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Newsome v. State
686 N.E.2d 868
Ind. Ct. App.
1997
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*1 necessary INSTRUCTION NO. 15f lief Tracy that such was to defend from an attack. may person A use reasonable force to against defend himself another’s imminent perceive I prejudice no and therefore illegal He reasonably use force. must would affirm the conviction. honestly believe that force is neces- sary to resist attack. He cannot use ex- disproportionate

cessive force or amount

of force under the circumstances. question ap- existence of an

parent danger and the amount of force

necessary force, only to resist can be de- standpoint from

termined of the defen- dant, at the time existing and under the NEWSOME, Appellant- Steven G. circumstances. The defendant use Defendant, may reasonably such force as necessary be apparent

to resist such attack or attack. He will not be accountable for an error in Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. STATE of judgment as to the amount of force neces- No. 20A03-9701-CR-25. sary, provided reasonably] he acted honestly. One who was in apparent no Appeals Court of of Indiana. danger ground and had no reasonable Oct. apprehension danger cannot raise this defense.

Record at 79.

INSTRUCTION NO. 15h

Reasonable belief means such belief as ordinary person pos- reasonable would existing

sess under all the circumstances

and as from perspective viewed of such

person within the total set of circum- existing particular

stances in the case.

Reasonable belief does require that the

danger perceived existed, actually but

only that reasonably perceived it was

existing circumstances, under all the in-

cluding any particular knowledge pos- However,

sessed the defendant.

reasonableness of the belief must be tested standpoint person of a of reason- sensibilities, being

able or unreasonably

excitable, unreasonably lacking per-

ceptive abilities.

Record at 81.

Carson’s defense consisted of the claim justified

that he stabbing Cary Ran-

som defending Tracy. because he was I that,

believe together, taken Instructions 15h,

15g, adequately and 15f informed the acquit that it could Carson if it found employed he reasonable force in stab-

bing Ransom, his reasonable be- *2 Holbrook, Goshen, Appellant E.

Neil I. Defendant. Competence Witness Modisett, General, Attorney Jeffrey A. Elfenbaum, Deputy Attorney F. Randi Gen- challenges the trial court’s de eral, Appellee-Plaintiff. Indianapolis, for victim, termination that the seven-year-old girl, at trial.

