10 N.Y.2d 151 | NY | 1961
This appeal involves the constitutionality of the statute restricting the erection of billboards and other advertising devices along the Thruway.
The advertising sign in question carried the legend “ OX EXIT 14-THKXTWAY ASHLEY MOTEL (aaa) ”, the motel being located some miles from where the sign was located. The Thruway Authority instituted this suit to enjoin the defendants—Ashley Motor Court, the owner of the motel,
Attending the enactment of the statute, section 361-a of the Public Authorities Law (L. 1952, eh. 593), were explicit legislative findings that the ‘ ‘ unrestricted and unregulated erection and maintenance of advertising devices adjacent to the thruway system would create conditions which are inimical to the public interest, interfere with the safety, comfort, security and welfare of the people of this state and mar the natural beauty of areas adjacent to the thruway system. In order to prevent such conditions the legislature hereby determines that the following enactment [§ 361-a] is necessary” (§ 1).
In its first subdivision, section 361-a prohibits the erection of any billboard or other advertising device located within a specified distance of the nearest edge of the Thruway pavement unless a written permit is granted by the Thruway Authority.
(a) “To provide for maximum visibility ’ ’;
(b) “To prevent unreasonable distraction” of motor vehicle operators;
(c) “To prevent confusion with regard to traffic lights, signs or signals ’ ’ or other interference with the effectiveness of traffic regulations;
(d) “ To preserve and enhance the natural scenic beauty or the aesthetic features of the thruway system ” and
(e) “ To promote maximum safety, comfort and well-being of the users of the thruway. ’ ’
The sign in question, for which no permit was ever sought by any one, is located within 500 feet of the edge of the Thruway pavement and was originally placed on defendant Ramapo’s property adjacent to Route 17 in 1937. When, in 1958, that property was condemned for use in connection with the widening of Route 17, it was moved to its present location on adjacent land.
The defendants argue that section 361-a is invalid because it is not reasonably related to the public health, morals or safety and because it constitutes a taking of property rights without compensation.
There can be no doubt that the statute is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative purpose. As both the Legislature’s finding and the statute’s listed objectives make clear, the legislation was aimed at rendering the Thruway safe for the traveling public — by providing for maximum visibility and by preventing unreasonable distractions. There are some, perhaps, who may dispute whether billboards or other advertising devices interfere with safe driving and constitute a traffic hazard (see Price, Billboard Regulations Along the Interstate Highway System, 8 Kansas L. Rev. 81, 88), but mere disagreement may not cast doubt on the statute’s validity. Matters such as these are reserved for legislative judgment, and the legislative determination, here expressly announced, will not be disturbed unless manifestly unreasonable. (See, e.g., Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N Y 2d 215, 218-219; Lincoln Bldg. Associates v. Barr. 1 N Y 2d 413, 415-416.)
It has been said that billboards can be as destructive of the beauties of the countryside as a plague of locusts and that, consequently, aesthetic considerations alone are enough to sustain enactments restricting and regulating the erection of advertising devices. We need not, however, concern ourselves with the question whether the preservation of £ 1 the natural scenic
As to the defendants’ argument that they are being deprived of their property without due process of law, it is enough to point out, as was found below, that, although the sign existed at another location at a prior time, it was relocated and placed in its present position in 1958, some years after the effective date of the statute, and that this constituted the erection of a new sign.
Even supposing, however, that the defendants possessed valid and subsisting property rights which the legislation here in issue abrogated, this would not provide sufficient basis for declaring the statute unconstitutional. In this connection, it is to be borne in mind that it was the very construction of the Thruway which created the element of value in the land abutting the road. Billboards and other advertising signs are obviously of no use unless there is a highway to bring the traveler within view of them. What was taken by the regulation, therefore, was the value which the Thruway itself had added to the land and of this the defendant cannot be heard to complain. The police power is 1 ‘ the least limitable of the powers of government and * * * extends to all the great public needs ” (People v. Nebbia, 262 N. Y. 259, 270, affd. 291 U. S. 502), and if the end desired be within the power of the State and the means used are reasonably suited to that end, it is no objection that “ the rights of private property are thereby curtailed”.
Since, therefore, section 361-a of the Public Authorities Law represents a constitutional exercise of the State’s police power (see, e.g., Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S. 526; Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U; S. 105; General Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Department of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149; Kelbro, Inc., v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64), the injunction was properly issued to require the defendants to remove the advertising device which they are maintaining.
The judgment of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.
Chief Judge Desmond and Judges Dye, Froessel, Van Voorhis, Burke and Foster concur.
Judgment affirmed.
. At the time this suit was instituted, the prohibited distance was 500 feet; it was later increased to 660 feet (L. 1960, eh. 904).
