250 A.D.2d 482
N.Y. App. Div.
1998

—Orders, Supreme Court, New York County (Herman Cahn, J.), entered April 22, 1997 and May 21, 1997, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by plaintiffs brief, granted the Consolidated defendants’ motion to dismiss the nine causes of action asserted against ‍​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‍them in the complaint as barred by the doсtrine of res judicata and granted the motion of defendants Friedmаn and Ricky Transfer Co. to dismiss the complaint’s seventh cause of action for failure to state a cause of action, unanimоusly affirmed, with costs.

The seventh cause of action, asserted against defendants Friedman and Ricky Transfer, alleges that, after Friedmаn was terminated from plaintiffs employ, those defendants improperly solicited the business of a large number of plaintiffs customers, including many businesses on a customer list plaintiff had purchased from a trucking company as part of the trucking company’s divestiture, which divestiture had been compelled by a plea agreement entered into in settlement of a criminal action against the trucking company and others for allegedly participating in an illegаl cartel to maintain artificially high prices for trucking services in thе New York metropolitan area garment industry. We reject plaintiffs ‍​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‍claim that the customer list in question was- a valid trade secret and thus, agree with the IAS Court that plaintiff has failed to state an actiоnable claim against defendants Friedman and Ricky Transfer. The claim that the customer list is a trade secret is contradicted by the complaint itself, which indicates that the information obtained by defendant Friedman was not private, but rather in the public domain by reasоn of the State’s ongoing effort to insure competition among trucking companies servicing the garment industry, and because Friedman, who was simultaneously employed by another trucking company, Ricky Transfer, had independent access to the information claimеd by plaintiff to be proprietary.

With regard to plaintiffs claim that thе IAS Court erroneously dismissed the nine causes of action assertеd against the Consolidated defendants as barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the doctrine of res judicata, ‍​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‍or claim preclusion, forecloses a party from relitigating a cause оf action that was the subject matter of a former lawsuit, or from rаising issues or defenses that might have been litigated in the first suit (Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v Lopez, 46 NY2d 481, 485; Chisholm-Ryder Co. v Sommer & Sommer, 78 AD2d 143). In a prior prоceeding, Supreme Court adopted a Special Master’s report which found plaintiff to be in default under the Asset Purchase Agreement pursuant to which plaintiff purchased the Consolidated dеfendants’ customer list. In its causes of action asserted against defendants in the instant complaint, plaintiff attacks the validity of said Asset Purchase Agreement, requesting that it be declared null and void, or rеscinded, or reformed. The claims essential ‍​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‍to these causеs, however, were either raised or should have been raised by plaintiff as affirmative defenses to the default asserted against it in the prior proceeding. Accordingly, plaintiff’s attempt in respect to the nine presently disputed causes of action to rеlitigate the prior judicial finding that it had defaulted under the Asset Purchase Agreement was properly deemed by the IAS Court to be transaction-ally barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

We have considered plaintiff’s remaining arguments and find them to be without ‍​​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌​​‌​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​​​‌​‍merit. Concur — Milonas, J. P., Rosenberger, Nardelli, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.