OPINION challenging the trial competency court’s de termination, argues Newsome that no evi STATON, Judge. presented dence was to indicate that the appeals Steven Newsome his J. conviction victim understood the difference between the by jury a for two counts of Molesting, Child appears truth and a he. It that Newsome Felony the first count Class B and on relies this court’s decision in Casselman v. Felony. count a second Class C The first State, 582 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). N.E.2d 482 In charge count was based on a that Newsome Casselman, this court held that before a performed victim, cunnilingus on the and the competent, child will be deemed it must be charge second count was based on the (1) established that the child understands the vaginal Newsome fondled the victim’s area. telling difference between telling lie and presents Newsome three issues for our re- (2) truth, knows she compul is under a view: (3) truth, sion to tell the and knows what a I. properly Whether the trial court ad- actually true statement (citing is. Id. at 435 victim, judged seven-year-old (Ind.Ct. 553, Short v. girl, competent testify to at trial. App.1991)); see also Russell v. II. Whether there was sufficient credi- (Ind.1989). 1222, 1224 N.E.2d presented ble evidence at trial justify Newsome’s conviction for the responds The State that sufficient evidence Molesting. crime of Child presented to indicate that the victim understands the difference between the truth III. Whether committed he, by and a noting that under Indiana during misconduct closing argument. persons Rule of Evidence 601 pre- all are We affirm. competent testify, sumed including chil- During August 1995, of Newsome lived Appellee’s dren. Brief at 9. In light of the victim, the same household with the a six- partial State’s rebanee on Ind.Evidence Rule year-old girl, family. and the victim’s On 601 and the trial court’s rebanee on this rule 22, 1995, August Anglin Officer Michael finding as a basis for the victim’s Nappanee City Department Police began competent,1 we must first determine what investigating allegations that Newsome mo- impact, any, if Ind.Evidence Rule 601 has on day, lested the victim. Later that previous our decisions regarding compe- police came along station with Rever- testify. tence of children to Keene, end Bill who originally reported had molestation, speak order to with Offi- The Indiana Rules of Evidence were first Anglin. signing cer After rights an advice of made effective in Indiana courts as of Janu- form, Newsome fondling admitted the vic- 1, See, ary Court, Indiana Rules of area, vaginal tim’s ques- further (1997). Indiana Rules Evidence tioning by Anglin Officer admitted to at- provides: Ind.Evidence Rule “Every tempting perform oral sex on the victim. person competent except be witness trial, provided otherwise At these victim testified rules or act of that Newsome vagina, the Indiana Assembly.” touched her on the General inside and the Ind.Evi- outside, added). with fingers (emphasis his dence Rule 601 his mouth. This rule The victim years phrased was seven is not presumption old the time as a compe- tence; she testified. its language requires bteral that ab said, overruling objection 1. In Newsome’s presumed at trial to "All witnesses are un- competence testify, judge victim der the new rules.” Record at 359. split is a in the federal courts re competent unless There be determined witnesses of Federal Evidence Rule garding the effect an act Rule of Evidence another Indiana majority of federal courts 601. The Assembly provides otherwise. of the General that a have considered the issue held 1990, a statute had recently as Indiana As obligation to ensure trial court still has an age under the that children presumed are that minimum standards testify. incompetent to of 10 were Ind.Code See, testify. allowing a met before witness (1988). However, provision § 34-1-14-5 3 Weinstein’s Assembly. Act General repealed Federal Evidenoe, 601.03[l][a], p. § 601-9 n. 1. United 20, 37, § Pub.L. of March (4th Cir.1984), Odom, 736 F.2d 104 States Thus, if 1279-80. Ind.Evidence Ind.Acts Fourth noted that a Circuit district literally, read children would Rule 601 is may prohibit testifying, even competent to automatically be deemed does not under Rule where determining whether without the need *4 duty testify truthfully. Id. understand the significance nature and understands the child Gutman, 725 at 112. In United States v. See, of her oath. 13 RobeRT MilleR, Lowell (7th Cir.1984), denied, 417 cert. 469 U.S. F.2d PRACTICE, INDIANA EVIDENCE Jr., INDIANA 244, (1984), 880, 105 83 L.Ed.2d 183 (2nd 1995). S.Ct. reading of § 601.101 ed. Such held, insanity ... “Although Circuit pre- Seventh nullify our Rule 6Ó1would Ind.Evidence longer ground disqualifying is no for of the Indiana Su- vious decisions and those witness, power, judge has the district require a trial court to preme Court which duty, appropriate in an case the to hold a obligation her that a child knows determine hearing to whether a witness determine truth, the differ- to tell the and understands allowed to in lie, should be because the truth and a before ence between testifying sanity incapable has of See, Casselman, made him testify. allowing her to (citations competent in a fashion.” Id. at 420 Russell, 435; 1224. 540 N.E.2d at N.E.2d at omitted). relatively adoption recent Because minority position adheres to a literal Evidence, the Indiana Rules of neither Rule 601 interpretation of Federal Evidence Supreme yet has nor the Indiana Court court not conduct under which a trial impact Rule 601’s on Ind.Evidence addressed competence of any inquiry into the witnesses. How- competency determinations.2 (5th Roach, States v. 590 F.2d United ever, by sever- the issue has been considered Cir.1979), the Fifth Circuit held: pertains to Federal al federal courts as Rules of Evi- ... under the new Federal 601, nearly identical Rule which is Evidence mental incom- it is doubtful that dence Although most of the rule.3 to Indiana’s grounds disqual- for petence would even be the issue that have considered federal courts prospective ification of a witness- in the context of witnesses who have done so [Njowhere competence men- is mental mentally incompetent, the alleged to are be possible exception Rule [to as a tioned im- Rule 601’s analysis of Federal Evidence longer to be seems no 601].... [T]here is competency determinations pact on mental psychi- any judicially-ordered occasion for impact of the rule on child analogous to the competency hearings atric examinations in both competency since determinations witnesses_ at 185-86. Id. precludes Rule the issue is whether cases Ramirez, also, 871 F.2d compe- States v. any type See United engaging a court from (6th denied, Cir.1989), cert. 493 U.S. tency whatsoever. determination cited, (Ind.Ct we did not Ind.Evidence Rule 601 653 N.E.2d 493 In Thornton v. 2. . impact language 601 as its App.1995), we cited Ind.Evidence Rule of the rule or delve into