delivered the opinion of the court:
This action was brought by plaintiff Deborah Newbrough against defendant Lockwood Dairy for personal injuries resulting from an auto accident. After a jury trial, plaintiff was awarded $48,500 in damages, which award was then reduced by 40% for plaintiff’s contributory negligence. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
At 2 p.m., November 17, 1988, plaintiff was driving southbound on a four-lane highway near a mall. She was lost and looking for street signs. Plaintiff stopped аt the red light at an intersection. Defendant Frank Moeller, who was driving the Lockwood Dairy truck, pulled up behind plaintiff. He stated that traffic was heavy, which was normal for that time of day. When the light turned green, plaintiff pulled away with no traffic in front of her. She stated that she accelerated at a regular speed. The weather was clear and the pavement dry. Plaintiff testified that she was going very slowly, slоwer than the other traffic in front of her. Defendant stated that he was three car lengths behind plaintiff. He looked away. Defendant stated that plaintiff’s car appeared to come to a stop in the road. Defendant’s truck hit plaintiff’s car. Defendant testified that neither plaintiff’s taillights nor her brakelights were lit. Plaintiff did not testify that she applied her brakes or signalled to traffic behind her. At the point оf impact, the nearest place to turn right was IV2 blocks ahead; the nearest place to turn left was one-half mile away. Neither party was ticketed for the accident.
Plaintiff was taken tо the hospital, treated, and released. On November 18, 1988, she went to Delnor Hospital and was referred to Dr. Anthony Kitslar, a neurologist. Plaintiff also later consulted Dr. Bukowy and Dr. Kochno.
Plaintiff sued defendant for her personal injuries.
At trial, Dr. Kitslar testified that hе conducted a neurological exam on plaintiff on November 22, 1988, the results of which were normal. Plaintiff had told Dr. Kitslar of her history of psychiatric disorders including anxiety, depression, for which she had eаrlier been hospitalized, and manic depression, for which she had taken medication. Dr. Kitslar found her most marked symptoms were a visible anxiety and an inability to concentrate. She also had prеssured speech and flight of ideas. Dr. Kitslar diagnosed plaintiff as having an anxiety disorder. Further, he testified that plaintiff did not have post-concussive syndrome, which is a syndrome involving considerable dysfunction following certain head injuries. It can vary from mild post-traumatic headaches to memory difficulties and difficulties with concentration. He testified that he saw no indication of any significant soft tissue injury. He presсribed an antianxiety medication and recommended that plaintiff see a psychiatrist if the drug was not effective.
A few days later, plaintiff saw Dr. Bukowy. Dr. Bukowy testified that he ran a variety of tests, the results of which were normal. He did not inquire about plaintiff’s past psychiatric treatment and plaintiff did not reveal such history. He said that on his first visit with plaintiff, she had some or most of the symptoms of mania. Plaintiff complained of severe difficulty concentrating, and Dr. Bukowy diagnosed her as suffering from post-concussive syndrome, attributable to the accident. In December 1988, Dr. Bukowy prescribed an antidepressant medication.
Plaintiff testified that a few weeks after the accident, she sprained her ankle. In January and February 1989, plaintiff had surgery for breast cancer. She experienced considerable fatigue frоm chemotherapy following the surgery.
Plaintiff testified that she consulted Dr. Taras Kochno in January 1990. He knew that she planned to call him as an expert at her trial. He testified that he examined her and tоok a medical history, but plaintiff did not reveal her history of psychiatric disorders. He diagnosed her as having a condition known as fibromyalgia, which is a controversial condition being debated in the mediсal literature. It cannot be objectively diagnosed. The symptoms of this disorder are a history of sleep disturbance and chronic fatigue, which plaintiff had. Dr. Kochno stated that he believed fibromyalgia is related to depression, not trauma.
Plaintiffs medical bills in the amount of $13,972.50 were admitted into evidence. A summary of these expenses was provided to the jury.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the court gave the jury instructions. These included the definition instruction on contributory negligence and the violation of statute instructions with regard to the law that no person may stop or suddenly decreаse speed without the appropriate signal and the law that no person shall drive at such a slow speed which impedes or blocks reasonable movement of traffic.
The jury returned a verdict finding defendant liable. It found that the total damages suffered by plaintiff were $48,500, with $7,500 of that amount for present and future medical expenses. The jury also found plaintiff contributorily negligent by 40% and reduced her dаmages accordingly. Plaintiff now appeals.
The first issue that plaintiff raises for our consideration is whether the trial court abused its discretion in giving defendant’s jury instructions on contributory negligence and violаtion of statute. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving defendant’s jury instructions on contributory negligence. It is well settled that a party may not complain of instructions given by the trial court at the request of another where the court at his request has given the same kind of instructions. (Prostko v. Willstead (1966),
Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving defendant’s instructions on violation of statute. In Luker v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc. (1968),
Here, there was evidence that plaintiff was lost. She testified that she was looking at street signs and going very slowly. She stated that when she looked up, the traffic had proceeded on and passеd her by. Defendant testified that plaintiff’s brake lights were not lit and that she did not give a signal as to her speed. This is clearly a greater quantum of evidence than that justifying the instructions given in Luker. In view of these facts, thеre was enough evidence on which to base the instructions.
The second issue plaintiff raises is whether the award of $7,500 for present and future medical expenses was manifestly inadequate. We uphold the amount awarded. The amount of a verdict is generally within the discretion of a jury, and a reviewing court will not order a new trial on damages unless the damages awarded are manifestly inadequatе or it is clear that the amount of the award bears no reasonable relationship to the loss suffered by the plaintiff. (Elliott v. Koch (1990),
Here, there was evidence carrying the implication that plaintiff’s injuries were exaggerated or feigned and that the medical treatment was not necessary. Plaintiff was nоt candid about her prior psychiatric problems with Doctors Bukowy and Kochno, who diagnosed her as having, respectively, post-concussive syndrome and fibromyalgia. Dr. Kitslar, the only physician with a сomplete medical and psychiatric history of plaintiff, testified that plaintiff did not have post-concussive syndrome. He stated that he prescribed an antianxiety medication for plaintiff and rеcommended that she see a psychiatrist if the drug was unhelpful. Moreover, plaintiff admitted to lying during her deposition testimony when she denied her psychiatric history. From this evidence, the jury could have concluded that part of plaintiff’s treatment after the collision was for a problem not caused by this accident, but was for a preexisting problem. Moreover, it could have concluded that her testimony regarding her injuries was simply not credible. As in Nicholl, the jury had ample reason to question the nature and extent of the alleged injury to plaintiff. In sum, the $7,500 award to plaintiff for her present and future medical expenses is reasonably supported by the record as a whole and is not manifestly inadequate.
The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BARRY, P.J., and HAASE, J., concur.