Monique NEWELL, Administratrix of the Estate of Romona Newell, Appellant, v. Abraham RUIZ, M.D., individually and as Partner of Radiology Professional Association; Radiology Professional Association.
No. 00-2091
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Argued April 5, 2001. Filed April 10, 2002.
285 F.3d 166
* (Amended in accordance with Clerk‘s Order dated 11/6/01)
Philip F. Mattia (Argued), Philip F. Mattia & Associates, Wayne, NJ, for Appellees.
Before SCIRICA, AMBRO and GIBSON,** Circuit Judges.
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Romona Newell appeals the dismissal with prejudice of her medical malpractice claim for failure to timely file an Affidavit of Merit in accordance with
Newell makes two arguments on appeal—first, that she substantially сomplied with the Affidavit of Merit Statute; second, that extraordinary circumstances warrant relaxation of the statutory requirements of
I
Romona Newell, a New York resident, commenced this medical malpractice action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on March 24, 1999. She alleges Abraham Ruiz, M.D., and the Radiology Professional Association committed malpractice by failing to properly read and interpret her mammograms in June 1997. Newell, who previously had cancer in her right breast, alleges defendants failed to detect abnormal changes in the mammography of her left breast. As a result, she claims a delay in diagnosis and treatment caused the can
Complying with New York‘s
On January 18, 2000, more than eight months after filing their answers in New York, defendants filed a motion to dismiss Newell‘s complaint for failure to comply with New Jersey‘s Affidavit of Merit Statute,
II
A.
In any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or рroperty damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation, the plaintiff shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the answer to the complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person that there exists a reasonable probability that the care, skill or knowledge exercised or exhibited in the treatment, practice or work that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional or occupational standards or treatment practices. The court may grant no more than one аdditional period, not to exceed 60 days, to file the affidavit pursuant to this section, upon a finding of good cause. The person executing the affidavit shall be licensed in this or any other state; have particular expertise in the general area or specialty involved in the action, as evidenced by board certification or by devоtion of the person‘s practice substantially to the general area or specialty involved in the action for a period of at least five years. The person shall have no financial interest in the outcome of the case under review, but this prohibition shall not exclude the person from being an expert witness in the case.
When construing a statute, “our ‘overriding goal must be to determine the Legislature‘s intent.‘” Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387, 774 A.2d 495, 498 (2001) (citations omitted). As the New Jersey Supreme Court has observed:
The first step in determining the Legislature‘s intent is to look at the plain language of the statute. As a general
rule, when the language of a statute is clear on its face, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it aсcording to its terms. Nevertheless, we also have stressed that where a literal interpretation would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy, the spirit of the law should control. Thus, when a literal interpretation of individual statutory terms or provisions would lead to results inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute, that interprеtation should be rejected.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
Newell contends she has a meritorious claim and that she substantially complied with New Jersey‘s Affidavit of Merit Statute. Because the statute does not address its applicability to cases transferred from another jurisdiction, she argues a narrow interpretation would thwart the legislature‘s intent of barring only frivolous claims.
B.
In several recent decisions, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that if “reasonable effectuation of the statute‘s purpose has occurred,” the Affidavit of Merit Statute does not require strict compliance. Galik v. Clara Maass Med. Ctr., 167 N.J. 341, 771 A.2d 1141, 1148 (2001); see also Fink v. Thompson, 167 N.J. 551, 772 A.2d 386 (2001); Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 708 A.2d 401, 411 (1998). In appropriate cases, “[c]ourts invoke the doctrine of substantial compliance to ‘avoid technical defeats of vаlid claims.‘” Cornblatt, 708 A.2d at 412 (quoting Zamel v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 56 N.J. 1, 264 A.2d 201, 203 (1970)).
The doctrine of substantial compliance requires the defaulting party to show: (1) the lack of prejudice to the defending party; (2) a series of steps taken to comply with the statute involved; (3) a general compliance with the purpose of the statute; (4) a reasonable notice of petitioner‘s claim; and (5) a reasonаble explanation why there was not strict compliance with the statute. Id. This equitable doctrine “requires a fact-sensitive analysis involving the assessment of all the idiosyncratic details of a case to determine whether ‘reasonable effectuation of the statute‘s purpose’ has occurred.” Galik, 771 A.2d at 1151 (citation omitted).
There is no legal prejudice to the defendants. Newell‘s complaint, filed in New York federal court on March 24, 1999, was accompanied by a Certificate of Merit attesting to the validity of her claim. Furthermore, Newell supplied defendants with copies of her mammograms and “took a series of steps that notified the defendants about the merits of the malpractice claims filed against thеm.” Palanque v. Lambert-Woolley, 168 N.J. 398, 774 A.2d 501, 506 (2001). As the New Jersey Superior Court observed:
[There is] no prejudice whatever that would result to defendants, other than that they would have to defend against a potentially meritorious claim, which is not legal prejudice. Certainly, there has been no showing of prejudice to defendants that would outweigh the strong preference for adjudication on the merits rather than final disposition for prоcedural reasons.