Supreme compe- Court case decided involving well as an Indiana prior on our decisions prior adoption Rule 601 of Ind.Evidence tency determinations. presumed proposition that “a witness is testify. at 497. Thornton competent” to "Every person competent be a witness the trial court dealt with the issue of whether provided except in these rules. as otherwise juvenile properly that a sex-crime determined FedR.Evid. 601. multiple personality from victim who suffered Although testify. disorder (1989) 107 L.Ed.2d 88 that minimum competency S.Ct. standards of are Thus, (implying that Federal Evidence Rule 601 met. we hold that Ind.Evidence Rule precludes any compe- examination of witness previous 601 does not affect Indiana deci- court, tency by although competence may competence sions of children other evidence such testify. be reviewed under rules A trial court required will still be 603). Casselman, Rule 403 inquiry Federal Evidence to conduct the set out in (1) 582 N.E.2d at 435—whether the child Reviewing purpose behind Federal Ev- understands the difference telling between seemingly language idence Rule 601’s strict truth, (2) telling lie and knows she is provides insight appropri- also into useful (3) compulsion truth, under to tell the interpretation ate A Indiana’s rule. lead- actually knows what a true statement is. ing on the commentator Federal Rules of suggests purpose Evidence that the of Fed- disagrees The concurrence with our con- group- eral Evidence Rule 601 was to abolish clusion that Ind.Evidence Rule 601 does not distinctions, pro- previous affect Indiana decisions which re- vide, example, that all children under a quire a trial court to preliminary conduct a age testify. certain are unable 3 Wein- inquiry competence prior into the of children EVIDENCE, 601.02[1], § FEDERAL allowing p. stein’s testify. them to The concurrence totally 601-7. prohibiting Instead of a cer- argues adoption of Ind.Evidence persons testifying, tain class of Federal Rule repeal 601 and the aof statute which Evidence Rule 601 allows the to hear presumed that children age under the of 10 *5 testimony questionable from witnesses of incompetent,4 were together, abolish a trial competence, jury and it allows the to deter- obligation court’s to conduct an inquiry into a appropriate weight mine the credibility competence prior child’s to allowing him to give to to that evidence. See Federal testify. Under the interpreta- concurrence’s Finding Servioe, Aids, tion, party Rules of Evidence a opposes who of a Advisory Note, Arti- Committee’s Rule may challenge compe- the witness’ VI, (1987). p. Although cle prohib- the rule tency, opposing party but the now bears the witnesses, its blanket exclusions of classes of proving burden of incompetence. witness’ it is still desirable for the trial court to make interpretation Such an comport does not with inquiry into the individual characteristics language either the of Ind.Evidence Rule 601 particular of a witness to ensure that he has holdings of this court which followed a “minimum credibility necessary standard of repeal of incompetency pre- the child permit any to person put any reasonable to Casselman, sumption. See 582 N.E.2d at testimony.” credence in a witness’s 3 Wein- 601.02[1], § Evidence, stein’s Federal p. The concurrence insists that Ind.Evi Advisory 601-7; see also Note, Committee’s “explicitly denee Rule 601 presumes [wit (“The question capaci- Rule [of witness competency.” ness] It does not. As noted ty] is particularly one suited to the earlier, provides Ind.Evidence Rule 601 weight one of credibility, subject judi- to “[e]very person competent to be a witness” authority cial sufficiency review the of unless another rule of evidence or an act of added)). (emphasis evidence.” general assembly provides otherwise. light majority of the position added). (emphasis Ind.Evidence Rule 601 federal purposes courts and the explicit behind language Fed This does not create the eral Evidence by implication Rule 601—and burden-shifting presumption by envisioned Ind.Evidence Rule 601—we think the better the concurrence which party would allow a reading of Ind.Evidence Rule 601 opposing is to re the witness to pre overcome this incomp quire the trial court to continue to conduct an sumption by proving the witness’ inquiry into witness competency to ensure literally, If read the rule would etence.5 (1988). 4. See IC 34-1-14-5 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), propo- 653 N.E.2d 493 for the presumed competent sition that "a witness is 5. As we supra, testify.” indicated in note this court pro- Id. at 497. The court in Thornton cited Ind.Evidence Rule explanation 601 in Thornton v. reading vided no for this of Rule 1224). Thus, -repeal of even after the accept the of require trial courts statutory presumption incompetence, of witness, their dem- regardless of every single required stat- a trial court to conduct the incompetence, unless another court onstrated particular competence inquiry minimal which was that a same or rule indicates ute incompetent. presumption’s repeal. prior See used of witnesses is or class Jr., Miller, PRAC- Indiana Robert Lowell now turn to the defendant’s We (2nd § 601.101 TICE, Indiana Evidence primary contention: that there was insuffi ed.1995). presented to cient evidence show understood the difference between the victim Rule reading Ind.Evidence Such is within the discre truth and a lie. It sound untenable, agree and we with would be whether a tion of the trial court to determine courts which majority of the federal competent child is prohibit trial held that the rule does judge’s observation of the child’s demeanor preliminary inquiry conducting responses questions posed to her Further, since nei competency. into witness Casselman, the court. counsel and language our case law nor ther A trial N.E.2d at 435. court’s determination anything to do Rule 601 have Ind.Evidence only be re that a child is will reject the concur presumption, we for an versed abuse discretion. presumption into the insertion of a rence’s rule. record in the instant case shows contends that The concurrence also following examination of the victim: repeal, in of the second subsection QUESTIONS BY THE PROSECUTOR 34-1-14-5, presumed children un- IC ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ H: incompetent, signaled age of 10 to be der the an intent specific foundation the concurrence’s after this stated Casselman: Our In it from the statute. section of IC 34-1-14-5 holding in [1990] incompeteney in proponent of a witness to provision’s ... *6 Casselman, legislature establishing contention. The presumption by deleting legislature repeal, Now, which had does decided alter amended the all competency. lay very the need children, support created shortly court A Yes. A Q A Yes. Q Q Okay. Spanked You Do the truth and a he? ner? Is corner. Okay. do? get spanked What know the difference between that what happens your stood in the cor- you if you mom and dad stand tell in a he? presumed

