108 S.E. 336 | N.C. | 1921
This is an action for divorce. Verdict and judgment for defendant. Appeal by plaintiff. A letter purporting to be from the defendant was offered as competent evidence against her, as tending to show the *58 misconduct alleged. Its genuineness being denied, the judge admitted witnesses to compare the signature and handwriting of the letter with the defendant's signature to the answer, which she (55) admitted to be genuine, but refused to permit the writings to be submitted to the jury for their inspection.
In Outlaw v. Hurdle,
But a recent statute, ch. 52, Laws 1913, now C.S. 1784, has provided, "In all trials in this State, when it may be otherwise competent and relevant to compare handwritings, a comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine, shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings and evidence of witnesses respecting the same may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute, provided this shall not apply to actions pending on 5 March, 1913." The last line is an unequivocal declaration of change in the rule obtaining theretofore.
As we understand the statute, the admission of testimony as to the genuineness of a writing by comparison of handwriting is now on the same basis as the declarations of agents. The Court determines whether there isprima facie evidence of agency or of the genuineness of writing admitted as a basis of comparison, and then the testimony of the witnesses and "the writings" (in the plural) themselves are submitted to the jury. It is fair to the presiding judge to say that this statute was not called to his attention. It was adverted to by Walker, J., in Bank v. McArthur,
Though it was error to exclude the writings from the jury if the testimony was competent and pertinent, it was not reversible error *59 in this instance, for we are of opinion that the letter, if genuine was irrelevant, not tending to prove any fact or (56) circumstance in issue, and the refusal to submit the writing to the jury to determine its genuineness was harmless error.
Upon the whole case we can find no error of which the plaintiff can complain.
No error.
Cited: S. v. Beam,