Mayfield v. Cmty. Med. Assocs., 335 N.J.Super. 198, 762 A.2d 237, 243 (2000) (citations omitted).
The second and third prongs of the substantial compliance doctrine are related. Newell took steps generally complying with the purpose of New Jersey‘s Affi
New York‘s
[T]he attorney has reviewed the facts of the case and has consulted with at least one physician in medical malpractice ac
tions ... who is licensed to practice in this state or any other state and who the attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable in the relevant issues involved in the particular action, and that the attorney has concluded on the basis of such review and consultation that there is a reasonable basis for the commencement of such action.
As a result of Newell‘s compliance with New York‘s Certificate of Merit Statute, she effectively made a threshold showing that the case had merit at an early stage of the litigation, the primary goal of New Jersey‘s Affidavit of Merit Statute.5 Although untimely, Newell also took measures to comply with the New Jersey statute, filing an Affidavit of Merit from a Board Certified Radiologist on February 11, 2000.6 Furthermore, Newell forward
Newell has presented a reasonable explanation for her actions. A New York resident, she filed her complaint in New York federal court.7 At the earliest stages of the litigation, it was reasonable for Newеll to believe that New York‘s Certificate of Merit Statute applied and that by satisfying the statute, she had made a threshold showing her case was meritorious. Furthermore, the New Jersey Affidavit of Merit Statute provides no guidance on the statute‘s applicability to cases transferred from another jurisdictions, especially when the triggering event, the filing of defendant‘s Answer, occurs in another state. Even less does the New Jersey statute address a situation in which a substantially similar “merit requirement” has been met at the commencement of suit which best serves its purpose—in the transferor state.
This combination of interlocking factors makes Newell‘s explanation why there was not strict compliance with the statute rеasonable.
C.
The New Jersey Supreme Court has declared the “purpose [of the substantial compliance doctrine] is to avoid the harsh
The legislative target of New Jersey‘s Affidavit of Merit Statute and New York‘s Certificate of Merit Statute was frivolous malpractice claims. Id. at 245; see also Zamft v. Cornell, 309 N.J.Super. 586, 707 A.2d 1068, 1071 (1998) (“Thе legislative intent in enacting the Affidavit of Merit Statute was to curtail the filing of frivolous malpractice actions. The expressed purpose of the statute was to require plaintiffs in malpractice cases to make a threshold showing that their claim is meritorious, in order that meritless lawsuits readily could be identified at an early stage of litigation.“) (quotаtion and citation omitted); see also Harmon, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 492. Defendants have never alleged that Newell‘s claims are frivolous or without merit. Furthermore, on April 23, 1999, a week before a scheduled court conference before the New York federal court, Dr. Ruiz‘s attorney requested a two-month adjournment “to see if we can possibly resolve the case quickly withоut going through the process of transferring it to a New Jersey
At every step in this litigation, Newell has acted appropriately, including providing defendants with pre-court ordered discovery. “Under the facts here presented, we are hard-pressed to find that the original failure to file a timely affidavit of merit ... evinced a knowing intent to disregard and thereby thwart the sound purpose of the statute.” Zamft, 707 A.2d at 1071.
As noted, defendants did not file their motion to dismiss Newell‘s claims until ten months after Newell filed her complaint, and nine months after Dr. Ruiz filed his answer. Newell has alleged that defendants delayed production of important documents and records, failed to respond to requisite discovery and engaged in “gamesmanship.” This raises the question whether defendants may have intentionally sought to achieve a “technical defeat[] of valid claims.” Cornblatt, 708 A.2d at 411 (quoting Zamel, 264 A.2d at 203).
The District Court has noted that the Affidavit of Merit Statute “specifically obligates [the] plaintiff to provide ‘a sworn statement in lieu of the affidavit’ setting forth the defendant‘s failure to proffer the appropriate records.”8 Nonetheless,
The purpose of the statute[] is not to afford malpractice defendants with a sword to fight off a malpractice action by procrastinating in providing records and other relevant materials that a competent, conscientious expert would have to analyze before submitting an Affidavit of Merit.... [A]n educated malpractice defendant may, though subtly, induce a plaintiff into believing there is no need to comply with the “in lieu of” procedure. The defendant may agree to supply the required information but simply fail to provide it in a diligent and timely manner, thereby allowing the statutory clock to run out. Consequently, the statute‘s time limits may become a sword in the hand of a defendant so that a meritorious claim escapes exposure to the litigation process.
Barreiro v. Morais, 318 N.J.Super. 461, 723 A.2d 1244, 1248 (1999).
We do not need to resolve this specific issue, however, as we hold Newell substantially complied with the Affidavit of Merit Statute.9
III
Because Newell substantially complied with
We will reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
On its face, the statute applies to “any action” involving medical malpractice brought in New Jersey. While there are no express exceptions in
Under the New Jersey Affidavit of Merit Statute, “a failure to file the required affidavit ‘shall be deemed a failure to state a cause of action.‘” Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 160 (3d Cir.2000) (quoting
We need not resolve this issue, however, as it does not affect our conclusion that Newell substantially complied with New Jersey‘s Affidavit of Merit Statute.