48 Ga. App. 226 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1933
Lead Opinion
Mrs. Newill sued for damages, alleging that she was burned by an explosion of gas furnished to her residence by the defendant, and alleged, that the defendant changed the nature of the gas furnished to her from manufactured gas, which was not highly explosive, to natural gas, which was more than twice as explosive as manufactured gas; that the explosion would not have occurred had the manufactured gas been in the conduits and pipes in her home, and that it occurred only because of the change of such gas in said fixtures without giving warning of the increased risk and danger incident thereto. The original petition was demurred to, on the grounds: that it stated a bare conclusion of the pleader; that it failed to allege the absence of the right to supply natural instead of manufactured gas; that it failed to allege any
It is true that ordinarily there may be no duty resting on a gas company to inspect and repair customers’ pipes beyond the meter and service lines of the company. In 28 C. J. 594, it is said: “The company is warranted in assuming that the interior system of pipes is sufficiently secure to permit the gas to be introduced with safety.” This inference applies “in the absence of any facts upon which to base an inference, of duty.” Id. The question before this court is whether the allegations made are sufficient to show the existence of any duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, and a violation thereof which resulted in damage, and injury to the plaintiff. Do the allegations setting up that the pipes and fixtures maintained by the defendant were of sufficient strength and material to properly confine the manufactured gas which plaintiff had been accustomed to use and the defendant had been supplying to the plaintiff through its pipes and fixtures, and the further allegation that without warning to plaintiff, natural gas was substituted by defendant which exerted a great deal heavier pressure in the pipes and fixtures of the defendant than manufactured gas, so as to cause them to leak gas upon the premises of plaintiff, and that such change was the proximate cause of injury to plaintiff, sufficiently show the existence and violation of a duty for which the plaintiff would be liable in the event such action resulted in damage to plaintiff? We think so. Certain duties are inherent in human society.. A owes B the duty to so handle- his affairs or conduct his business and control the material forces with which he
Was the omission to warn or to inspect the pipes when the gas exerted a heavier pressure and thus caused its escape the proximate cause of the injury? No subject has caused more discussion and seeming variety of opinion than has that of “ proximate cause.” Powell, J., in the case of Atlantic Coast Line v. Daniels, 8 Ga. App. 775 (70 S. E. 203), has given one of the most lucid discussions on the subject that we have ever read. Granted that the placing of the natural gas in the pipes by the defendant caused them to leak gas which they otherwise would not have done, was this escaping gas the proximate cause of the injury, without any other efficient, intervening cause which would thus relieve the gas company from liability? Was the act of the plumber in striking the match the proximate cause, or was the escaping gas the proximate cause of the injury? “The proximate cause of an injury may not even in juridic contemplation, be sole and single.” Atlantic Coast Line Co. v. Daniels, supra. Quoting again from that opinion: “Now if it appears that the injury resulted from a condition into which there entered both negligent and non-negligent activities, and that according to the laws of human probability the injury would not have resulted but for the negligent activities, and that when the negligent and non-negligent activities united, the injury naturally followed, the law disregards the non-negligent activities as causes, considers them as but a part of the normal environment, and considers the negligent actor as disturbing that normality, and, therefore, as being the juridic cause of the in
Judgment reversed,
Rehearing
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
We wish to make only one observation in answer to counsel’s motion for rehearing. It is true that the filing of an amendment does not of itself make such amendment a part of the record of the case; yet where it appears, as in the present case, that the amendment was tendered and a formal order passed directing that it be filed subject to the right of the defendant to demur further or renew its demurrer theretofore filed, and where the defendant did demur to the petition “as amended,” and the court passed an order sustaining the demurrer to the “petition as amended,” such amendment will be treated as having been formally allowed, although no order “formally allowing” the same is shown. Rehearing denied.