regardless age, happens are if teh the Q Okay. What However, testify. a child must still truth? he has the knowl- demonstrate to the court Nothing. A required by the Russell court edge before * * * * * * is established.... Record at 357. (citations Casselman, N.E.2d at 435 added). exchange, the omitted) upon this The Russell Based (emphasis lay proper foundation for failed to to show that “the required the record Although the competency of this witness. be- understood the difference child witness the difference he, that she knew telling a knew victim testified telling truth and tween he, nothing truth, there is the truth and between compulsion to tell he was under truly that she understands actually which indicates what a true statement and knew State, v. Russell, is. Russell at what that difference (citing 540 N.E.2d was.” stances, be con- believe Thornton can we do not cited Bellmore We note that the court also 601. proposition (Ind.1992), adequate precedent reh. sidered v. 601 re- denied, language Ind.Evidence Rule that the proposition and that Bell- for same "presumed,” in adoption quires all witnesses to be prior was decided more sense, competent. shifting burden circum- of Evidence. Under these Indiana Rules (Ind.1989), supreme prior allowing N.E.2d child is harm- court held: less error. child, ... a in order know the nature of present The victim in the case was must, oath, appreciating an in addition to subjected vigorous cross-examination of true and the moral content false state- the defense. Newsome’s counsel asked the ments, what a true statement know actual- conversation, trial, victim about her prior to is_ ly require- this additional [F]or investigator with an from the Children and satisfied, making more than

