OPINION
Thе defendant, Valleywood Associates, Inc. (defendant), appeals the denial of its petition to arbitrate a contractual dispute between it and the plaintiffs, John B. Newman and Linda A. Newman (collectively plaintiffs). A Superior Court motion justice determined that the defendant’s motion to arbitrate would be granted only if the dеfendant released its mechanic’s lien on the subject real property within two weeks. For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the motion justice erred in ultimately denying the defendant’s motion to arbitrate.
I
Facts and Travel
The defendant agreed in 2001 to construct a one-family home for plaintiffs in Lincoln, Rhode Island. The seven-page written and signed agreement included provisions governing both mechanics’ liens and binding arbitration. 1 A dispute arose between the parties, which plaintiffs attribute to defendant’s “substandard, unsatisfactory, and defective” work.
The defendant filed a notice of intention in accordance with the Rhode Island Mechanics’ Lien Law found at G.L.1956 chapter 28 of title 34. The plaintiffs then posted a bond of $58,113 to discharge that lien, which allowed them to close on a home mortgage. Then plaintiffs also filed a complaint against defendant in Superior Court, asserting a host of counts ranging from breach of contact to slander of title.
Based entirely on the binding arbitration provisiоn in the contract, defendant *1288 moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and that venue was improper, under Rules 12(b)(1), (2) and (3) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, respectively. The motion justice granted defendant’s motion to dismiss upon the condition that defendаnt release the mechanic’s hen within two weeks, otherwise defendant’s motion would be denied. When defendant failed to release that lien, the motion justice denied the motion to dismiss. The defendant appeals, asserting that the motion justice’s refusal to allow defendant to file a mechanic’s lien while arbitrating that dispute сonstituted reversible error.
II
Analysis
A
Propriety of the Appeal
General Laws 1956 § 10-3-19 provides the scope of appellate review of decisions pertaining to arbitration.
Bradford Dyeing Association, Inc. v. J. Stog Tech GmbH,
B
Arbitration and Mechanics’ Liens
The primary question presеnted on appeal is whether defendant may first file a mechanic’s lien to protect its interest in allegedly unpaid services and then arbitrate the underlying contractual dispute. Since subject-matter jurisdiction is “an indispensable requisite in any judicial proceeding,” we review the question
de novo. Zarrella v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
As a preliminary matter, we note that thе contract signed by the parties does not limit the parties’ ability to arbitrate a contractual dispute. The contract’s broad language stating that disputes “shall be submitted to binding arbitration” comports with the statutory requirement that an arbitration agreement be “clearly written and expressed.” Section 10-3-2. The arbitration clausе does not expressly provide that defendant would waive its contractual right to arbitration if it filed a mechanic’s lien on the property. 3 In fact, the arbitra *1289 tion clause does not cross-reference the provision pertaining to mechanics’ liens. In light of this fact, we must determine whether, as a matter of contract law, defendant waivеd its right to arbitrate the contractual dispute when it filed a mechanic’s lien.
The gravamen of plaintiffs’ argument on appeal is that defendant’s filing of a mechanic’s hen constituted a waiver of any contractual right to arbitrate the dispute because it manifested a willingness to litigate rather than arbitrate. The defendant оffers that neither the Arbitration Act nor the Mechanics’ Lien Law prevents a party from filing a mechanic’s Hen and then arbitrating the underlying contractual dispute and, therefore, urges us to read the two statutes in pari materia. Since this precise question is an issue of first impression in this jurisdiction, we briefly will review the applicable statutes and caselаw governing both arbitration agreements and mechanics’ liens.
Chapter B of title 10, entitled “The Arbitration Act,” states arbitration agreements generally are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” Section 10-3-2. In giving force to that legislative mandate, we have declared, “[ajrbitration is a desirable method of dispute resоlution that has long been favored by the courts.”
Soprano v. American Hardware Mutual Insurance Co.,
“If any suit or proceeding be brought upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration, the court in which the suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in thе suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties, stay the trial of the action until the arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with the аrbitration.” Section 10-3-3.
This favored method of dispute resolution, however, can be waived when a party “manifest[sj a willingness, if not a desire, to have the courts resolve the controversy.”
