether a mortgage lender is specifically authorized hy law to charge a fee for preparation of legal documents such as a note and mortgage. In arguing the second issue, plaintiff challenged the trial court’s alternative rationale for finding that the bank properly charged a fee for the preparation of legal documents. Plaintiffs argument is cursory, and, while he argues that the trial court’s ruling was without merit, he fails to ratiоnalize or explain this position. He also fails to cite relevant authority to support that the trial court’s ruling was devoid of merit. Thus, even if this issue could properly be considered apart from the issue of the unauthorized practice of law, the issue is abandoned. Houghton v Keller,
Certain exceptions to the exemption are set forth in MCL 445.904(2). Smith, supra at 449. The exceptions outlined in § 4(2) are not at issue in this case.
The eespa applies to federally related mortgage loans, which include loans secured by a first or subordinate lien on residential real property designed principally for the occupancy оf one to four families if the loans are made in whole or part by a lender whose accounts are insured by an agency of the federal government or by a lender regulated by an agency of the federal government. 12 USC 2602(1).
In reaching our cоnclusion, we acknowledge plaintiffs reference to MCL 438.31a when arguing that the mortgage transactions were not specifically authorized. Other than citing the statute and its contents, however, plaintiff provides no explanation or argument to explain the effect of this provision on the issues in this case. We are not required to discover and rationalize plaintiffs position, and we decline to do so. Houghton, supra.