ment to be a Family Advocacy Center. at Record 375. T flat statement like know what the truth The victim testified that she told the investi required is’ would be of a small child. For gator that Newsome privates touched her child, of a small the case the term with his mouth. Record at 376-77. Counsel may many connotations, “truth” in- played videotape then of the victim’s con cluding simply parents per- what or other investigator, versation with the which showed in authority say. sons Id. at 1224. that the victim investigator did not tell the that Newsome touched her with his mouth. The court went on to note that this could be Record at 385. The victim then admitted accomplished by asking give the child to investigator that she did not tell the about example telling of someone a lie. Id. at 1225. orally touching privates. her Rec enough It is not for child witness to However, ord she continued to main simply punished indicate that she will be for tain that Newsome did in fact touch her lie, telling present as the victim did in the privates with his mouth. Id. Although supreme case. court in Baxter It can be inferred from exchange (Ind.1988), 522 N.E.2d 362 reh. de- she understood that a true statement is one nied, indicated that such information would comports reality. fact and Upon be of in determining value whether a child being videotape, shown the which indicated understood the difference between the truth testimony incorrect, that her earlier lie, and a the children the Baxter case also victim admitted that she did not tell the examples offered clear of truth and falsehood advocacy investigator center that Newsome knowing they addition to would be privates her touched with his mouth. Her punished lying. Id. at 370. Since the admission the videotape, and her victim in this case was not give any asked to consistent during rigorous cross- type example or other indicating examination that Newsome in fact touched actually that she understood the difference privates orally, enough her are to infer that lie, the truth between and a anwas abuse *7 she understood the difference between the of discretion for the trial court qualify her Therefore, truth and a lie. the failure of the as a witness. prosecutor adequately question her was Only when the abuse of discretion affects harmless error. right party substantial of a or is inconsis- justice tent with substantial is reversal war- II. ranted. Trial Ind. Rule 61. In Russell v. Sufficiency the Evidence State, (Ind.1989), 540 1222 N.E.2d our su- preme court held that the trial court’s deci- Newsome contends that there was insuffi- sion to allow a child to presented without ade- cient evidence support trial to quately determining whether the child knew his conviction. reviewing When a claim of the difference evidence, between the truth and sufficiency a lie we do not re- was harmless where the child weigh demonstrated judge credibility the evidence or during subsequent questioning State, that 816, she witnesses. Jordan v. 656 N.E.2d fact (Ind.1995), understood the difference. Id. at 1225. 817 reh. denied. We look to the long As provided as the witness the court an evidence and the reasonable inferences “ample inferring basis for that she knew that support therefrom that the verdict. Id. The a true comports statement is one which with conviction pro- will be if affirmed evidence of fact reality,” the failure to discover this bative value jury exists from which a could

