72 Iowa 379 | Iowa | 1887
It is stated in the petition that a petition was presented to the defendants asking the removal of a
The trial was to the court, and there is no dispute as to the facts. The evidence sustains the allegations of the petition, and it is not claimed by counsel for the appellees that such allegations should not be regarded as established. The questions discussed by counsel are purely of a legal nature, and pertain to the powers conferred upon school officers, including the superintendent of public instruction. We understand that the question to be determined is whether the defendants can or should be compelled in this proceeding to remove the school-house from where it now stands to another place. The question as to whether it should be removed to any particular place is not, as we understand the record, presented, and it has not been argued by counsel. If correct in this view, it does not seem to be material to inquire whether a site has been procured or not. The only question considered by- the county superintendent was as to the removal. He did not take into consideration where it should be removed, and his decision in tliis respect was reversed by the superintendent of public instruction, and it
The statute provides that boai-ds of directors of district townships shall fix the site of school-houses. (Code, § 1724.) From any decision or order of such directors an appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party to the county superintendent, and from the decision of the latter an appeal may be taken to the superintendent of public instruction. The decision of the latter the statute provides shall be final. (Code, §§ 1829-1835, inclusive.) Of course, this provision of the statute must be construed to include only such matters as are within the jurisdiction of the several school officers above mentioned, and of which and the parties jurisdiction is obtained as provided by law. As to such questions the decision of the superintendent of public instruction must be regarded as final and conclusive, and binding on the parties, and it follows that such decisions must be enforced by the courts.
It is not claimed by counsel that the superintendent of public instruction did not have jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter, and it is conceded that as to all ministerial acts his decision is final; but it is insisted that such officer does not possess any judicial functions. In support ■of this proposition, Dist. Twp. of Sioux City v. Pratt, 17 Iowa, 16, is cited. In that case the relief asked was to set aside a contract for building a school-house, on the ground that it had been obtained by fraud. ’ Erom the action of the board in entering into the contract an appeal was taken by a tax-payer to the county superintendent, who declared the contract illegal and void, and it was insisted that such decision was final and conclusive. But it was held otherwise, and that as to such matter the superintendent was not vested with judicial powers. This case is clearly distinguishable
Counsel do not claim that the defendants have established by the evidence that the district did not have any funds with which to make the removal, and, if such fact could be regarded as established, it is not claimed by counsel to be material.
Por the reason stated, we think the district court erred in rendering judgment for the defendants.
REVERSED.