58 Iowa 447 | Iowa | 1882
The defendant, in his statement to the justice, did not charge upon the plaintiff the commission of any specific offense, nor do the facts stated impute any crime. The appellee insists that for this reason the court properly struck out the evidence and directed the jury to find for the defendant. The plaintiff relied upon Shaul v. Brown, 28 Iowa, 37. In that case, however, a distinct offense, namely, the crime of larceny was charged. If there was any defect in the information it was in that the facts stated, as constituting the crime, did not amount to the crime of larceny. In this respect, that case differs from the case at bar, and differs from McNeely v. Driskill, 2 Blackf., 259; and Farlie v. Danks, 30 Eng. L. and Eq., 119, which it cites and distinguishes.
It is clear from the petition that the gravamen of the plaintiff’s cause of action is the Avickedly and maliciously instituting a prosecution against the plaintiff charging him with the commission of a crime. The case of McNeely v. Driskill, 2 Blackf., 259, is in its material facts exactly like the present, and the decision is directly in point. In that case it is said: “ If a justice of the }Deace, by mistake of judgment, conceives an act to be a felony which is not a felony, and in consequence of that mistake, causes an innocent person to be arrested and imprisoned, the laAV will not hold the person avIio made the complaint responsible in this form of action, for the consequences of such errors.” Leigh v. Webb, 3 Esp. Rep., 165, announces the same doctrine. In
Affirmed.