875 guilty beyond testimony insufficiently victim’s find the defendant reason- credible support able doubt. a conviction. The victim testified that Newsome III. vagina her with touching

abused her his fingers Testimony and with his mouth. Prosecutorial Misconduct to sustain a the victim alone is sufficient State, 191, conviction. 583 N.E.2d v. that prosecutor Newsome contends Griffin denied, (Ind.Ct.App.1991), reh. (citing during committed closing argu- misconduct State, 739, N.E.2d Gonzales v. 740-41 ment by making improp- several rebuttal (Ind.1988)). testimony The victim’s was also reviewing er prosecu- remarks. In a claim of Anglin’s testimony corroborated Officer misconduct, torial we must first determine po Newsome’s admissions at the prosecutor’s whether conduct was im- present lice Accordingly, station. the State State, proper. v. 613 N.E.2d Zenthofer ed from which sufficient evidence (Ind.1993). If we determine the conduct guilty could conclude that Newsome was be was improper, must we then determine yond a reasonable doubt. whether all under the circumstances the prosecutor’s placed misconduct the defendant Newsome also contends that the victim position grave in a peril. deciding In credibility lacks she because testified that placed whether grave the defendant was investigator she told an that Newsome peril, probable persuasive we consider the mouth, privates touched her with his when effect of the on jury’s misconduct deci- videotape fact a of the conversation revealed sion. Id. she had not. The victim later admitted dur- ing cross-examination that she did not tell objects first comment Newsome the caseworker that Newsome touched her is, “So, you heard Mr. Newsome’s side of orally. argues Newsome this lack of story through Anglin Officer and Mr. youth, credibility, along her make her I story yeah, Newsome’s fondled her most testimony inherently unbelievable. ly in vagina performed I area and oral A conviction stand on the uncor sex on her as well.” at 421. Record New- roborated evidence of a minor witness. Nel objected during some to this statement State, (Ind.1988). son grounds trial on Officer misstated “impinge jury’s We will not responsi on Anglin’s testimony. Record at 421-22. In bility credibility weigh to assess evi light objection, of this re dence, unless this Court is confronted with said, phrased his “As I comment and recall

inherently improbable testimony, equivo or ... testimony the officer’s he said did cal, wholly in uncorroborated try anything ever to do oral with her. [New- dubiosity.” credible Becker v. says yes, yeah.” some] Record at 422 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) N.E.2d (citing added). (emphasis (Ind. Bedwell v. 481 N.E.2d 1090 argues 1985)). summarization Becker, refused to we find that a Anglin’s testimony of Officer is incorrect be- inherently improbable child’s *8 testify cause the officer did not on direct incredibly or the dubious where witness had per- examination that admitted Newsome given prior some statements inconsistent to forming cunnilingus on the victim. Accord- trial. These inconsistencies were Newsome, ing Anglin only to Officer testified brought by pre out at trial defense attempt per- that Newsome an Becker, admitted to jury. in sented to the Just as cunnilingus Assuming form on the victim. present fact that in the the victim case arguendo interpretation may that this is correct made inconsistent statements does testimony Anglin’s of Officer and that testimony inherently not make her at trial improbable prosecutor’s attempt summarizing or at incredibly dubious. It is the first incorrect, jury’s judge testimony any function to this confusion victim’s credibili was ty part dispelled by prosecutor’s on these inconsistent state was restate- ments, objection during after and we will not conclude that the ment Newsome’s clos- were, turn, event, prosecu- which any ward defense counsel argument.