North Smithfield Teachers Association v. North Smithfield School Committee,
Intended to prevent unjust enrichment, the purpose of the Mechanics’ Lien Law is to “ ‘affоrd a liberal remedy to all who have contributed labor or material towards adding to the value of the property to which the hen attaches.’ ”
Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi,
A claimant perfects a lien on the property to which he or she has contributed labor or materials by mailing a notice of intention to the property owner and then filing that notice of intention in the land evidence records within 120 days after completing the work. Section 34-28-4(a);
see also Gem Plumbing & Heating Co.,
With this understanding of the relevant statutes, the need to read these statutes in pari materia becomes readily apparent. First, § 34-28-33, in expressly assuring that a party’s rights to other remedies will not be limited by the filing of a mechanic’s hen, supports a conclusion that the filing of a mechanic’s lien does not waive arbitration. Second, § 10-3-3, in allowing for a stay of a Superior Court action while the matter is referred to arbitration, provides the procedural mechanism that would allow parties to proceed to arbitration while a mechanic’s hen has been placed on the property.
The recent case of
Aponik v. Lauricella,
We hold that a party does not waive its right to arbitrate a contractual dispute, as a matter of law, by filing a notice of intention to claim a mechanic’s hen. Thus, a party may proceеd to arbitration after first encumbering the subject real estate with a mechanic’s hen.
Any holding to the contrary would frustrate the purposes of both statutes because it would require potential litigants to choose between arbitration and filing a mechanic’s hen. Under that view, any arbitration agreement would obstruct the public рolicy outlined in § 34-28-1, which prohibits a contractual release of the right to file mechanics’ hens. Also, under that *1291 rule of law, any claimant seeking to avail itself of the liberal remedy afforded by the Mechanics’ Lien Law would forfeit an often-preferred alternative to litigation. We see no reason to envision the road leading to the resolution of contractual disputes as containing such a pronounced fork.
This holding does not contradict our caselaw governing waiver of arbitration. Of all the binding authority to which plaintiffs cite for the proposition that defendant waived its contractual right to arbitration, none addresses the precise question of whether the filing of a notice of intention to claim a mechanic’s lien constituted a waiver of arbitration.
Brissette v. Potter,
Finally, this holding should not be read as prohibiting parties, who agree to arbitrate contractual disputes, from expressly providing that any right to arbitration is waived by the filing of a mechanic’s hen, thereby requiring a party to choose one remedy or the other.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Superior Court and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The record shall be returned to the Superior Court.
Notes
. The provision concerning mechanics’ liens states:
“As between Contractor [defendant] and Buyer [plaintiff], it is expressly agrеed that Contractor shall at no time suffer any mechanic's liens to be placed upon the property arising from Contractor's failure to pay any material, men [sic ] or mechanic. Should a mechanic's lien be placed upon the property subsequent to the conveyance to the Buyer and within the presсribed period of time as established by Rhode Island General Laws Title 34 Chapter 28, Contractor agrees to remove the mechanic's liens by paying out of its own funds any sums required to be paid for the removal of the mechanic’s liens and further agrees to indemnify and hold the Buyer harmless from any and all mechanic’s lien or liens of its subcontractors or claims of its subcontractors as same are filed within the statutory prescribed period of time.
"It is further agreed by and between Contractor and Buyer that Contractor will provide Buyer with release of liens of all subcontractors upon request of Buyer and prior to disbursement being made to Contractor by Buyer.”
The provision concerning arbitration states:
"In the еvent a dispute shall arise between Contractor and Buyer, such that said dispute cannot be resolved mutually between the parties, said dispute shall be submitted to binding arbitration through the American Arbitration Association, Providence office by application made to the Boston District. Both Contractor and Buyer agree for рurposes of arbitration that each will pay it’s [sic] associated costs of arbitration.
"At such times as the decision is rendered by the arbitrator, the party against whom the decision is entered will bear the responsibility for all costs incurred through arbitration including filing fees with the American Arbitration Association and the arbitrator’s fees.”
. General Laws 1956 § 10-3-19 states:
"Any party aggrieved by any ruling or order made in any court proceedings as authorized in this chapter may obtain review as in any civil action, and upon the entry of any final order provided in § 10-3-3, or an order confirming, modifying or vacating an award, he or she may appeal to the supreme court as provided for appeals in civil actions, and the supreme court shall make such orders in the premises as the rights of the parties and the ends of justice require.”
. It is important to distinguish between a contractual waiver of the right to arbitrate a dispute, which is discussed above, from a contractual waiver of a right to file a mechanic’s lien. General Laws 1956 § 34-28-1(b) *1289 expressly prohibits any contractual waiver of a party’s right to file a mechanic’s lien. There was, however, discussion at the hearing on the motion to dismiss about whether the contract itself precluded defendant's right to file a mechanic’s lien. Since such a ruling would be in clear violation of § 34-28-1, we confine our review to whether filing a mechanic's lien prevents defendant from proceeding to arbitration.
. The buyer in that case did not challenge the contractor’s right to arbitrate the dispute while filing a mechanic’s lien on the property.
. In light of our recent decision in
Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi,