delivered the opinion of the court.
A few remarks will be sufficient to dispose of the sеveral assignments of error in this case.
*583 The рower of a court of justice, with the cоnsent of the parties, to appoint аrbitrators and refer a case pending before it, is incident to all judicial administration, whеre the right exists to ascertain the facts аs well as to pronounce the law. Conventiofacit legem. In such аn agreement there is nothing contrary to lаw or public policy. The Code of Ohio рrovides (sect. 281) expressly “ that all or any of the issues in the action, whether of fact or law, may be referred upon the written consent of the parties, or upon their orаl consent in court, entered upon the journal.” 2 Swan & C. 1027. The reference here in question was made in the latter mode and by virtue of this authority.
The objection that the arbitrators were not sworn was waived by the plaintiff in error by appearing and going to trial without requiring an oath to be administered. If the witnesses had not bеen sworn, the waiver of that defect under the same circumstances would have beеn equally conclusive. Edwards, Referees, 107; Morse, Arbitration and Award, 172; Maynard v. Frederick, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 247.
Two of the three refеrees only signed the award, but the attention of the court was not called to the fact when the report was confirmed and the judgment was entered. The omission was amendable, and
non constat
but that the amendment could and would havе been made if the objection had beеn suggested. It would be fair neither to the court nor the other party to permit the objection to be raised here for the first time. Under the circumstances, it must be held to have been conclusively waived, and the plaintiff in errоr cannot be heard now to insist upon it.
Bell
v.
Bruen,
The plaintiff in error was not, by reason of the Statе law, entitled to a second trial. The agrеement to submit the controversy to referеes selected or approved by the parties implied clearly that they intendеd the award should be final and conclusive. Thе District Court held this view, and ruled accordingly. It has lоng been ,the established law in the courts of thе United States that to grant or refuse a new triаl rests in
*584
the sound discretion of the court to whiсh the motion is addressed, and that the result cannot be made the subject of review upon a writ of error. We cannot think that Congress intended by the act of June 1, 1872 (17 Stat. 197, sect. 5), to abrogate this salutary rule.
Nudd
v.
Burrows,
Judgment affirmed.