Jаmes Newman appeals his conviction of two counts of child molestation, asserting numerous errors. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
1. Newman contends thаt the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. “On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable tо the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility but only determines whether the evidence is sufficient under the standard of
Jackson v. Virginia,
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence shows that, in January and February 1997, Newman often stayed at the home of his daughter and nine-year-old granddaughter. During this period,'he would sometimes sleep in the same bed with his granddaughter. The granddaughter testified that, while she pretended to be sleeping, Newman would pull up her nightgown and rub her vagina and breasts with his hand. Sometimes he would take off her panties. She testified that she eventually told her mother about the tоuchings, and that she also told Laura McElrath, a detective for the Gordon County Sheriff’s Department.
McElrath testified that she interviewed the victim on February 19, 1997. A videotape of the interview was introduced into evidence and played for the jury. The victim’s statements in the interview were consistent with her trial testimony that Newman touched her privаte parts while in her bed.
The State also presented evidence of a similar transaction in which Newman had previously molested another minor on numerous occasions by touching her vagina while giving her piggyback rides.
This evidence was sufficient to persuade a rational trier of fact of Newman’s guilt beyond a reasonablе doubt of child molestation. See
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Kapua v. State,
2. Newman contends that the trial court erred by failing, during the Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 (B) hearing, to make an express determination that the рrobative value of the similar transaction evidence outweighed the prejudice to Newman. However, Newman made no specific objection to the similar transaction testimony on these grounds, either at the similar transaction hearing or when the testimony was offered at trial. Accordingly, he cannot raise this issue on appeal. See
Garner v. State,
To the extent that Newmаn is arguing that a trial court has an affirmative obligation, as part of the USCR 31.3 (B) similar transaction hearing, to make an express determination that the probative value of similar transaction evidence outweighs its prejudice to the defendant, he misunderstands the duties of the trial court in such hearing. The only issues required to be considerеd by the trial court in a similar transaction hearing are those set forth in
Williams v. State,
It is true that, like any other evidence, the trial court has the discretion to exclude relevant similar transaction evidence on the grounds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
White v. State,
3. At trial, the victim’s mother testified that, as a result of, among other things, publicity in the JonBenet Ramsey murder casе, she asked her daughter whether anybody had bothered her, and that the daughter then told her about Newman’s actions. On cross- *796 examination, Newman asked the following question: “And along with the JonBenet Ramsey matter that caused you to bring up this inquiry to [the victim] was conversations that you had with Laura Woods [the mother’s sister-in-law] about the visions or thoughts or dreams that Laura Woods had about James Newman with your daughter?” After the State raised a hearsay objection, Newman responded by stating that the conversation was relevant to show the mother’s actual reason for approaching her daughter. The court refused to allow the question, finding that the mother’s reason for аpproaching her daughter was not relevant. The court allowed Newman to ask whether conversations with Woods prompted the mother to ask the victim abоut any improper touching. In response to this question, the mother denied that any conversation with Woods prompted her to approach her daughter, noting that she seldom spoke with Woods. Newman now contends that the trial court erred in sustaining the State’s objection to his initial question.
The admission or exclusion of evidencе on grounds of relevancy is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and such discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Knapp v. State,
4. Newman contends that the introduction of both a videotape and the live testimony of the victim was repetitious and prejudicial. This ground has been uniformly decided adversely to Newman.
Price v. State,
5. Newman further contends that the trial court erred in allowing the jury, upon its request during deliberations, another
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viewing of the videotape. The replaying of evidence which the jury asks to hear is within the discretion of the trial court, and we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in this instance.
Nelson v. State,
6. Newman contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the presumption of innocence stays with the defendant throughout the trial. However, the trial court correctly charged the jury on the presumption of innocence, and that such presumption remains until it is overcоme by evidence sufficient to convince the jury that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. “This is a complete and accurate statement of lаw. It is no longer necessary to give the exact language of requests to charge when the same principles are fairly given to the jury in the general charge of the court.” (Punctuation omitted.)
Guyton v. State,
Judgment affirmed.