ing prejudicial to the defendant. subject to did not Newsome comment tor’s improbable it is that it had grave peril since Any objection “baloney” to comment is jury. Zenthofer, on the persuasive effect object to it waived since Newsome did not at at 34. 613 N.E.2d Zenthofer, at 34. With trial. 613 N.E.2d comment, to the “smoke” this state- respect pros argues that the Newsome also was not abusive defense coun- ment towards Anglin’s tes comment about Officer ecutor’s Rather, merely request it was sel. superi- implies timony improper is because on jury to focus the State’s evidence. The knowledge of the Newsome relies case. or not improper. was remark Supreme holding in Court’s on the Indiana Finally, argues that State, N.E.2d 18 v. Ind. Kocher improperly on the' prosecutor commented de denied, (1979), proposition that a reh. testify failure to at trial. He fendant’s cites opinion express not prosecutor following support of comments in this opinion upon infor implies that her is based contention: privy. Id. at jury is not mation to which up get say You heard this officer prosecutor’s on Officer 20. The comment reverend, came in his with [Newsome] imply that Anglin’s does not We [New- his minister. filled out forms. knowledge has of evidence which prosecutor doing didn’t what he was or some] know simply at presented trial. It is was not problems had [Newsome] some under- summary Anglin’s and a of Officer standing going what on? He’d be the was evidence, permissi that which is comment on crying attorney. first one for an Record at See, v. 580 N.E.2d ble. Jarrett 441; certainly ... there has been no (Ind.Ct.App.1991), denied. trans. suggest to that [Newsome evidence claims was The second comment Newsome right gave he his state of mind when following: “Certainly there’s improper is the Anglin.] his statement Officer There’s suggest that would that [Officer no evidence not a mental or disease defect defense anything inappropriate as is Anglin] did psychological You’ve here. heard no evi- by in con- raised defense counsel sometimes dence. Record at 442-43. voluntary.” statements that are nection with privilege against Fifth “The Amendment argues that at 422-23. Newsome Record compulsory is self-incrimination violated improper because it im- this statement when a makes a statement job get plies the “defense counsel’s is to subject by interpretation jury to reasonable by insignificant bringing his client off out as an invitation draw an adverse inference Appellant’s legal facts and technicalities.” from defendant’s silence.” Moore Brief at 10. (Ind.1996), reh. denied. possible con- defendant waives error “[A] complained Neither remarks prosecutor’s closing argument cerning the improper Newsome were under this stan- object argument fails to where he dard. Zenthofer, trial.” 613 N.E.2d at 34. Since simply The first remark was a rebuttal of object comment at Newsome failed to this argument Newsome’s that his statement trial, appeal. has waived on he the issue Anglin voluntarily was not made. It Officer Accordingly, we need not decide whether indirectly directly refer does not either improper. comment was refusal at trial and Newsome’s no interpreted reasonable could have The third remark cited Newsome as an to infer comment invitation Newsome’s was, improper much smoke in “there’s so guilt from his silence. hardly you.” front I can’t see *9 remark argues at 439-40. that this com Neither was the second an Record He prose improper refusal ment and another comment where the reference to Newsome’s to “baloney” testify. primary One of argument cutor called a defense Newsome’s conten (Record 441) during argument his was closing at were to- tions that abusive statements

877 police competency appropriate. to the made under statute is his statement Such is that it was not not the case. circumstances indicate See, 431-33. Record at It was credible.6 issue, majority’s study Under the of the argument proper to rebut legislature changed specific the portion has by pointing psy- out that contention no of the competency statute on of witnesses concerning chological evidence Newsome’s supreme and the adopted court has a new In presented. Harper state was v. mental rule regarding competency the of witnesses (Ind.1985), the Indiana N.E.2d 508 altering all without the law. It does not prosecutor’s Supreme Court that a com- held legislative body follow that our enrolled an improper was not where it was ment ad- highest judicial body act and our adopted a dressed, totality, in its not to the defendant’s all rule to leave the static. statutory law The testify failure to fail- but defendant’s adoption modification rule priori and the present to to ure evidence substantiate a changed the law. emotionally that his victim claim unbal- (1993 Ed.) § pro- IND.CODE 34-1-14-5 alleged at the time anced of the crime. Id. “persons vides that certain shall not be com- Furthermore, no 511. reasonable petent witnesses.” In its current form the prosecutor’s interpreted could the com- statute sets out those who have received ment, taken in of rebutting the context including confidential communications attor- argument defense that Newsome’s statement neys, physicians, clergy members of the police credibility, inviting to as the lacked wives, husbands and as well as per- insane upon of guilt inference Newsome’s his sons, as those not competent who are wit- Moore, failure at trial. 669 N.E.2d majority, nesses. As the noted until its Therefore, prosecutor’s at 739. we find the repeal 1990, the second subdivision of the improper. comments not to have been presumed incompetency statute of: “Chil- Affirmed. (10) dren years age, under ten of unless it

appears they understand the nature arid ROBERTSON, J., obligation of an oath.” concurs. By repeal its section HOFFMAN, J., in result with concurs children, legislature pre removed the opinion.

separate sumption incompetency. Evid.R. adopted by court, supreme our would still HOFFMAN, concurring in Judge, result. legislature presump allow to retain the Although result, I respect concur in the I however, incompetency; tion legisla fully majority’s dissent from the examination ture has not the section or a sim recodified issue as to of the provision. Thus, ilar the deletion of the pre witness. Ind.Evidenee Rule does presumptive incompetency repre of children competent. that all are sume witnesses change law. sents in the See Joe v. Le (Ind. Thornton bow, (Ind.Ct.App.1996). N.E.2d Ct.App.1995). The onus is a defendant determining legislature in whether competent. that a is not establish interpretations tended courts to retain A compe determination a witness’s as to developed through common law once a stat tency lies within the sound discretion of the revised, ute was noted: Court only trial and is reviewable for a mani language When a statute contains which is fest abuse of that discretion. presume legislature, deleted we majority opinion legislature that the intended the assumes Evid.R. deletion thus, literally; represent change cannot analy- be read in the law. We repealed portion simply sis under the cannot into a statute lan- ‘re-read’ attorney following right during frame 6. Newsome’s said was not in of mind. closing argument, determining weight proper "In He was in the state of mind in order statement, given you give proper say to a in order to what be defendant's should statement may happened." consider all under which it not have Record at circumstances made_ suggest Now I would that Mr. *10 clearly has been aban- analysis, which the old [Citations has been deleted. which guage doned, to the bench and will cause confusion omitted.] rule, a child the new in Indiana. Under bar opponent the competent witness unless is a analysis Further, majority’s breaks the testimony raises issue and demon- the the scrutiny. The rule’s pragmatic under down incompeteney. strates children exclude presumptively failure into special inquiry their prohibit Here, not the colloquy does the between the issue testifying prior to when competency that the witness the witness revealed and rule, The read by a defendant. is raised between truth and a distinction understood repeal of the subdivision the conjunction with articu- was able to falsehood. The witness children the regarding telling a consequence for unpleasant late an arbitrary statute, previous the abandoned properly reviewed for a manifest lie. When rule age, in favor of a lines drawn Thornton, discretion, see abuse competency until otherwise assumes which not apparent that Newsome did it is opponent of the testi- the demonstrated incompeteney, and the witness’s establish mony. competency must finding as to trial court’s be affirmed on that basis. investigation of the issue is majority’s The re- incorrect. It concludes patently in- presuming

pealing provision the former pre- instituting a rule which

competency and legislature nor competency neither the

sumes an intent to alter signaled supreme lay proponent of the witness to need for a establishing com- very specific foundation INC., ERECTORS, INDIANA First, majority engrafts petency. Appellant-Defendant, requiring 601 the abandoned burden Evid.R. proponent of a to establish competency, then of that witness’s level INDIANA TRUSTEES OF The very specific only the majority concludes that UNIVERSITY, Appellee- now re- evolved under the inquiry which Plaintiff. satisfy will pealed portion of statute wholly majority opinion fails to The burden. No. 53A01-9703-CV-88. any change repeal of the recognize after Appeals of Indiana. Court of adoption the rules of evi- provision and dence. Oct. 1997. rule, anal- statutory provision The old Dec. Rehearing Denied The new rule ex- ysis have been abolished. new presumes competency. Once the

plicitly super- adopted, unquestionably

rule was inquiry rule

seded old majority’s steadfast spawned. rule The

old change results recognize the rule

refusal competency issue faulty analysis

in a present

in the case. problem. result underscores end must be determining that a foundation

After here, precisely met

laid and was

majority further concludes that the witness’s she, fact, under- revealed telling the truth

stood the difference between lie, in allow- telling so the initial error

ing Adherence is harmless.

Case Details

Case Name: Newsome v. State
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Oct 14, 1997
Citation: 686 N.E.2d 868
Docket Number: 20A03-9701-CR-25
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
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